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ABSTRACT 
Through a series of critical interventions in contemporary political thought, utilising 
the concept of liminality, this thesis points towards a Foucauldian ontology of the 
conditions necessary for social criticism. Beginning with a critical investigation of 
Foucault's archaeological and genealogical works (chapter one) the idea that 
Foucault's "analytic of the limit" provides sufficient grounding for a critical theory 
of society is challenged. While Foucault's approach contains many insights into the 
character of social relations it ultimately embodies a problematic transcendental 
conception of the present. It is argued that Foucault's early works require an 
"analytic of liminality" if this problem is to be avoided. Chapters two, three arid 
four serve the following functions: firstly, they explore the concept of liminality as a 
feature of (respectively) the present, the self and everyday speech acts; secondly, 
they are critical interrogations of non-Foucauldian accounts of social criticism -
from neo-Marxism and postmodernism, through communitarianism to critical 
theory; thirdly, they introduce a series of concepts that are sensitive to the 
"paradoxical" condition of liminality thereby suggesting the themes that a 
Foucauldian ontology of social criticism must endeavour to incorporate. In chapter 
five it is argued that Foucault's later works implicitly contain an analytic ofliminality 
that entails a non-transcendental account of the present. Integrating the later work 
into his earlier work, therefore, provides a greater theoretical understanding of 
Foucault's ontology of social criticism. It is concluded that Foucault (and 
poststructuralism in general) represents a distinctive and convincing voice in the 
debates concerning the character of social criticism. 
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PREFACE 
Engaging with the work of Michel Foucault, and with elements of contemporary 
French thought in general, raises problems regarding the nature and "style" of 
philosophical discourse. This is especially pertinent to the following work which 
seeks to juxtapose Foucault (and others) against current debates in the Anglo-
American and German traditions of social and political philosophy. These problems 
broadly fall into two camps. Firstly, it may be that the incommensurability of 
different philosophical traditions erects an unbreachable barrier to meaningful 
exchange and discussion. Secondly, there are problems regarding the relationship 
between literature and philosophy. Is it possible, for example, to demarcate 
literature and philosophy as intertwined but nonetheless distinct modes of writing? 
While it is not my intention to investigate these debates in full, it is necessary to map 
out how these problems are dealt with in the following work. 
On the problem of incommensurability, I shall present each philosophical tradition in 
the terminology and "context" that most adequately captures the richness of its 
approach. Although this may lead to abrupt changes of style at times, it is 
nonetheless justified by the insight that such juxtapositions can bring. For example, 
in chapter four, when exploring the relationship between Jurgen Habermas, John 
Searle and Gilles Deleuze on the importance of a "pragmatic" understanding of 
speech acts, it is prima facie possible to draw comparisons between their work. 
This is despite the very different styles each writer brings to the topic and the 
different philosophical traditions from which their particular discussions emerge. If 
such a comparison was to judge the thought of Searle as inadequate on the grounds 
that it was written in a very dry analytical style, this would be just as reprehensible 
as the thought of Deleuze being dismissed because it is presented in a style alien to 
most analytical thinkers. Therefore, my first point regarding the comparison of 
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different philosophical traditions 1S an appeal for equity m the name of a fair 
reading.l 
Requesting that each thinker be examined in the context of their tradition is not an 
excuse for lack of rigour. It is an attempt to portray the various approaches 
discussed in this thesis at their most rigorous and convincing. Moreover, the 
juxtaposition of different theoretical traditions is, as Foucault suggested, the very 
heart of philosophical activity: 
what is philosophy today - philosophical activity, I mean - if it is not 
the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it 
consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what extent it 
might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is 
already known? ... it is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its 
own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it. 2 
To question established hierarchies of thought it is necessary to bring differing 
traditions into contact with each other. It is to engage in a practice that has 
sustained philosophical thought since its inception, namely the examination of its 
own assumptions. This is my second point. 
Thirdly, there is no basis for a "plain", self-explanatory or transparent approach to 
philosophical issues. This does not preclude debate. It enlivens and informs 
discussion by way of the many nuances that each approach and tradition can bring 
to a given subject. In this way, I hope to show how a widening of the terms of 
traditional philosophical discourses - be it the introduction of "continental" thought 
to "Anglo-American" debates, or vice-versa - can create openings in political 
1 For one account of the ways in which Foucault, for example, has been unfairly read see Paul Bove's 
discussion of Charles Taylor's essay, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", Political Theory, vol. 12, May 
1984, pp152 - 83, in "The Foucault Phenomenon: the Problematics of Style", Foreword to Foucault, 
Gilles Deleuze, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988. 
2 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure trans. Robert Hurley, Penguin, London, 1985, p9. 
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philosophy rather than polemical stances that remain entrenched around issues of 
"style". 
It may be that the reader feels aggrieved at the prospect of the author refusing to 
translate issues into a unified style. This would, however, misinterpret the point 
being made. It is not that concessions are not given but that upon close 
examination concessions are (for the most part) not required. Furthermore, I would 
adhere to the formulation of Gillan and Lemert: 
Too much attention to the reader's interests in clarity and we become 
fools for having destroyed whatever is legitimately subtle in our 
subject. Too much commitment to the subject's complexity and we 
become foolish enthusiasts. Neither type of fool deserves to be read. 3 
Finally, in treating each philosophical tradition as equally valid and deserving of 
assessment on its own terms, it could be claimed that, far from facilitating 
communication and discussion between the competing styles, I am legitimating their 
separation. In maintaining the distinctiveness of each tradition the problem of 
reading across the traditions is ignored. However, the following chapters (in 
particular chapters three and four) demonstrate that it is possible to retain the 
distinctive voice of each tradition without jeopardising the "requirements" of 
philosophical discussion. The differences must be preserved but they are not as 
great as is sometimes imagined. 
Underlying many of these debates are problems regarding the relationship between 
literature and philosophy. It may be contended that, whatever literary merits the 
writings of Foucault, Deleuze and others may contain as fictional expressions of the 
human condition, they do not fulfil the requirements of truth necessary for 
3 Garth Gillan and Charles C. Lemert, Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1982, pviii. 
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philosophical writing. Increasingly, a similar charge has been mobilised in the other 
direction. Many postmodern writers have come to view any attempt at 
systematisation or logical coherence as ipso facto repressive of "difference" and 
exclusionary. The only remaining approach to "reality", it may be argued, is the 
open engagement of the writer with the literary tropes and forms embedded in the 
many "texts" that constitute our lives. 
On these debates much has been written. 4 My own intuition, apparent in the 
chapters below, is that there is no need for philosophy to exclude literature or vice 
versa. Certainly this is no more than an intuition, but where I have felt that a 
particular point can be more adequately conveyed by reference to "literary 
techniques" I have done so. As with the problem of incommensurable philosophical 
traditions, I tend towards working "inside" the frontiers between literature and 
philosophy. Indeed, the aim of getting "inside" all sorts of frontiers and thresholds 
is the dominant theme of this thesis. 
4 Useful works include: J. Habermas, "Philosophy and Science as Literature?", Postmetaphysical 
Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. W.H. Hohengarten, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992; R. Rorty, 
"Philosophy as a kind of writing", The Consequences of Pragmatism, Harvester, Brighton, 1982; J. 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976. This is, of course, only 
a selection of a vast area of debate. 
V. a little like 
going to and fro 
till in the end 
close of a long day 
to herself 
whom else 
time she stopped 
going to and fro 
time she stopped 
time she stopped 
W. Morel 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps there exists in speech an essential affinity between death, 
endless striving, and the self-representation of language ... from the day 
that men began to speak toward death and against it, in order to 
imprison it, something was born, a murmuring which repeats, recounts 
and redoubles itself endlessly, which has undergone a process of 
amplification and thickening, in which our language is embedded 
today2 
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This thesis did not originate with a hypothesis to be proven or disputed; nor is it an 
overview of debates concerning a particular topic; nor a textual exegesis of one or 
more authors; nor an analytical dissection of certain themes; though it is, to varying 
degrees, all of these. I shall look at each in turn. 
Chapters one and five begin with a hypothesis; Michel Foucault is a thinker of the 
limit not the liminal. Throughout the thesis I shall consider the efficacy of this 
statement as a starting point as well as its usefulness as an end point (that is, the 
extent to which it suggests other questions and hypotheses). In particular, the first 
1 Samuel Beckett, "Rockaby", The Collected Shorter Plays , Faber and Faber, London, 1990, p276. I 
am grateful to Anna Cutler for drawing my attention to this quote. 
2 Foucault, "Language to Infinity", Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essavs and 
Interviews bv Michel Foucault, D.F. Bouchard (ed), Cornell University Press, New York, 1977, p55. 
See also "What is an Author?", The Foucault Reader P. Rabinow (ed), Penguin, London, 1984, p1l9 
for a similar, but less nihilistic, account of the relationship between discourse and "murmuring". 
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and last chapters are concerned with a critical exposition of Foucault's major works 
in the hope of revealing the merit of thinking about his project in the terms set out 
in this initial statement. Chapter one develops the hypothesis as a source for a 
critical appreciation of his earlier (archaeological! genealogical) work, while chapter 
five seeks to excavate the role of liminality in his later (ethical) writings - the 
relationship between these different theoretical strategies is explored in the relevant 
chapters. It is argued that the concept of liminality provides insight into the 
theoretical assumptions that propelled his approach to social criticism. Before 
going on, it is necessary to situate this discussion in the broader perspective of 
current debates. 
Recent debates in contemporary political philosophy have focused on ways of 
avoiding the problems of traditional political theory, with its ethnocentric and 
patriarchal essentialisms, while simultaneously seeking to maintain a distance from 
the disabling relativism of postmodern philosophy. From the idea of complex 
equality to the conception of justice as political not metaphysical, from calls for 
radical democracy to the analysis of communicatively structured ethics, from 
hermeneutic accounts of community to feminist perspectives on power and 
knowledge (and much more besides) contemporary debates in political philosophy 
are brought to life by the attempt to find the elusive space between traditional 
theory and postmodernism. In this arena, the "weak" foundations upon which to 
ground an adequate conception of social criticism can be found - foundations, that 
is, that give due regard to notions of "difference". It is this slippery terrain that I 
shall explore and attempt to occupy. This is not to say that all the possible positions 
within contemporary thought are exhaustively discussed. Most notably, the work of 
Rawls and contemporary feminist writers are left unexamined. These are 
undoubtedly major omissions but practicalities demand that such decisions are 
made. I do not wish to suggest that contemporary liberals or the many feminist 
insights into contemporary social and political thought have nothing to contribute to 
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the debates, only that to incorporate such writings would require a much larger 
piece of work. However, I do hope to have conveyed a sense of the range of 
contemporary debates by including sections on Jameson (neo-Marxism), Baudrillard 
(postmodernism), Taylor, Ricoeur and Nancy (communitarianismlhermeneutics), 
Habermas (critical theory), Searle (analytical thought) and Foucault and Deleuze 
(poststructuralism).3 In this way, some of the key problems in delineating the space 
between traditional and postmodern theory can be ascertained. 
This entails a further point. In pursuing this wide range of thinkers I am not 
suggesting that the following work in any way constitutes a rigorous examination of 
every aspect of each theorist; it is not a thoroughgoing textual exegesis and critique 
of each of these thinkers. Apart from being pragmatically impossible in a work of 
this size, it is not my aim to produce some grand synthesis that incorporates the 
traditions of political thought I have mentioned. Rather, I hope to provide some 
pointers regarding a more fruitful interaction between the thinkers that are 
examined, in a way that seeks to get beyond the superficial posturing that has 
tended to plague debates between these various traditions. Of course, eschewing 
any attempt to embrace every aspect of this diverse range of thinkers is not an 
excuse for a lazy reading of the texts involved. The selection of authors (and 
themes within these authors) is open to question in the "traditional" sense, as are the 
interpretations put on the themes that are extracted from their work. I am not 
attempting to side-step the issue of whether or not I have represented the theorists 
fairly. 
It is not enough, though, to assemble this diverse range of authors in the name of 
debates concerning foundations for social criticism. The field of vision must be 
narrowed and this is achieved by focusing the debate around the concept of 
3 I realise that almost all of these bracketed terms are contentious but as part of a general introduction 
they serve to indicate the variety of approaches examined below. 
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liminality. It is worth spending some time explaining the history of this concept, my 
reasons for using it and possible problems that it presents. The history of the term 
"liminal" is drawn primarily from the discourses surrounding anthropology and 
sociology. In 1908 van Gennep published his seminal work on rituals of passage, 
Rites de Passage,4 in which he outlined the different stages involved in rites of 
transition; for example, the transition from childhood to adulthood, from woman to 
mother, from elder to ancestor and so on. He defined the idea of rites of passage as 
"rites which accompany every change of place, state, social position and age". 
Moreover, each period of transition contained three different phases; the first phase 
of separation in which the individual or group are removed from the existing social 
structure; the second phase of marginality (or limen) which is characterised by the 
paradoxical position of the individual or group in relation to the preceding and 
forthcoming social structure; and the third stage of aggregation during which the 
passage is retrieved and consummated in the new social setting. Indeed, for van 
Gennep, and other early proponents of the idea,5 this concept was not only useful as 
a tool for understanding the processes involved in life-changes (like those 
mentioned above), it was also pertinent when examining, "any change from one 
state to another. "6 
It was Victor Turner, however, who gave the idea of rites of passage its most 
thorough examination, and in particular he concentrated upon the liminal phase of 
the period of transition. 7 For Turner, transition as a whole (exemplified by the 
4 Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, trans. M.B. Vizedom and G.L. Caffee, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1960, originally published in 1908. 
5 For example, Henri Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe Volumes 1 and 2, David Nutt, 
London, 1912; particularly p74. 
6 V. Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage", The Forest of Symbols, 
Cornell University Press, New York, 1967, p95. 
7 See V. Turner, On the edge ofthe Bush: Anthropology as Experience, E. Turner (ed), University of 
Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985, p7, where Turner attributes his interest in van Gennep to reading Rites 
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liminal phase of that transition) was "a process, a becoming, and in the case of rites 
de passage even a transformation". He goes on to suggest that we think of the 
process of transition as analogous to water becoming vapour or a grub becoming a 
moth - that is, as a qualitative change of state. He has, therefore, a strong sense of 
the very real changes that occur at times of transition and how these changes 
involve major reconceptualisations of the initial categories by which a person or 
group describe their identity. Furthermore, the "liminal persona" (the person or 
group going through the transition) is considered "structurally invisible" - "they are 
at once no longer classified and not yet classified". 8 It is this paradoxical position 
that is diagrammatic of the liminal phase (and processes of transition as a whole). 
Turner views the liminal as "a realm of pure possibility whence novel configuratiOlls 
of ideas and relations may arise"; an arena where "we are not dealing with structural 
contradictions ... but with the essentially unstructured (which is at once de structured 
and prestructured)" and that it is a time often associated with "the unbounded, the 
infinite, the limitless. "9 
Turner was not content to develop this analysis in the field of (traditionally defined) 
anthropological research. In his later work, he addressed the possibility that 
liminality functioned in many areas of social life and at many levels. In his lecture 
"Liminality and Morality"10 he considered the usefulness of a liminal approach to 
periods of historical transition; periods "when the past has lost its grip and the 
future has not yet taken definite shape. "11 Such times are those which problematise 
de Passage while engaged on his own transition with his wife Edith as they set sail from England to 
America. 
8 Turner, "Betwixt and Between", p96. 
9 Turner, "Betwixt and Between", pp97-98. 
10 Turner, "Liminality and Morality", Firestone Lecture, delivered at the University of Southern 
California, quoted in Barbara Myerhoff, "Rites of Passage: Process and Paradox", Celebration, Victor 
Turner (ed), Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1982, pp109-135. 
11 Quoted in Myerhoff, "Rites of Passage: Process and Paradox", pll7. 
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the existing moral and social structures, not from the position of another moral 
code, but from the process of transition itself. As in the liminal phase of rites of 
initiation, the liminal phase in general creates a time for playful imagination and 
creativity that can instil critical perspectives and attitudes. It is, though, also a time 
of possible alienation and lack of self-definition. Therefore, the insight that may 
accompany the "unbounded" and "unstructured" position may be gained at the cost 
of profoundly unsettling experiences. As Myerhoff puts it, however, the central 
feature of periods ofliminality is that "criticism and awareness are almost inevitable 
in liminal circumstances." 12 It is this aspect of liminality that I shall try to explore 
below in a F oucauldian context. As a preliminary to this I shall briefly outline the 
background to my introduction of the concept of liminality into the literature 
surrounding Foucault's writings. 
It is a commonplace among commentators on Foucault's work that his thought is 
aimed at provoking a "limit-attitude" towards discursive categories and institutional 
formations. 13 It is argued that Foucault's major insight was his recognition of the 
need for a philosophico-historical project that traced the formation of systems of 
thought in a way that displayed the outer reaches, the edges or limits of these 
systems. One may draw a comparison with Thomas Kuhn's analysis of scientific 
paradigms. 14 As with Kuhn, Foucault's project is aimed at revealing the 
contingencies that enabled discursive patterns to form, contingencies later masked 
under progressivist categories of discursive self-definition. It is important to 
remember, nonetheless, that the different areas of study, the natural as opposed to 
12 Myerhoff, "Rites of Passage: Process and Paradox", p 117. 
13 Although there are numerous examples of this interpretation, of particular interest are: Clare 
O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?, Macmillan, London, 1989, and Charles C. Lemert and 
Garth Gillan, Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression. 
14 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. For 
discussion of the issues involved in making this comparison see, H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1982 
pp69-70 and pp76-78; and D. Wood, Philosophy at the Limit, Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp17-l8. 
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the social sciences, makes for different emphases and attitudes in their accounts of 
knowledge formation. 15 
Foucault's project, the argument continues, is aimed at undermining these hidden 
structures by pushing our thought to the very limits of possible understanding. 
Transgressing those limits exposes our preconceptions revealing the structures that 
underpin different forms of knowledge and power. Madness and Civilisation,16 for 
example, reveals the intimate relation between the incursion of rationality into the 
public sphere and the exclusion of certain categories of people as "mad", that is, not 
fit for rational thought. Exposing these categories and means of exclusion helps to 
foster a critical understanding of the relationship between the promotion of 
rationality and the constitution of madness as irrationality. The "renewed rites of 
purification and reason"17 that would come to create the "great confinement" of the 
mad demonstrates the close and unambiguous links between the formation of an age 
of reason and the alienation of large sections of society from that process -
alienation, that is, in terms of confinement, medicalisation, normalisation etc. This 
revelation invites us to transgress the limits of our thought and to gaze beyond the 
confines of our "normal" conceptual structures. It asks us to consider the character 
of the relation between reason and madness as one that is not wholly reasonable. In 
this way Foucault's project can be viewed as expressing a limit-attitude which 
constantly strives to undermine our common assumptions; it is a project that forces 
the transgression of our boundaries of thought. 18 
15 This point is stressed by Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, p76. 
16 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, Routledge, London, 1992. 
17 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p3. 
18 It is at this point that the difference with the Frankfurt School becomes most obvious. Foucault, on 
this account, proposes a method that tries to subvert Enlightenment reason whereas the Frankfurt 
theorists are typically involved in trying to "reconstruct" reason; "to salvage the wreck of the 
Enlightenment" (I am grateful to Shane O'Niell for this evocative way of putting it). 
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It is my contention that this interpretation of the Foucauldian project is more useful 
as a starting point than as an end point; it is a place to begin critical discussion of his 
work not a way of summing it up. Rather than simply accepting that Foucault's 
thought encapsulates an "analytic of the limit" we must try and find an approach to 
his work that looks beyond this reading. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is important that the critical discourse around Foucault does not become too 
complacent or too readily subsumed in its own terms of reference. This is the only 
way of avoiding the reification of the author that Foucault so despised. 19 Secondly, 
it is important for scholarship inspired by Foucault's work that the charges levelled 
against his thought by critical theorists20 are met. Critics of Foucault have argued 
that as a theorist of the limit he offers no way of conceptualising a normative 
grounding for social criticism. This means, they continue, that his thought boils 
down to a brand of nihilism with "neo-conservative" political consequences. These 
charges must be rebuffed if the "empirical insights" of his work are not to be 
subsumed in the "weak" foundationalism of neo-Kantian perspectives. This 
assumes, of course, that Foucault offers a novel perspective on the nature of social 
criticism that is occluded by the neo-Kantian approach. One aim of the following 
chapters is to demonstrate this to be the case. 
To this end, I propose to examine the idea of the limit-attitude from the perspective 
of the transition implicit in crossing limits, that is, from the perspective of the 
19 See, for example, the interview "The Masked Philosopher", Michel Foucault: Politics. Philosophy, 
Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, L. Kritzman (ed), trans. A. Sheridan and others, 
Routledge, London, 1990, pp323-330. The irony of refusing to foreclose interpretations of the 
author's work on the author's wishes is noted. 
20 I take the Critical Theory inspired objections to be, J. Habermas, T. McCarthy, S. White (see 
bibliography). While these critics offer an array of perceptive insights into Foucault's work, I shall 
examine what I take to be the major argument against his work: that is, that he offers no normative 
grounding for critique and is therefore a form of "neo-conservative". Throughout the thesis I shall 
look in more detail at the possibility of social criticism from a Foucauldian perspective. In this way 
the charge of "neo-conservativism" is reformulated within the terms of Foucault's project rather than 
as a response to the charges of the Critical Theorists. 
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liminal. 21 It is erroneous to assume that in crossing the boundaries of our thought 
Foucault's genealogies present a self-evident critique of social norms. As hinted at 
above, this is highly problematic given that we are left with very little in the way of 
a grounding for social criticism. Importantly, though, this does not entail that we 
return to the weak normativism of neo-Kantianism. Rather, there is a way of 
conceiving of the philosophical grounds for criticism that is in keeping with the 
poststructuralist critique of Enlightenment thought. My accent to this debate is to 
introduce the concept of liminality. Typically, Foucault's critical attitude is 
envisaged as a transgression of the limits of our thought, of going beyond them into 
some unspecified arena. Yet, it is more fruitful to place the emphasis on' the 
actuality of transition as a critical force, on moving through the limits into the zone 
of liminality where categories are disrupted and yet to be defined. This is the 
difference between the "lightning transgression" of limits, which I take to be an 
uninformative idea of the act of surpassing conceptual boundaries, and liminality, 
which captures the paradoxes of transgression, the paradoxes inherent in critically 
examining social relations. 22 
21 At this point it is worth mentioning that the idea of the liminal is not wholly foreign to Foucault's 
work. As early as Madness and Civilization, pll, the idea ofliminality is mentioned in relation to his 
discussion of the "ship of fools". However, this is quite a different matter from a reconceptualisation 
of his project via the concept of the liminal. 
22 There is a potential problem with the terminology that I employ throughout the discussion. Terms 
such as "transition", "transgression", "becoming", "virtuality" and "liminality", while they are not 
synonyms, are used, more or less, interchangeably. However, the crucial factor is the context in 
which they appear. At times, the notion of "transgression", for example, will refer to the "lightning 
transgression" mentioned above, that is, as a concept to be criticised. In the last chapter, Foucault's 
notion of "transgression" is employed differently to suggest the "inside", or liminal moment, of 
transgression. Indeed, one aim of this project is to establish that, while Foucault talked of 
"transgression" (and related terms) throughout his work, the view he had of this concept changed as 
his theoretical approach changed. The meaning assigned to particular terms should be clear from the 
context of the discussion. 
My reasons for stressing the concept of liminality will hopefully become clear. Briefly, I 
favour this term as the one that most adequately expresses the paradoxical character of transition and 
the different levels on which transition/transgression operates. It is also a term that is not loaded with 
too many philosophical preconceptions and, therefore, it enables the following reading of Foucault to 
maintain a certain critical distance from the vast secondary literature surrounding his thought. 
Further elaboration of the idea of liminality is given at the start of chapter five. 
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This approach to Foucault presupposes that I do not adhere to the position that 
poststructuralist thought functions as a critique of all foundations in philosophy and 
politics. It is not constructive to polarise the debates between criticaVliberal theory 
and poststructuralism around the foundationalism-antifoundationalism debate. To 
do so is to occlude the very real points of contact, the shared historical 
understandings and common origins, that can be found between these traditions. 
Moreover, by characterising poststructuralism as a critique of all foundations, many 
of its proponents are playing into the hands of its detractors by offering a vague and 
unresolvable 'Other' to the dominant philosophical tradition. 
The worth of pursuing a poststructuralist conception of social criticism, therefore, is 
not to be found in abandoning the idea of foundations altogether. On the contrary, 
in excavating a counter-tradition to the Enlightenment conception of what 
constitutes a foundation, poststructuralist thought proposes an alternative account 
of social criticism.23 The challenge of poststructuralism lies not in its rejection of all 
philosophical foundations but more particularly in the rejection of the Hegelian 
dialectic (including Marxist versions of it) and the phenomenological-existential 
conception of the sovereignty of an immutable subjectivity.24 Putting it in these 
terms may be construed as emphasising the banal. Certainly, it is not enough to 
characterise the difference between poststructuralism and critical theory. Yet, the 
importance of poststructuralism is in the way that it pursues these 
dialecticaVphenomenological foundations ruthlessly. Poststructuralism aims to 
purge thought of all "microfascisms"; to find and expose all traces of dialecticism 
and to unmask the immutable subject wherever it resides. Waving the postmodern 
flag of "Otherness" - as if that was all that was required - is an empty gesture. To 
23 A similar point is made by M. Hardt Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, VeL Press, 
London, 1993, ppix-x. 
24 One of the best sources of Foucault's account of his relationship to Hegel, Marx, Merleau-Ponty and 
Sartre among others is Remarks on Marx, Semiotext(e), New York, 1991. 
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find an alternative foundation for social criticism, one that draws upon the margins 
of the Enlightenment, is to offer a real challenge to the different aspects of the 
dominant tradition. 
A brief examination of poststructuralism as a reaction to these two dominant 
traditions of French thought in the early twentieth century can clarify this position. 
The pervasiveness of Hegelianism in France was largely due to the work of Kojeve. 
His interpretation of Hegel caught the mood of the time in that it provided an 
intellectual response to the events of the Bolshevik revolution and Lenin's claim that 
an understanding of Hegel was imperative for a greater understanding of 
Marxism. 25 The embrace of Hegelianism through its propagation by Kojeve became 
so widespread that, as Descombes suggests, it became the focus for "the desire for a 
common language" in French philosophy of the period. 26 Alongside this stream of 
thought, and to some extent intertwined with it, the phenomenological/existential 
approach to subjectivity flourished with the work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.27 
The desire to reinvigorate the experience of subjectivity over the abstract Cartesian 
cogito became the guiding principle of this approach. Yet, it also became the mill-
stone around its neck. In simply reversing the Cartesian formulation, prioritising 
the "I am" over the "I think" it remained firmly in the tradition of thought developed 
since Descartes. The subject was still absolute.28 In response to these two 
convergent traditions there arose another way of conceiving of history and 
subjectivity, but a way that itself depended upon two 'minor' strains in French 
philosophy. 
25 See V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophv, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 
pp9-l0. 
26 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p 11. 
27 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp48-74. 
28 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p69. 
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As a way of thinking through the problem of progressivism in history, encapsulated 
in the dialectic, it became necessary (for Foucault in particular) to tum to the works 
of "Cavailles, Koyre, Bachelard and Canguilhem". Their emphasis on discontinuity 
instigated the need to interrogate the relation between "the positivity of the sciences 
and the radicality of philosophy". 29 Thus Foucault came to be interested in the 
history of "truthful discourse" - the ways in which truth functions in specific 
domains of inquiry. This preoccupation would continue throughout his works 
(admittedly, in various forms) guided by the belief that the study of the formation of 
concepts allows for a critical theoretical position to be constructed without the 
baggage of Hegelianism. 30 He also found in Canguilhem a way of reconceptualising 
the subject as conceived by Phenomenology.31 Yet, the most telling aspect of his 
reaction against the subject-centred approach of the dominant tradition was his 
reading of another minor line of French thought; the line through Nietzsche to 
Bataille and Blanchot. Foucault explained the relations as follows; 
What did one find instead [of the dominant tradition] in Nietzsche? The 
idea of discontinuity, the announcement of a "superman" who could 
surpass "man". And then in Bataille, the theme of the limit-experiences in 
which the subject reaches decomposition, leaves itself, at the limits of its 
own impossibility. All that had an essential value for me. It was the way 
out, the chance to free myself from certain traditional philosophical 
binds. 32 
In this way we can see that, for Foucault at least, the coming together of two minor 
traditions in French intellectual life enabled him to free his thought from the 
philosophical atmosphere of the time. It was not the rejection of all philosophical 
foundationalism that motivated his work. It was the attempt to find foundations 
29Foucault, "Introduction" to G. Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans. C.R. Fawcett 
in collaboration with R.S. Cohen, Zone Books, New York, 1991, pll. 
30 Foucault, "Introduction", The Normal and the Pathological p16. 
31 Foucault, "Introduction", The Normal and the Pathological p20. 
32Foucault, Remarks on Marx, p48. 
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that did not entail the problematic assumptions of dialectical and subject-centred 
philosophies. As Hardt has put it, poststructuralism rests on "the affirmation of 
alternative lineage's from within the tradition itself' .33 He continues; 
Post-structuralism does critique a certain notion of foundation, but only to 
affirm a more adequate one to its ends. Against a transcendental 
foundation we find an immanent one; against a given teleological 
foundation we find a material, open one. 34 
Liminality is one way of conceptualising the character of this alternative approach 
to foundations in Foucault's thought. 35 Interpreting Foucault through the concept 
of liminality suggests a Foucauldian ontology of the immanence of social criticism. 
Putting it another way, the concept of liminality serves to explicate a non-
transcendental and non-teleological Foucauldian conception of social criticism. It is 
this idea that is explored throughout the following chapters. 
In chapter one, Foucault's attempts at providing an archaeology of the human 
sciences and a genealogy of regimes of power, while highly insightful, are shown to 
be ultimately defeated by the "analytic of finitude" that he sought to overcome. 
Although his "history of the present" functions as a way of going beyond the 
limitations of his archaeological approach it too becomes enmeshed in the finality of 
its own limits. In other words, the present becomes the transcendental foundation 
of his genealogy. This has the consequence of disabling an active critical present; a 
present as limitless, a present as boundless, a liminal present. 
33 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze, px. 
34 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze, pxv. 
35 It is important to clarify that I do not hold the introduction of the concept ofliminality to be the last 
piece in the jigsaw puzzle. Rather I think of it as one way of enlivening the debates, a way that is 
perhaps more amenable to the process of dialogue between the various philosophical schools than one 
drawn exclusively from the French tradition. 
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In chapter two, the idea of a liminal non-transcendental present is explored via the 
thought of Jameson and Baudrillard. Their work, moreover, is brought into a 
critical perspective through Henri Bergson's method of intuition philosophique. It 
is argued that despite the superficial differences regarding the conceptions of the 
present offered by Jameson and Baudrillard, the ideas they proffer of the present -
as ultimately recuperab1e through a Marxist narrative or wholly dispersed in a 
synchronic hyperrea1ity - rest upon similar transcendental assumptions. Broadly 
speaking, and without pre-empting the fuller discussion, we can think of their 
approaches as being mirror-images of each other. It is further argued that 
Bergson's thought embodies the conceptual tools necessary for the investigation of 
a non-transcendental liminal present. However, there are other philosophical 
projects that also aim to avoid the transcendentalism of Marxism and 
postmodernism. In chapter three I examine the communitarian-hermeneutic 
alternative via the work of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur. 
So as not to repeat the argument of chapter two, however, the focus is on the 
relation between narrative identity and the self proposed by Taylor and Ricoeur. 
This has two advantages. Firstly, I hope to prefigure the charge that in criticising 
Marxism and postmodernism I was not engaging with the most productive aspects 
of contemporary political theory. The more subtle rendering of the importance of 
narrative in our everyday lives given by Taylor and Ricoeur allows for a further 
narrowing of the critical space that I hope to occupy. Secondly, in bringing the idea 
of 1imina1ity into the discussion on identity and the self it is possible to convey a 
further aspect of the usefulness of this concept as a critical tool. Limina1ity, in other 
words, helps to direct our attention to the dangerous universalism implicit in even 
the most well intentioned of hermeneutic positions. Lastly, an approach to the self 
that is sensitive to moments of 1imina1ity is suggested in the work of Jean-Luc 
Nancy, particularly his idea of the "ipseity of presence". 
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In chapter four, I pursue the possibility that the idea of the liminal can be made 
redundant as a critical concept to the extent that it can be subsumed by a pragmatic 
analysis of speech acts. My principal concern here is to rise to the challenge of 
Habermas's "reconstructive" theory of communicative action. As a way of 
advancing this investigation Habermas's relation to Searle is scrutinised. It will be 
argued that the "immanent transience" of communication (implied by a liminal 
present) suggests the need for a pragmatic understanding of everyday speech which 
rejects both intersubjective and intentional accounts. The "collective pragmatics" of 
Deleuze and Guattari, while preserving the insights of the Habermasian account, 
fulfil this role. 
The various threads of the argument are reassembled through a return to Foucault 
in chapter five. It is argued that Foucault's later works contain an implicit 
recognition of the importance of liminality and a liminal conception of the present. 
In other words, Foucault's "ethical project" contains a reinvigorated conception of 
"transgression" that enables his theoretical approach to avoid transcendentalism and 
reach "inside" the present. Thus, contrary to the majority of interpretations which 
focus on Foucault's ethical commitment as an end in itself, I argue that it is most 
fruitfully assessed as a novel reading of his "limit-attitude" to social formations. In 
this respect the liminal becomes a fourth aspect of Foucault's thought (knowledge, 
power and subjectivity being the others). Yet it is not an aspect that completes his 
project. On the contrary, it clears a path for further consideration of the nature of 
social criticism in Foucault's work. 
The conclusion summarises the analysis in two ways. First, there is a review of a 
selection of the secondary literature on Foucault's work and its bearing on the 
interpretation presented throughout the thesis. Secondly, five different models of 
social criticism are summarised and a case put forward for the recognition of 
poststructuralism as a distinctive voice in these debates. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LIMITS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 
Introduction 
Michel Foucault is a philosopher of the limit not the limina1. l 
This gesture to concision, this hypothesis, designer label or slogan, is created in 
order that it may show, immediately, its shortcomings and failings. Its inadequacies 
are "up-front", in full view of any critical gaze that may fall upon it. Moreover, It is 
these inadequacies that open up the area of analysis. In the tensions of this slogan' -
all slogans have tensions - the questions that shall preoccupy this work are 
constantly reiterated: what does it mean to say that Foucault is a philosopher of the 
limit? what is liminality? what place, if any, does the liminal occupy in Foucault's 
work? what difference does it make to Foucault's critical endeavour to emphasise 
liminality over limits? and so on. And such is the need of the slogan; to allow its 
own dissolution and dismemberment while the trace of its inscription is a memory, 
faint yet empowered. 
Foucault's archaeological/genealogical works skirt the boundaries of our 
vocabularies, the limits of our gaze and relations. He invites us to view with him 
the taut lines of stress that become visible as the centre (be it the dominant code, 
discursive practice or concentrations of power) contracts in defensive rigor or 
moves to incorporate "others". This is "the limit-attitude"; the pull to the edge and 
the surge of vertigo that challenges us to see, not to show in an act of "proof', the 
relations interiorised within and through the norm. This is the limit-attitude; the 
I In "A Preface to Transgression", Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews bv Michel Foucault p33, Foucault declares that the illumination of "the language of 
transgression .. .1ies almost entirely in the future". By introducing the idea of the liminal (through 
Foucault's language of transgression) perhaps the process of illumination can be furthered. 
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scrutiny of the breakdown of intensities at the points of greatest weakness in order 
that the "workings" of the central mass may be discerned. It is a critical attitude 
that questions the core notions of our thought from a position of distance from that 
core. Yet the view from the limit is not Archimedean, it is not a fixed point of pure 
gaze and correlative pure judgement; it is a view from many points, indeed from 
many movements, where judgement is "fictionalised".2 
But it is not simply this. We must know and recognise the limits, a recognition 
captured in the movement across these limits. This is the thought of the limit; the 
actualisation of "transgression" as the act of defining the frontier. 3 It is being able 
to know the limits only once they are past. Recognising that the movement beyond 
boundaries is not a step into a void or vacuum, Foucault suggests that crossing the 
limits of thought is to feel thought once more in relations of attraction and 
repulsion, similarity and difference, recognition and exclusion. The limit, therefore, 
is defined in the immediate instance of its transgression in thought, "the flash of its 
passage"4, and then it is lost in the need to define afresh new limits relative to new 
systems of relations. Yet the memory of the limit must persist in the act of 
transgression. This is the thought of the limit; the will to make this paradox work; 
to transgress in a "lightning movement" the limits of thought. 5 
This is inadequate, but in time the limits, evident precisely in thought's "lightning 
transgression" of them, confront our thought and its centripetal preoccupations and 
2 For example, Foucault, PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, 
Colin Gordon (ed), trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, K. Soper, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
London, 1980,p193. 
3 Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression", p33-35. In chapter five I shall examine the way 
"transgression" is used by Foucault in his essay, "What is Enlightenment?", The Foucault Reader. 
4 Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression", p33. 
5 C. O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher? p32, captures Foucault's thought well with this 
phrase, which she takes from Foucault's "A Preface to Transgression", p35, where he talks of 
crossing the limit as "a flash oflightning in the night". 
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tendencies. 6 In history, Foucault discerns the movements that have brought limits 
into being, be they the limits of medicine, punishment, sexuality or reason itself, and 
he tempts us to engage in a to-and-fro across these limits - to view the self-defining 
and other-defining techniques of these practices, while simultaneously traversing 
the limits of our relationship with these events. Our history, as a "history of the 
present", is one that is thoroughly imbued with relations to the limits of thought, it 
is thoroughly imbued with power relations. This is the limit-attitude thinking the 
thought oj its own limits. It is the trajectory of this movement towards 
transcendence that is explored throughout this chapter. 
Using Foucault 
Foucault's famous rebuke, "do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain 
the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in 
order",7 makes coherent commentary difficult if not impossible. And this is 
precisely the point. For Foucault, authorship is a mechanism that is often drawn 
upon to hide and obscure the uncertainties and paradoxes that exist within any text 
or body of work. In the essay "What is an Author?" Foucault states; "the author 
is ... the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the 
proliferation of meaning" .8 The escape routes from the world of a particular text to 
the "outside" of that text are closed off, suggests Foucault, by the assertion that the 
textual "world" corresponds wholly to the imaginative "world" of the author. In 
other words, the author has come to represent the sole arbiter of "correct" 
6 And yet it is the time of transgression that seems missing from Foucault's thought, the 
transgression of limits being a "harrowing and poised singularity", "A Preface to Transgression", 
p35. It is this tension in Foucault's thought that I shall explore in more detail throughout this 
chapter asking how the time required for transgression, the time of liminality, can be thought of in 
a way that empowers his analysis of limit-experiences. This will become clearer as the argument 
unfolds below. 
7 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Routledge, London, 1991, p17. 
8 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, pl19. 
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interpretations regarding the text. This is the limiting effect of the author; the claim 
to complete control of the text through the subjection of the text to the projected 
coherence of the author's intentions. Although Foucault recognised that authorial 
projections of coherence may lead to "the creation of discourses" he added that "it 
is very likely impossible to account for their positive and multiplicatory role if we 
do not take into consideration their restrictive and constraining function. "9 
It was Foucault's aim to write in such a way that it minimised the limiting effects of 
his authorship. He sought to multiply the escape routes from his texts and to 
diversify the number of possible readings of his work. Foucault was constantly 
driven by the desire to "think otherwise": 
There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think 
differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, IS 
necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. 10 
In the active disavowal of the limiting effect of authorship writing can function as 
an intersection; a coming together, not that things may fall into place, but rather 
that they may part, suggesting new openings and approaches. Foucault writes from 
many intersections. His works would never pretend to be the last word on a 
subject. Talking of The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Foucault could be 
referring to any of his major works: 
This book does not have the function of a proof. It exists as a sort of 
prelude, to explore the keyboard, sketch out the themes and see how 
people react, what will be criticised, what will be misunderstood, and 
what will cause resentment. 11 
9 Foucault, "The Discourse on Language", his inaugural lecture to the College de France, given 2 
December 1970, printed as an appendix to the American edition of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, trans. A. Sheridan, Pantheon, New York, 1972. 
10 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pS. 
11 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p193. 
Or again in more general terms: 
What I say ought to be taken as "propositions" or "game openings" where 
those who may be interested are invited to join in; they are not meant as 
dogmatic assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc. 12 
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This approach does require a certain attitude. It requires an attitude that revels in 
not knowing the direction an analysis will take in advance. It seeks to open the 
"labyrinth" of possibilities inherent in all analysis and that uses such multiple options 
as a creative force to be encouraged rather than a problem to be overcome:· "to 
those ... for whom to work in the midst of uncertainty and apprehension IS 
tantamount to failure, all I can say is that we are clearly not from the same 
planet. "13 In short, Foucault's investigations constitute historical and philosophical 
gambits. His approach owes a large debt to his reading of Roussel. 14 In Roussel, 
Foucault found a writer who conjured new forms and statements out of the "already 
said" of everyday discourse. Foucault saw in Roussel's experiments on writing the 
means "to say other things with the same words, to give to the same words another 
meaning" .15 Foucault's own writing was constantly striving to outdo itself. It is as 
if he threw concepts into the air to watch them shatter and form new patterns upon 
landing. 
For Foucault, writing and the processes that constitute analysis ought to be non-
linear. Linearity is characterised by the attempts of philosophers to derive pure first 
12 Foucault, "Questions of Method: An Interview With Michel Foucault", After Philosophy: End 
or Transformation?, K. Baynes, 1. Bohman and T. McCarthy (eds), MIT Press, London, 1989, 
plOl. 
13 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p7. 
14 Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, trans. Charles Raus, 
Athlone Press, London, 1987. 
15 Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, p96. 
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principles of thought from which they construct, layer upon layer, a self-contained 
explanatory system for the phenomena in question. For example, the search for the 
fundamental truths of humanity, the essential and universal features that are hidden 
to all but those with insight into the depths of human nature. It is "traditional 
philosophy" - the philosophy of humanism, or of revealed essences and movements -
yet it is also the realm of the hermeneuticist as the philosopher who discerns hidden 
meanings and origins. Such an approach, Foucault claims, is now "obsolete" .16 
Referring to his own "genealogical" method as an alternative Foucault suggests; 
Whereas the interpreter is obliged to go to the depth of things, like an 
excavator, the moment of interpretation (genealogy) is like an 
overview ... which allows the depth to be laid out in front of him in a more 
and more profound visibility; depth is resituated as an absolutely 
superficial secret .17 
I shall return to the nature of the genealogical approach later. For the moment I 
wish to make the straight-forward point, following Blanchot, of "how distasteful he 
[Foucault] found the notion of depth"18 - depth in the sense of an underlying series 
of logical connections that relates universal principles to particular situations. For 
Foucault, the search for a prime mover or fundamental principle is "an endless 
task"19 and by implication a futile one: 
if interpretation is a never ending task, it is simply because there is nothing 
to interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret because, 
16 Foucault, "Foucault Responds to Sartre", Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966-84), trans. 1. 
Johnstone, S. Lotringer (ed), Semiotext(e), New York, 1989, pp35-39. 
17 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pl07. 
18 M. Blanchot, "Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him", FoucaultIBlanchot, Zone, New York, 1990, 
p67. 
19 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. A. M. 
Sheridan, Routledge, London, 1991, pxvi. 
when all is said and done, underneath it all everything IS already 
interpretation.2o 
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In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault likens the search for philosophical truth to the 
search for religious truth. Foucault equates the search for the deep truths of man to 
the search for "the word of God" suggesting that "for centuries we have waited in 
vain for the decision of the word. "21 In place of "the decision of the word", with its 
connotations of deep calmness and serenity, there has been a synonymic din. That 
is, a clatter of repetitions and reworkings claiming insight and profundity as they fall 
one upon the other in a search for the bedrock truths of humanity. To avoid adding 
to this philosophic din, Foucault travels from the depths to the surfaces. 
Referring to the human sciences that are his principle area of study, Dreyfus and 
Rabinow suggest that, for Foucault, it is "the surface details of these social 
sciences ... that provide the key to what is really going on. "22 Foucault's approach is 
to create maps of social relations - be they relations acting within discursive 
practices, disciplines or institutions - that counters attempts to link these relations 
to a founding principle residing "above" or "below" society. It is to form a 
topology of "surface networks"23 that defines phenomena in terms of the contiguity 
oftheir parts. It is to be, as Deleuze has put it, a "new cartographer". 24 
With an eye for surfaces comes an ear for silences. Not simply an ear for the 
unsaid, for the Other of language (though that too), but an ear for the "brash 
20 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pl07. 
21 Foucault, The Birth ofthe Clinic, pxvii. 
22 H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, p102. 
23 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p105 
24 Deleuze, Foucault, translated and edited by Sean Hand, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1990 pp23-44. 
27 
silence", the silence that proclaims itself from the rooftops. In The History of 
Sexuality: An Introduction, Foucault criticises the idea that in recent history we 
have "liberated" sexuality into the realm of discourse from where it had previously 
been banished: 
people will be surprised at the eagerness with which we went about 
pretending to rouse from its slumbers a sexuality which everything - our 
discourses, our customs, our institutions, our regulations, our knowledges 
- was busily producing in the light of day and broadcasting to noisy 
accompaniment. 25 
For Foucault, one of the most pernicious forms of discursive practice is that which 
incorporates phenomena, like madness and sexuality, precisely by endlessly 
referring to it as a silence. Mapping these silences to display the discursive 
practices that have engendered the sense that certain topics are taboo - revealing 
how we can become unwittingly embroiled in the practices that entice us into 
thinking that "our liberation is in the balance"26 - is one of Foucault's most 
prominent themes. The various attempts at producing a method to accompany this 
theme shall be critically assessed below. 
Perhaps the most immediate reaction to a philosophical approach like Foucault's, 
one that tries to reorient our usual strategies of thought, is to suggest that it is all 
very well and good, but writing of this kind does not constitute philosophy. After 
all, where is the sense in calling a text philosophical if it refutes the notion that 
philosophy offers a fundamental insight into, for example, the nature of human 
agency? Would it not be more appropriate to refer to such an approach as literary, 
for example? Indeed, Foucault is perfectly open in calling his works "fictions". In 
conversation with Lucette Finas he stated this clearly; "I am well aware that I have 
25 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, pI58. 
26 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, pI59. 
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never written anything but fictions. "27 Or, as Maurice Blanchot rephrases this same 
statement, "I am a fabulist composing fables whose morals one would be unwise to 
wait for. "28 Yet Foucault immediately adds: 
It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for 
a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about 
that a true discourse engenders or "manufactures" something that does 
not as yet exist, that is, "fictions" it.29 
What is the force of this complex statement? How are we to conceIve of the 
relation between fiction and truth? One way is to compare it to Helene Cixpus' 
critique of patriarchal thought where she combines the strategies of working within 
the historically formed (male) systems of thought with a creative act of imagination, 
a way of reconceptualising possible modes of expression; "What I say has at least 
two sides and two aims: to break up, to destroy: and to foresee the unforeseeable, 
to project. "30 For Deleuze, Foucault's fictions function to create truth, or more 
precisely new truths, which open up new strategies of Being, that "have changed 
what it means to think. "31 Fiction operates as the outside of truth, but in fiction 
many truths are to be found. 32 
27 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p193. 
28 Blanchot, FoucaultJBlanchot, p94. 
29 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p193. 
30 H. Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa", New French Feminisms, E. Marks and 1. de 
Courtivron (eds), Harvester, Brighton, 1980, pp245-264, p245. Of course this is not to down play 
the differences between Cixous and Foucault on many issues. 
31 Deleuze, Foucault, p120. 
32 For an interesting discussion of the importance of "fiction" in Foucault's thought see R. 
Bellour, "Towards Fiction", Michel Foucault: Philosopher, translated and edited by T. Armstrong, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1992, ppI48-156. 
29 
Foucault is not attempting to reduce philosophy to a form of literature, as perhaps 
Rorty is,33 rather he is trying to analyse the relationship between the two. 
Foucault's works are "fictions" in the sense that they do create new topologies and 
maps of strategic relations, yet such an act of creation is also a philosophical one in 
that it challenges revered philosophical assumptions. Foucault wishes to engage 
philosophy with its own presuppositions through the act of "fictionalising" a way of 
philosophising that appears as the "other" of itself This is not an act of 
dissolution, rather it is an attempt to enable an analysis that is self-reflexive in 
character, a way of thinking that comes to terms with the role thought plays within 
the analysis; "the history of thought insofar as it is thought about the truth. All 
those who say that for me the truth doesn't exist are simple-minded. "34 And later in 
the same interview: 
The task of speaking the truth is an infinite labour: to respect It In its 
complexity is an obligation that no power can afford to short-change, 
unless it would impose the silence of slavery. 35 
The truth is a complex and changing thing - one creates truth as opposed to 
discovering it. This may seem a very unphilosophical approach. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari,36 however, the act of" creating" new concepts, new truths, is 
precisely the activity that can be called philosophical. They claim that "philosophy 
is not a simple art of forming, inventing or fabricating concepts, because concepts 
33 Putting it crudely Rorty is concerned to conflate fictional truth and factual truth, levelling them 
to the same plane, whereas Foucault is more concerned to explore the possibilities of the historical 
relationship between fictional discourse and discourses that claim to speak the truth. This 
difference may be further expressed by consideration of the way in which Rorty seeks to establish 
the contingency of language as a whole, while Foucault is engaged in the localised relations of 
truth and the fictions they engender - hence Foucault's greater sensitivity to regimes of power and 
the specificity of knowledge formation, for example. See Rorty, Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
34 Foucault, "The Concern for Truth" in Foucault Live, p295. 
35 Foucault, "The Concern for Truth", p308. 
36 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Verso, London, 1994. 
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are not necessarily forms, discoveries or products ... philosophy is the discipline that 
involves creating concepts".37 This strong sense given to the act of creating 
concepts is perhaps the best way to understand Foucault's philosophical approach. 
It is an approach that I shall return to in the last chapter. 
But what is the truth of Foucault? How do we comment on Foucault? How do we 
read an author that eschews the fixed identity of authorship? How do we interpret 
the writer that writes on silences? We can not hope to uncover the "Real" or the 
"True" Foucault - the one coherent text that underpins the whole gamut of his 
works. There is no essential Foucault. Or, as Blanchot remarks of Foucault, he is: 
a man always on the move, alone, secretive, and who because of that 
distrusts the marvels of interiority, refuses the traps of subjectivity, asking 
where and how there emerges a discourse entirely surface and 
shimmering, but bereft of mirages. 38 
So how do we comment on Foucault? To sloganise; do unto his ideas as he did 
unto others. One must scrutinise his ideas so that the surfaces and silences of his 
texts become visible and audible. Foucault's own limits must be transgressed in 
order that they may be defined. The "brash silences" of Foucault's own texts must 
be examined in detail. His fictions must be "fictionalised", and brought into a more 
complex relation to the truth .. It is to do to Foucault what he claimed to be doing 
to Nietzsche's thought; "to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. "39 
37 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p5. 
38 Blanchot, FoucaultIBlanchot, p68. 
39Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, pp53-54. The full quote is as follows: "For myself, I prefer to 
utilise the writers I like. The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, 
to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say I am being faithful or 
unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest." 
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Relocating the trace of the opening slogan, in Foucault a theory of the liminal is 
"brash" in its silence. Change, shifts and transgressions are everywhere in 
Foucault's work; from changing perceptions of madness, through paradigm shifts in 
academic disciplines, through different "regimes" of power, to the relationship 
between the confessional and the couch. Yet the "criticism and awareness" inherent 
in these periods of change, the intricacies of the liminal experience as a theoretical 
construct, are the silences within this cacophony.40 The aim of this piece is to look 
to these silences not in order to "fulfil" Foucault or complete his thought but 
precisely the opposite, to see what new dimensions and connections are possible. I 
shall not comment on Foucault, I shall try to use him. 
Subjectivity and Truth 
It is worth clarifying a point that has been implicit in the discussion so far; the 
phenomena Foucault is interested in investigating. Foucault-as-archaeologist is 
primarily interested in the internal regulatory principles of the disciplines known 
collectively as the "human sciences". Foucault-as-genealogist tends to view these 
disciplines in terms of their relationship to the wider organising practices of social 
formations. 41 It is probably more correct to refer to the "human" rather than the 
"social" sciences as a good deal of Foucault's work was on disciplines like biology 
40 Donnelly, "On Foucault's Uses of the Notion of Bio-Power", Michel Foucault: Philosopher, 
pp199-203, offers an "appreciative but critical" account of the way that Foucault often "elided" his 
genealogies, that is his descriptions of "specific mechanisms and strategies" with his "epochal" 
descriptions regarding the "diagrammatic" features of particular periods. He goes on to conclude 
that there is an "unabridged gap" between these two strains in Foucault's thought (on bio-power). 
I agree with Donnelly in many respects, indeed part of my hope with introducing the idea of the 
liminal into his work is to show how we can reconceptualise the relation between the historical 
work and the philosophical foundations of that work. I would disagree with Donnelly when he 
suggests the way to resolve the difficulty he sees in Foucault is to keep these categories of the 
genealogical and the epochal separate. It is more fruitful to analyse the way in which these 
categories can be linked, or shown to overlap - to create a liminal zone of creativity and ambiguity 
within Foucault, rather than to try and resolve it via exclusionary techniques. 
41 The distinctions and similarities between Foucault's "archaeologies" and "genealogies" will 
become more apparent as the chapter proceeds. 
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and psychiatry which are not normally thought of as "social" sciences. However, 
with this caveat in mind, I shall revert to the standard practice of using the terms 
interchangeably unless otherwise specified. 
There is one possible misunderstanding that needs to be mentioned. In "Michel 
Foucault's Immature Science"42 Hacking portrays Foucault as offering a conceptual 
framework for understanding the status of the "immature" social sciences that is 
similar to the perspective of Anglo-American debates around Kuhn and Putnam. 
By bringing Foucault's thought "down to (our) earth",43 Hacking offers a way of 
embedding Foucault in analytic debates. Hacking argues, for example, that the only 
real difference between Foucault and Putnam is that Putnam is pre-occupied with 
the study of established "mature" sciences whereas Foucault is interested in the 
"immature" human sciences. Once this point is made, continues Hacking, we can 
easily accommodate Foucault into Anglo-American debates simply by recognising 
that he is actually studying a different set of practices from those studied by 
traditional philosophers of science. Yet, as Wartenburg forcefully argues,44 the 
account of Foucault given by Hacking is highly "sanitised" and misses "the main 
insights" of Foucault's project. One can agree with Thomas McCarthy,45 that the 
primary interest of Foucault - and the Frankfurt School to which he is also referring 
- is, "the role that the social and the social scientifically trained experts have played 
in the process of rationalisation. "46 The point of study is the interesting paradox 
that these "experts" have produced little, if any, concrete knowledge of society yet 
42 I. Hacking, "Michel Foucault's Immature Science", Nous, volume l3, 1979, pp39-51. 
43 Hacking, "Michel Foucault's Immature Science", p40. 
44 T. Wartenburg, "Foucault's Archaeological Method: A Response to Hacking and Rorty", The 
Philosophical Forum, volume 15, no.4, 1984, pp345-364. 
45 T. McCarthy, "The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School", Political 
Theory, volume 18, no.3, 1990, pp437-469. 
46 McCarthy, "The Critique ofImpure Reason", p440. 
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have been accorded positions of power within the modern world. One can agree 
further with McCarthy, that Foucault differs from the Frankfurt School, and is thus 
even less susceptible to Hacking's interpretation, in that he offers his ideas as "anti-
social-science" rather than as a reworking of the human sciences.47 Or as 
Machad048 puts it, Foucault's work on the human sciences "cannot be fixed into a 
rigid canon." Thus, while Foucault studied the human sciences he did so from a 
larger perspective than is generally the case (with the exception of the Frankfurt 
School) and in such a way that they are viewed as intimately embroiled with 
practices of control and institutionalisation as a whole. 
With Foucault generally situated in this way, we can go into more detail. For 
Foucault, perhaps the key period in this "process of rationalisation" is the end of the 
eighteenth century, for it was during this period that, through Kant, human agents 
came to view themselves as (simultaneously) autonomous subjects and the object of 
their own thought. In The Order of Things Foucault characterises this era as the 
one in which; "Man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge 
and as a subject that knows; enslaved sovereign, observed spectator. "49 
It is this "double", this dual conceptualisation of the status of human beings, that 
inaugurated the sciences of "man". This set the limits that define our understanding 
of "man", as a science of "man".50 Foucault calls these limits the analytic of 
47 McCarthy, "The Critique ofImpure Reason", p442. 
48 R. Machado, "Archaeology and Epistemology", Michel Foucault: Philosopher, p17. Machado 
offers a much more subtle account of Foucault's project in The Order of Things than Hacking, an 
account which emphasises that: "It is the idea of an immutable, systematic and universally 
applicable method that Michel Foucault is asking us to question", p 17. 
49 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Tavistock 
Publications, London, 1977, p312. 
50 Foucault insists that this possibility of a science of man was excluded by the prior Classical 
episteme because of the way that it ordered humans in a "chain of being" in relation to God. In 
the new episteme this chain is broken via the introduction of man as "the measure of all things." 
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finitude - "the limits of knowledge (that) provide a positive foundation for the 
possibility of knowing. "51 In the formation of this analytic Foucault views the 
beginnings of "the process of rationalisation"; the subject assumes an unassailable 
position, it becomes the content of knowledge and that which forms it; it is a 
c....", 
process that constructs its own foundations out of its own limits. With the analytic 
of finitude are born the human sciences. 
It is clear that Foucault's studies of the human sciences are intimately entwined with 
an investigation into the construction of the "subject"; that is, to the ways in which 
we construct the "truth" of ourselves. In an interview just before his death 
Foucault explicitly stated that throughout his texts he tried to "discover how the 
human subject entered into 'games of truth'. "52 Certainly one should be slightly 
wary of such retrospective appraisals given Foucault's tendency to characterise all 
his previous work in terms of whatever approach he happened to be pursuing at the 
time. Yet this conceptualisation of his own project is probably the most adequate 
way of thinking about his overall approach, precisely because the vagueness of the 
phrasing allows for the subtleties of his many outlooks to be retained but thought 
through as containing a degree of continuity. In the following sections I shall turn 
to a critical appraisal of the different ways Foucault sought to work through the 
relationship between subjectivity and truth. The first is his archaeological approach. 
See, The Order of Things, pp307-312 and the useful gloss offered by Dreyfus and Rabinow in 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, especially pp27-28. 
51 Foucault, The Order of Things, p317. 
52 Foucault, "The Ethic of The Care of The Self as a Practice of Freedom", Philosophy and Social 
Criticism: The Final Foucault. Studies on Michel Foucault's Last Works, nos.2-3, 1987, pp1l2-
131, pl12. In chapter five I argue that this general Foucauldian project can be reconfigured as the 
attempt to trace the history of thought. This is important when considering Foucault's later works 
to the extent that it avoids the possible confusion of conceiving of Foucault's ethics as a "return" to 
the subject. 
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The Limits of Foucault's Archaeology53 
For Foucault it is not a question of the "truth" or "falsehood" of the human 
sciences. This must be the case given his assertion that truth and falsehood are 
constituted as a product of discursive practices; "practices that systematically form 
the objects of which they speak. "54 So another way of approaching the terrain must 
be found, one that places the analytic of finitude - "man's attempt to fully affirm his 
finitude and at the same to completely deny it"55 - under a critical gaze; an 
approach, that is, which does not rely on a re-establishment of finitude. To achieve 
this, Foucault sought to chart each successive attempt at grounding the sciences of 
man on the analytic of finitude and analyse the ways in which it has led to 
"repetition" and "retreat" each time. 56 However, Foucault at this time was still in 
the thrall of the idea that a method could be detailed that would "throw off the last 
anthropological constraints" of the human sciences by revealing, in a "generalised" 
way, the mechanisms of such constraints. 57 With his archaeological method 
Foucault sought to "uncover" the limiting effect of the analytic of finitude in order 
to create a way of thinking that did not prioritise the subject. However, Foucault 
failed in this attempt precisely because his analysis remained situated within the 
terms of the analytic of finitude. While this is far from a novel interpretation of his 
archaeological work, Dreyfus and Rabinow providing the definitive account of this 
53 The terminology in the following section ("archaeological method" etc.) is such common 
currency now among anyone familiar with contemporary political theory that I feel it is somewhat 
foolish to give a definition, to point out that Foucault is not talking about "digging up" the past 
etc. However, for those maybe not so familiar with the material, perhaps the best place to look for 
a useful account of this term, and its correlates, is the "Introduction" to The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. 
54 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p49. 
55 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, p31. 
56 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp315-317. 
57 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p15. 
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critique,58 it is important to work through this argument in order that the critical 
position developed throughout this chapter can take a more definite shape. 
Foucault's archaeological approach is founded on an appreciation of a previously 
"unthought" aspect oflanguage. Foucault delimits an area located between the idea 
of language as an invisible structural background - as an accepted unity upon which 
we draw - and the idea of language as simply a series of specific utterances - that 
language can only ever layer over our thought "a dust of facts. "59 It is this area that 
Foucault calls "the domain of discourse"; a domain where "regularities" may 
emerge but stultifying unities be avoided; a domain where the specificity of 
language may be celebrated without becoming debilitating. 60 
With his archaeology Foucault sought to uncover the discursive practices operating 
within autonomous domains; practices that constituted the self-regulating 
frameworks of the specific disciplines he examined; practices which the 
archaeologist could view from a distance, enabling insight into the hidden structures 
of thought that constitute these disciplines. In this way, archaeology is prejudiced 
against the non-discursive; the mute environments of light and visibility that interest 
the genealogist (as we shall see later) play only a very restricted role in 
archaeological inquiry. Archaeology emphasises the "field of use"61 surrounding 
58 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pp90-100. 
For an alternative account of Foucault's archaeology, one that is critical but ultimately sympathetic 
to his project, see, Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
59 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p28. An interesting analysis of Foucault's use ofthe 
term discourse, it's problems and insights, is given by M. Frank, "On Foucault's Concept of 
Discourse", Michel Foucault: Philosopher, pp99-116. 
60 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p29. 
61 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pl04. 
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statements; "the relation between statements "62, that constitute autonomous 
linguistic domains and form the disciplinary boundaries of the human sciences. 
Foucault's aim in pursuing his archaeological approach is summed up in The Order 
of Things; 
such an analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of science; it is 
rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and 
theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was 
constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori .. .ideas could appear, 
sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, 
rationalities be formed, only perhaps to dissolve and vanish soon 
afterwards. 63 
In order to carry out this inquiry Foucault introduced a new tool of analysis and 
coined it the episteme.64 In suggesting this concept Foucault wanted to show that 
what he was not seeking to analyse was "a slice of history common to all branches 
of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates", but 
rather to analyse the interconnections on the level of "discursive regularities" .65 
tt 
This shift of emphasis is important for Foucault in thatJ\allows a way of thinking 
about the human sciences which does not privilege the Weltanschauung in which a 
science came into being but focuses on the "process of a· historical practice" 
immanent to the sciences he studies. In sum: 
62 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p31. 
63 Foucault, The Order of Things, pxxi-xxii. 
64 A thorough account of Foucault's use of the term "episteme" can be found in, G. Canguilhem, 
"The death of man, or exhaustion of the cogito?", trans. Catherine Porter, The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault, Gary Gutting (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp71-
91. 
65 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p191. In saying this I am aware of the ambiguity 
that the term has in Foucault's writings; see O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?, pp54-
55, for a discussion of this ambiguity. 
By episteme we mean .... the total set of relations that unite, at a given 
period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, 
sciences and possibly formalised systems .... The episteme is not a form of 
knowledge or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the 
most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit or 
a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given 
period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of 
discursive regularities. 66 
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At this point we can return to the idea of "discourse" and further elaborate upon its 
role in Foucault's analysis. The primary unit of discourse is the "statement". Yet, 
as is apparent from both the passages just cited, Foucault is not interested in the 
novelty of statements - the archaeological method does not aim to find the original 
moment of the discourses it studies. Rather, the archaeologist is concerned to map 
the regularity of statements; 
the originalitylbanality opposition is therefore not relevant; between an 
initial formulation and the sentence which, years or centuries later, repeats 
it... [the archaeological inquiry] establishes no hierarchy of value; it makes 
no radical difference. It tries only to establish the regularity of 
statements .... Archaeology is not in search of inventions. 67 
The production of statements becomes, for Foucault, detached from the subjective 
intentions and cognisance of the producer; statements take on the form of 
"discourse-objects" amenable to study by the distanced archaeologist who is able to 
discern structures of meaningfulness, structures that simultaneously enable the 
production of statements yet which also limit and shape the nature of new 
statements.68 Foucault as archaeologist sees his method as the beginning of the end 
66 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p191. 
67 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p144. 
68 It is interesting that in this first major justification of his approach Foucault rejects the notion 
of "limit-experience" implicit in, for example, the conclusion of Madness and Civilization. The 
possibility of "interrogating the being of madness itself, its secret content, its silent, self-enclosed 
truth" is abandoned for an analysis of "all that was said in all the statements that named it", The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, p32. This is interesting to the extent that it is a recognition of the 
impossibility of wholly occupying the "Other" as a way beyond the strategies that operate through 
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of the need to ground the study of human beings on the analytic of finitude; 
archaeology IS "an enterprise by which one tries to throw off the last 
anthropological constraints; an enterprise that wishes, in return, to reveal how these 
constraints could come about. "69 
The similarities with certain forms of structuralism70 are obvious; the primacy of 
meaning defining systems over individual speech acts and the search for the formal 
laws that govern such systems. In The Order of Things Foucault views the notion 
of "code", for example, in terms that could have come directly from any of the 
major structuralist texts; 
The fundamental codes of a culture - those governing its language, its 
schemas of perception its exchanges, its techniques its values, the 
hierarchy of its practices - establish for every man, from the very first, the 
empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be 
at home.71 
Yet Foucault, despite the admission that his approach is "not entirely foreign to 
what is called structural analysis"72, on the whole vigorously refuted claims that he 
discourse. However, .as I shall argue below, Foucault's first reaction to this, his archaeological 
method, was in fact an over-reaction that itself became trapped in the Same (to use O'Farrell's 
terminology). 
69 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pI5. 
70 Once again we come up against the difficulty of taking a term like this as containing a definite 
meaning. As Descombes demonstrates, Modern French Philosophy, pp75-109, the history and use 
of this term is complex and problematic. With specific regard to Foucault, Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pp52-58, make the distinction between 
atomistic and holistic structuralism, suggesting that Foucault is quite definitely not a proponent of 
the former but does, at this stage in his work, resemble certain features of the latter. For my part, 
I shall make no specific comment on these complexities, taking my lead from Foucault's belief 
that all that held together the structuralist movement was its opposition to a theory of the subject: 
"it's not simply a matter of structuralism or the structuralist method - it all served as a basis for 
and a confirmation of something much more radical: the calling into question of the theory of the 
subject", Remarks on Marx, p58. 
71 Foucault, The Order of Things, pxx. Compare this to the idea of the code found in Levi-
Strauss's Structural Anthropology, vol. 1, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, 
London, 1968. 
72 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p15. 
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was a structuralist. There is some merit in distinguishing archaeology from 
structuralism. In contrast to structuralism, which is characterised as the purveyor 
of "the great universal discourse that is common to all men at a particular period", 
Foucault says of his project; "I did not deny history, but held in suspense the 
general, empty category of change in order to reveal transformations at different 
levels; I reject a uniform model of temporalisation". 73 
Without going into the value of Foucault's self-distancing from structuralism,74 it is 
important to examine more closely his rejection of "a uniform model of 
temporalisation. " One of Foucault's more famous ( or infamous) positions is his 
suggestion that history ought to be viewed as a series of "ruptures". In The Order 
of Things, for example, Foucault cites two major points of rupture as crucial to our 
understanding of the human sciences. The first brought the Renaissance period to 
an end and witnessed the birth of Classicism (circa 1660) while the second brought 
the beginnings of Modernism (circa 1800). My aim is not to study the historical 
accuracy or details of these ruptures or discontinuities - that is a task for trained 
historians - but rather to view the role that the concept of rupture played m 
Foucault's archaeological thought. Blanchot characterises it well: 
Now Foucault ... does not reject history but distinguishes within it 
discontinuities, discrete - local rather than universal - divisions, which do 
not presuppose subsisting beneath them a vast silent narrative, a 
continuous, immense and unlimited murmur which would need to be 
suppressed (or repressed). 75 
73 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p200. 
74 Another way of phrasing the distinction Foucault invokes is to conceive of structuralism as the 
search for universal pre-conditions of knowledge formation, whereas archaeology always begins 
with the "suspension" of judgement on what any particular pre-conditions might be. It is 
important to note, however, that the charge against structuralists - that they ignore history - is not 
beyond dispute; see, for example, "Claude Levi-Strauss" by 1. Boon, in The Return of Grand 
Theory in the Human Sciences, Quentin Skinner (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, pp159-176. 
75 Blanchot, FoucaultlBlanchot, p73. 
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With the notion of rupture Foucault attempts to steer our thought towards the 
limits of the self-regulatory discursive practices that are the raison d'etre of the 
archaeologist. In the opening pages of The Birth of the Clinic these limits are 
brought vividly in front of the reader with the report of the practices of a certain 
Dr. Pomme whose treatment of hysteria patients can only leave us bewildered. It is 
worth quoting in full: 
Towards the end of the Eighteenth century, Pomme treated and cured a 
hysteric by making her take "baths, ten or twelve hours a day, for ten 
whole months". At the end of this treatment for the dissection of the 
nervous system and the heat that sustained it, Pomme saw "membranous 
tissues like pieces of damp parchment. .. peel away with some slight 
discomfort, and these were passed daily with the urine; the right ureter 
also peeled away and came out whole in the same way". The same thing 
occurred with the intestines, which at another stage "peeled off their 
internal tunics, which we saw emerge from the rectum. The oesophagus, 
the arterial trachea and the tongue also peeled in due course; and the 
patient had rejected different pieces either by vomiting or by 
expectoration".76 
The empirical truth of this account, whether it actually took place or not, is not 
important. Furthermore, that current thinking on the treatment of hysteria patients 
has changed is beyond doubt. Yet must we conceive of the shift in terms of a 
rupture? Is it not possible that medical thinking on hysteria has simply "progressed" 
in a seamless fashion; that there has been an advancement of thought by way of trial 
and error? For Foucault, such suggestions are implausible. He argues that today 
we can not even know what this description means, though at one time it 
represented a serious objective account of the treatment of hysterics. Dr, Pommels 
"treatment" of hysterics prefigures our own conception only in the sense that it 
reveals a "new disposition of the objects of knowledge".77 Foucault's aim is to use 
76 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, pix. 
77 Foucault, The Birth ofthe Clinic, p68. 
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this realisation to inform a critique of our commonly held belief that medical 
knowledge is converging on an objective truth of the human body. His technique is 
to point to the chasm that exists between the truth of statements like those of Dr. 
Pomme and the meaningful framework within which these statements were 
conceived. Once we come to terms with the fact that the report of Dr. Pomme was 
constituted as true within an accepted structure, though the method of treatment is 
obviously in no way "objectively true", we are drawn to consider the essentially 
arbitrary nature of modem frameworks of medical knowledge. Furthermore with 
this realisation Foucault invites us to view history as a series of discontinuous 
frameworks that cannot be encompassed by any form of grand narrative. The 
example of Dr. Pomme's report shows, among other things, the fallacy of a "unitary 
model of temporalisation" . 78 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault draws another conclusion from the 
"ruptured" outlook of the archaeologist; 
Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making 
human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and 
all action are the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, 
time is conceived in terms of totalisation and revolutions are never more 
than moments of consciousness. 79 
To avoid the glorification and reification of the autonomous subject in (and of) 
history, to avoid the limiting effect of the analytic of finitude, the archaeologist 
proposes that we conceive of time as ruptured and discontinuous. The conception 
of the regularity of statements within epistemic formations "constituted as 
78 This is, of course, a technique repeated often by Foucault (the technique of shocking us into the 
realisation of the arbitrariness of our systems of thought) and is most famously used in the later 
work, Discipline and Punish, where the opening pages describe in vivid detail the execution of 
Damien and the very different, but now recognisable, regime of Leon Faucher, see pp3-7. 
79 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p12. 
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objects"80 removes the individual from the analysis; the sequence, or narrative, of 
passing time is reconceived as a series of events that carry no hidden meaning and 
no subject. Or as Machado has put it, archaeology aims "to produce a history of 
knowledge from which all trace of the history of the progress of reason has 
disappeared".81 
Which is to say, Foucault had tried to do to the human sciences what they had tried 
to do to the human subject. While the experts of the human sciences attempted to 
clarify laws of human behaviour through various levels of disinterested observation 
and recording, Foucault conceived of the archaeological project as being the 
distanced observation of the discursive practices of the disciplines involved; the 
observation of the observers. Dreyfus and Rabinow refer to this move as "double 
phenomenological bracketing"82 rightly suggesting that Foucault saw this act of 
doubling as "the road towards that stable, autonomous theory"83 that would allow 
for the study of the human sciences if not of human agents themselves. 
Yet the archaeologist's only props are the dubious assumptions that discursive 
practices are visible in a pure form - as types of "science-objects"84 - to the gaze of 
the archaeologist; that the study of discourse is readily available to the 
"phenomenologically detached" archaeologist; that the archaeologist can continue 
the inquiry without discursive constraints. F or the practice of archaeological 
analysis it is necessary that the study of discourse somehow escapes the problems 
generated by the study of "man" . Yet it is far from clear how this is achieved. Has 
80 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p205. 
81 R. Machado, "Archaeology and Epistemology", Michel Foucault: Philosopher, pp3-19. 
82 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pp49-51. 
83 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, p90. 
84 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p207. 
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Foucault's archaeology actually escaped from the analytic of finitude that it sought 
to examine? 
As Foucault argues that the human sciences are caught between the finite object of 
study and the subjectivity of the scientists, between the "enslaved sovereign" and 
the "observed spectator", so archaeology is caught between the archaeologist's 
capability to be an inquirer into history on a-historical grounds, while also claiming 
to chart the historicity of the human sciences. The archaeologist must, firstly try to 
deny her own finitude and claim knowledge of events that is unlimited by the 
conditions of knowing, while secondly affirming her finitude in order that these 
conditions of knowing are available. Foucault the archaeologist becomes trapped 
within the limits of his own making; limits that define his attitude yet that must 
remain hidden from him. This is the limit of the analytic of finitude; these limits 
were as Blanchot points out "the aspirations of a structuralism then in its death 
throes".85 
Foucault's Genealogy 
The need to overcome these limits led Foucault to a reconsideration of Nietzsche; 
from archaeology to genealogy; from the analysis of the being of language, the 
archaeological question, to an inquiry into the politics of language, the genealogical 
question. But more than this, Foucault began to look to the apparatuses of power 
- the social practices, organisations, and institutions - that envelop the realms of 
"autonomous" discourse the archaeologist was previously concerned with. The 
limit of finitude arose within archaeology because of its inability to explicate a non-
teleological method of interpretation. With the analysis of "autonomous" discourse 
came the positioning of the knowing subject as "outside" of the phenomena in 
85 Blanchot, FoucaultIBlanchot, p70. 
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question - archaeology came to represent the idea of progress it sought to 
overcome. As a result, the limits of knowledge became the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of knowing. This constituted the limit of finitude of archaeology. 
In an attempt to transgress this limit, Foucault began to formulate genealogical 
questions in order that he could situate the interpreter-as-genealogist firmly within 
the problem area. That is, Foucault no longer accepted the possibility of "double 
phenomenological detachment" and sought instead to theorise the involvement of a 
responsive and reflexive observer fully aware of her embodiment within fields of 
discourse, practices and institutions. The intricacies of this transgression are 'the 
subject of this section. 
I wish to make two broad contrasts between archaeology and genealogy as a 
preliminary. First, the genealogist - and I refer principally to the genealogies of 
disciplinary practices offered in Discipline and Punish and of sexuality in The 
History of Sexuality: An Introduction - views social relationships as complex 
environments not simply correlative to the regularity of serious statements. Gilles 
Deleuze86 draws the distinction between "a system of language" and "a system of 
light" in order to capture the importance that non-discursive formations play in the 
genealogy of social practices. The need for this distinction is that it enables the 
genealogist to free the analyses from the limiting effect of the primacy of the 
statement which had tied the archaeological project to problematic conditions of 
knowledge. By concentrating on the statement the archaeologist inhibited 
questions of power - to which we shall turn shortly. 87 As a way of further 
86 Deleuze, Foucault, p32. 
87 As Deleuze, Foucault, pp32-33, points out, Foucault did consider "non-discursive" background 
environments in his books Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic. However, in 
these works they were "designated negatively". In the shift to a genealogical understanding of the 
networks of power and how these interact with the formation of knowledge Foucault could see 
these elements of "light and visibility" in a more "positive form". Importantly, it is not that 
Foucault replaced an analysis of language with an analysis of non-discursive forces, but that he 
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illustrating the distinction between "language and light" we can look to Foucault's 
study of Jeremy Bentham's model prison, the Panopticon. 
In conversation with Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle Perrot, Foucault summarises 
the structure of the building as follows; 
A perimeter building in the form of a ring. At the centre of this, a tower, 
pierced by large windows opening onto the inner face of the ring. --;-'1e 
outer building is divided into cells each of which traverses the whole 
thickness of the building. These cells have two windows, one opening on 
to the inside, facing the windows of the central tower, the other, outer one 
allowing daylight to pass through the whole cell. All that is then needed is 
to put an overseer in the tower and place in each of the cells a lunatic, a 
patient, a convict, a worker or a schoolboy. The back lighting enables 
one to pick out from the central tower the little captive silhouettes in the 
ring of cells. In short, the principle of the dungeon is reversed; daylight 
and the overseers gaze capture the inmate more effectively than darkness, 
which afforded after all a sort of protection. 88 
He further sums it up by saying that each inmate is "perfectly individualised and 
constantly visible". 89 Or as Blanchot puts it, the Panopticon "reveals the absolute 
power of total visibility". 90 As the circulation of light and visibility throughout the 
Panopticon is pure and total, it is beyond signification in the form of regularised 
statements. Moreover, the strategies of disciplinary practice as a system of light 
working in the structures of the Panopticon are expressed throughout the social 
body (to the lunatic, patient, worker, or schoolboy) not merely within enclosed 
domains of autonomous discourse. 
now takes these forces into account in his work in a way that creates a new an:! interesting 
approach to the relation between knowledge and power. 
88 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p147. See also Discipline and Punish, pp200-201. 
89 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p200. 
90 Blanchot, FoucaultIBlanchot, p85. 
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The Panopticon also allows us to begin to draw out the second feature of 
genealogical inquiry that distinguishes it from the archaeological project; namely the 
role of power in the analysis. I wish to make to make two points initially; that 
Foucault views power, as expressed through the Panopticon, as continuous and as 
diagrammatic. The continuity of power is captured in the twofold relation that 
firstly, the inmates are never sure when they are being watched so they must assume 
that the surveillance is constant, that there is "permanent visibility"91; and secondly, 
that the guards or overseers are themselves thoroughly enmeshed in the relations of 
power within the Panopticon, they are not in some sense above or outside those 
relations. As Foucault puts it: "power has its principle not so much in a person as 
in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes".92 Or, as Barou 
suggests; "one has the feeling of confronting an infernal model that no-one, either 
the watcher or the watched, can escape". 93 To which Foucault adds; 
It's a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just 
as much as those over whom power is exercised .... Power is no longer 
substantially identified with an individual who possesses or exercises it by 
right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no-one owns. Certainly 
everyone doesn't occupy the same pOSItIOn; certain POSItIons 
preponderate and permit an effect of supremacy to be produced. 94 
The traditional source of power, the monarch, finds no place in this modern 
conception of the functioning of power; indeed no individual is the locus of power 
(not even Bentham himself).95 The operations of power are no longer dictated by 
the will of one person, they are no longer dependent upon an individual's character 
and nature (the monarch may be a good, bad or indifferent one) but are continuous 
91 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p201. 
92 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p202. 
93 See, PoweriKnowledge, p156. 
94 Foucault, PoweriKnowledge, p156. 
95 Foucault, PoweriKnowledge, pI57. 
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throughout the social body as "a complex system of cogs and gears" where "each 
person, depending on his place, is watched by all or certain of the others. You have 
an apparatus of total and circulating mistrust, because there is no absolute point". 96 
Moreover, the continuity of power exhibited within the Panopticon becomes the 
model for the modem conception of relations of power in general. Foucault was 
entirely serious in his assertion that the inmates of the Panopticon were "workers 
and schoolboys" as well as prisoners; indeed, as the last quotation suggests, 
Foucault had in mind the myriad of power relations existing throughout the entire 
population. Foucault expresses this in Discipline and Punish when he talks of the 
Panopticon as; "the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form .. .it 
is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any 
specific use". 97 
The fact that the Panopticon remained on paper is of no consequence to Foucault -
"its vocation was to become a generalised function". 98 It was the discussion of the 
ideals of power and the abstraction of these ideals that interested him - the role of 
the Panopticon as a diagram of power relations, a way of thinking about the 
"polyvalent applications" that this model of power relations instituted. 99 Power 
becomes constituted in predominantly spatial terms, that is, in a configuration that 
96 Foucault, PoweriKnowledge, pI58; Discipline and Punish, p204. 
97 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p205. Deleuze, Foucault, p34, makes the same point when he 
states that "the abstract formula of Panopticism is ... to impose a particular conduct on a human 
multiplicity", whatever that multiplicity may be, for example workers, schoolboys etc. 
98 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p207. 
99 It is important not to confuse the idea of analysing the panoptic diagram of power with an 
ideological approach to the way power operates. Foucault argues, Discipline and Punish, p206, 
that power thought of in ideological fashion places the source of power "outside, like a rigid, 
heavy constraint" whereas the actual functioning of this form of power "is so subtly present in [the 
functions it invests] as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact". 
See also Deleuze, Foucault, p37 where he describes the diagram acting "as a non-unifying 
immanent cause that is co-extensive with the whole social field". 
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ensured the continuity of power relations thus seeking to impose an order on to the 
population without respite. As Deleuze phrases it, power becomes "a machine that 
is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak" .100 I shall go 
into more detail on Foucault's conception of power in the next section. Presently it 
is enough to realise that with the introduction of power into the analysis, Foucault 
is making an important break with his earlier archaeological project. 
What is genealogy? In looking for a new approach to history Foucault sought to 
reinvigorate the Nietzschean idea of "genealogy"; an approach to history that is 
"gray, meticulous and patiently documentary" .101 The task of the genealogist he 
characterises as the thorough and painstaking search through history to uncover the 
"details" that other, unifying histories have obscured. It is in these details that the 
genealogist finds grounds to criticise the "meta-historical deployment of ideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies", thus opposing itself "to the search for 
origins" .102 Foucault takes genealogy as an account of specificity in history; it is a 
way of recovering the "jolts and surprises" in history. This is not one possible way 
of giving history its due, "history is genealogy". 103 
To put it another way, genealogy can be described as an act of "making visible". It 
is the "making visible" of the social practices designed to increase the visibility of 
the population. In this sense it is the same as the archaeological approach of 
"double phenomenological detachment", with however an awareness of non-
discursive features and the relations of power within society. But it also involves 
100 Deleuze, Foucault, p34. 
101 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", The Foucault Reader, p76. 
102 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p77. 
103 Noujain, E.G., "History as Genealogy: An Exploration of Foucault's Approach to History", 
Contemporary French Philosophy, A. Phillips Griffiths (ed), Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
pp157-174. 
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the attempt to "make visible" the genealogist as a constitutive part of an 
investigation; it is the attempt to create a reflexive approach to interpretation. 
Before turning to this central aspect, however, it is worth looking at some of 
Foucault's more general views on the nature of genealogy. 
The genealogist does not aim to unearth the hidden narratives of history; genealogy 
tries to "record the singularity of events outside of any fixed finality" .104 In the 
"relentless erudition" of the act of "making visible" the genealogist refutes the 
metaphysics of all embracing theories of history and replaces these with "the secret 
that ... (things) have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion from alien forms" .105 However, genealogy is not the task of saying "'Voila, 
long live discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good thing too' but to 
pose the question, 'How is it that at certain moments ... there are ... these 
transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is 
normally accredited?'" .106 
In refusing grand metanarratives genealogy emphasises the local. It becomes a 
strategy for mapping out the topology of local situations; seeing the networks of 
power at the small scale and coping with them as such, rather than through the 
application of all encompassing frameworks. 107 Moreover as there is no unifying 
theme to history, for the genealogist, there is no prospect of a unifying liberation. 
There is no pre-ordained class, no transcendental spirit nor pure rationality which 
104 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p76. 
105 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p78. 
106 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, pIl2. 
107 We can view Foucault's publication of the memoirs of the criminal Pierre Riviere in this way; 
I, Pierre Riviere ... trans. by F. Jellinek, Michel Foucault (ed), Peregrine, Harrnondsworth, 1978. 
In Foucault Live, p132, Foucault remarks that Riviere's document "so escapes from every possible 
handle, that there is nothing to be said about this central point, this crime or act, that is not a step 
back in relation to it". The specificity of the document is made to stand on its own without 
recourse to a historical narrative that subsumes it. 
51 
carries with it the universal hopes of "mankind". The hope that there may be a 
residual humanism that binds human beings in some moral community is also a 
futile hope, the modem subject is a fabrication of the times and constituted through 
the operation of multiple applications of power; 
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a 
primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to 
fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or 
crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power 
that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, 
come to be identified and constituted as individuals ... the individual is an 
effect of power. 108 
This same point is made more succinctly in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" when 
Foucault remarks that "nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to 
serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men". 109 Without 
an available schema the genealogist must rely on the "positivity" of the local 
situation as the yardstick for analysis. Or perhaps it is the concept of power that 
assumes the role left by the absence of other frameworks? This possibility will be 
examined once a fuller account of Foucault's notion of power is given. For the 
moment we must return to the another axis of the genealogical approach, namely 
the role of the self-reflexive interpreter. 
The important link between the genealogist and his object of study can be found in 
the definition of genealogy as "the painstaking rediscovery of struggles together 
with the rude memory of their conflicts". 110 In his elaboration on this Foucault cites 
genealogy as "the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us 
to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge 
108 Foucault, Power!Knowledge, p98. 
109 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p87-88. 
110 Foucault, Power!Knowledge, p83 (my italics). 
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tactically today". 111 Yet the memory of the genealogist is not the memory that 
accompanies forgetting, it is not the wish for total recall. Neither is it the act of 
tapping into a collective memory of past events, for no such thing exists. It is the 
relation of the genealogist to her own contemporaneity; the realisation of the 
genealogist's position as a trace within her own analysis and the further realisation 
that this trace has an effect on the present, that is, on the local struggles of the 
genealogist's situation. It is the "history of the present", which is not "the presentist 
fallacy"112 of projecting current meanings and concepts on to historical events, but 
the specifically self-critical attitude to the past and its relation to the present in a 
way that does not remove the act of interpretation but places it firmly within the 
bounds of the analysis. The memory of past struggles is the "absolute memory" 
that is "itself endlessly forgotten and reconstituted".113 The genealogist must 
continually assert her presence as thought thinking-back-on-itself. As Dreyfus and 
Rabinow phrase it: 
Genealogy accepts the fact that we are nothing but our history, and that 
therefore we will never get a total and detached picture either of who we 
are or of our history ... we must inevitably read our history in terms of our 
current practices. 114 
This is not a futile exercise, but it does mean a coming to terms with the role of 
power, and the effect that it has in any attempt to provide an analytic of our relation 
to the past. With this in mind we shall turn to the conception of power held by 
Foucault, principally the view espoused in The History of Sexuality: An 
111 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p83 (my italics). 
112 For a useful discussion of this see Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pII8. 
113 Deleuze, Foucault, p107. 
114 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pp122-I23. 
53 
Introduction. However, it is worth saying a few words about the relation between 
archaeology and genealogy first. 
Foucault does not view genealogy as a wholesale replacement for archaeology 
rather as a compliment to it: 
archaeology would be the appropriate methodology of the analysis of 
local discursivities, and genealogy would be the tactics whereby on the 
basis of the descriptions of these ... the subjected knowledges which were 
thus released would be brought into play. 115 
For Foucault then, there are instances of specific local practices where archaeology 
would be the most useful method of study in that it would reveal the arbitrariness of 
the hermeneutic approach, and show that projected continuities of narrative were in 
fact intersected by moments of rupture. The primary task of the archaeologist is to 
expose teleological presuppositions within disciplines. This completed, however, 
archaeology must give way to the genealogical excavation of archaeology's own 
teleological assumptions. That this leads genealogy into a non-teleological but 
transcendental relation to its own presuppositions will be argued in the closing 
section. 
An Analytic of Power 
There is a limit to cross; the frontier (time) between us - who us?- and those past, 
that is, the frontier (space) that must be traversed in the act of memory. Forgive 
my slogans - they help me remember - but "do to yourself as you would do to 
others" and recall how easily we forget the effects of power when it is tempting to 
do so; the strategies of the limit are strategies after all. In trying to unlock 
reflexivity Foucault is thus drawn towards a conception of power. This, though, is 
115 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p85. 
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not a "theory" of power; "if one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be 
obliged to view it (power) as emerging at a given place and time and hence to 
deduce it, to reconstruct its genesis" .116 
In theory one forgets memory; the desire for security and fixity, the desire for 
origins, places the theorist outside of the domain one seeks to recuperate. The 
desire of the theorist is alienated from the analysis, it is interiorised as outside. In 
theory one forgets the limits; they simply do not exist, as they define the conditions 
of the epistemological act as "deduction". In theory one gets an analytic of finitude. 
In theory we could return to the archaeological project. Foucault suggests an 
alternative; 
move less towards a theory of power than towards an 'analytics of power'; 
that is, toward a definition of the specific domain formed by relations of 
power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make 
possible its analysis.! 17 
Foucault wishes to transgress the limits of the theoretical approach by shifting the 
goal posts; with time-honoured philosophical technique he suggests not new 
answers to traditional questions, but new questions. He invites us to move from 
"what is power?" to "how is it exercised?"; from the genesis of power to the field of 
power, to the spatial relations it imbues, to its networks of transmission, to its 
fluidity of movement and ever shifting activities; "it is to give oneself as the object 
of analysis power relations and not power itself'.118 Or again; "Power in the 
substantive sense, Ie pouvoir, doesn't exist...power means relations". 119 
116 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p199. 
117 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, p82. 
118 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, p209. 
119 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, pI98. 
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As I shall present it, Foucault concentrated on two principal ways in which the 
exercise of power can be conceived; the traditional perception of power as 
"juridico-discursive" and his alternative analysis of power as relational and "micro-
physical". Through his approach I shall conclude this section with a look at 
Foucault's conception of the relation between power and knowledge and its bearing 
on the genealogical pursuit of reflexivity. 
For Foucault, the "juridico-discursive" representation of power is one that "is 
deeply rooted in the history of the west" .120 He represents it in terms of five main 
features. The first of these he labels "the negative relation". By this Foucault 
means that power conceived in this way takes the form of "rejection and exclusion". 
Power is solely thought of as a relation that says no to other relations, that is, as a 
non-productive notion. In the case of sexuality, Foucault remarks that "it (the 
juridico-discursive view of power) never establishes any connection between power 
and sex that is not negative" .121 Power is seen as impinging upon the domain in 
which it operates, as masking or distorting certain features of sexuality, never as a 
positive element in the production of pleasure; "its effects take the general form of 
limit and lack". 122 
Secondly, Foucault points to "the insistence of the rule". This entails that the 
relation upon which power acts, for example sexuality, is initially sectioned into 
"licit and illicit; permitted and forbidden". 123 This prescription is enshrined in a rule 
of law; that is, power functions through discourse to the extent that "it speaks, and 
120 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction p83. 
121 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, p83. 
122 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, p83. 
123 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. p83. 
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that is the rule". This is the conception of power which takes as its ideal 
manifestation the word of the legislator; it equates power with the purity of juridical 
discourse and the "insistence" of the law implied within it. 
Thirdly, Foucault sees in the juridico-discursive VIew of power a "cycle of 
prohibition", a mechanism that tries to induce within relations a scheme of self-
regulation. The prohibitions - "thou shalt not go near, thou shalt not touch, thou 
shalt not experience pleasure, thou shalt not speak, thou shalt not show thyself; 
ultimately thou shalt not exist except in darkness and secrecy" 124 - become 
interiorised. "Renounce yourself or suffer the penalty of being suppressed; do not 
appear if you do not want to disappear" .125 Power acts as a limit in that it offers a 
form of Hobson's choice; the choice between "two non-existences". 
Fourthly, Foucault discerns within this traditional view of power a logic that creates 
laws that carry a threefold weight. They actively affirm that the subject is taboo, 
while denying talk on the subject and simultaneously questioning the reality of the 
subject; "the paradoxical logic that might be expressed as an injunction of non-
existence, non-manifestation and silence" .126 This is "the logic of censorship" that 
forms a crucial aspect of the view of power as juridico-discursive. 
Finally, Foucault suggests that this way of looking at power assumes the 
"uniformity of the apparatus". By this Foucault means that at all levels of the 
operation of power, be it in the "form of the prince who formulates rights, of the 
father who forbids, of the censor who enforces silence, or of the master who states 
the law", 127 power is thought to act in the same way, namely as a general form of 
124 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. p84. 
125 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, p84. 
126 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, p84. 
127 Foucault, The Historv of Sexuality: An Introduction, p85. 
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constraint and submission. Power, on this account, is treated as a homogeneous 
function of restriction. 
These five features constitute, for Foucault, the juridico-discursive conception of 
power; power as law and dictate, as repression and exclusion. In conversation with 
the editorial collective of Les Revoltes Logiques Foucault generalises this view as 
involving a "double subjectivisation" .128 On the one hand, power is thought of as a 
law pronounced by a "great absolute subject...the sovereignty of the Father, the 
Monarch or the General willI!. The "doublel! subjectivisation is completed in that 
one is led to think of "the point where one says yes or no to power". 129 This double 
subjectivisation presupposes "on the one hand a sovereign whose role is to forbid 
and on the other a subject who must somehow effectively say yes to this 
prohibition", be it through the "renunciation of natural rights, a social contract or a 
love of the master". 130 
The source of this double subjectivisation is to be found, suggests Foucault, in the 
Europe of the Middle ages and the system of absolute monarchy that prevailed. 
Despite the onset of "the age of revolutions" and the overthrow of many 
monarchical systems Foucault contends that "law was a weapon of the struggle 
against the same monarchical power which had initially made use of it to impose 
itself'.131 In other words the revolutionaries still retained the model of power as 
"juridico-discursive". Furthermore, it is still prevalent within "current conceptions"; 
128 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p140. 
129 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p140. See The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p85 for a 
similar statement. 
130 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p140. 
131 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p 141. 
At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the 
representation of power has remained under the spell of the monarchy. In 
political thought and analysis we still have to cut of the head of the 
King. 132 
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In sum, Foucault's argument is that theorists of power tend to be caught in a time-
trap, unaware that power has taken on new forms - the nature of which I shall turn 
to soon. However, it is worth asking first why it should be that political thought -
including Marxist thought133 - came under such a spell. Foucault does suggest that 
"power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself' .134 
The importance of this statement is that it captures the relation between freedom 
and power that accompanies the juridico-discursive approach. As long as we hope 
to retain a conception of freedom, "however slight", then we must view power as 
something that is oppressive and must be shed off our shoulders. This means that 
"power as a pure limit on freedom is, at least in our society, the general form of its 
acceptability"; 135 without a conception of power as a restrictive set of mechanisms 
there would be no room for freedom. This, for Foucault, accounts for the 
persistence of this view of power and why political theory has still not "cut off the 
head of the king". Of course, as we examine Foucault's account of the operation of 
modern power this means that we must also be aware of how he hopes to account 
for freedom. Is it simply going to disappear from the analysis or is there an 
alternative account of freedom that accompanies his alternative approach to his 
analysis of the way power operates? This is a question that can not be fully 
132 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, pp88-89. 
133 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p88. 
134 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p86. 
135 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p86. 
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addressed until the final chapter with a look at his later writings; for now, though, 
we must be aware of it as a central issue in his work.!36 
That power relations are never solely relations of domination, negative prohibitions 
or function as law is the main thrust of the argument of The History of Sexuality: 
An Introduction. Far from there having occurred a "sexual revolution" in recent 
times, (thus implying that our sexual selves were restricted by the operation of 
power) Foucault argues that since the beginning of modern times there has been a 
relentless development of discourses on sexuality. Moreover, these have led to the 
creation of the domain of sexuality as a legitimate area for scientific study, they 
have created the "historical construct"!37 of sexuality; 
what was involved ... was the very production of sexuality. Sexuality must 
not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in 
check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to 
uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct; not a 
furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in 
which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the 
incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the 
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, m 
accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power.!38 
136 Many commentators have made the question of Foucault's account of freedom, or more 
specifically his inability to give an adequate account of this notion, the central question in his 
thought. One example will suffice; R.J. Bernstein's article "Foucault: Critique as a Philosophic 
Ethos", Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, Axel Honneth et 
al (eds), MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, argues that Foucault's account of a "sceptical 
freedom that limits itself to talk of new possibilities for thinking and acting but heroically or 
ironically refuses to provide any evaluative orientation as to which possibilities and changes are 
desirable is in danger of becoming merely empty". I point to this line of criticism now, however, 
not to try and engage with it rather to acknowledge that it is a persistent and important position. 
My reasons for leaving it to one side at present are that I want to try and rebut such criticisms but 
only through a more fundamental rethinking of Foucault's work, a rethinking that involves more 
general questions regarding his thought. In the last chapter I shall try and indicate how this 
reworking can open up the discussion of Foucault's account of freedom in a way that explores 
Foucault's thought from within his own domain, rather than applying a conception of normative 
critique onto his work, a conception he was at pains to reject. 
137 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p105. 
138 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, pp105-106. 
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The historical details of the argument Foucault proposes can be found in the text. I 
wish to use this example simply as a way of introducing, in a conceptual manner, 
the more positive notion of power Foucault outlines in the book. How does power 
operate, for Foucault? Power is a relation between forces and every distribution of 
forces is a distribution of power. 139 As mentioned earlier, power is not a substance, 
and thus it can never be singular, it must exist as a relation of forces; 
what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which 
does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their 
actions; an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which 
may arise in the present or the future. 140 
Given this non-substantivist view of the character of power, there follow' three 
principal theses. First, power, as we have seen already, is not essentially repressive. 
Power can be a productive force, "it incites, it induces, it seduces"141, creating 
possibilities as much as curtailing them. Secondly, power is exercised rather than 
owned. It is not the property of one particular class or of any single individual, 
though it can be practised as domination by these, but it is a relation immanent in all 
expressions of force. Thirdly, power works through the actions of the dominated 
as surely as it does through the actions of the dominators. This is, of course, a 
consequence of the previous thesis in that if power is relational then it must 
function through every aspect of the relation. In this thesis we can discern 
139 There may be some confusion regarding the different notions of force and power. One way of 
thinking about this is to consider force to be the "series of clashes that constitute the social body" 
while power should be viewed as the "stratification" or "institutionalisation" of these clashes; 
Foucault Live p188. This is a crucial distinction given Foucault's desire to conceive of modes of 
power which do not correspond to the wholly negative view of power discussed above. If power is 
a relation of forces then there exist an open-ended number of relations in the whole social field, 
including relations that are productive. In relation to Deleuze and Guattari, B. Massumi, A User's 
Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, MIT Press, London, 1992, p19, makes essentially the 
same distinction; "Force culminates a boundless potential. It takes the uniqueness of the event to 
its limit. Power delimits and distributes the potential thus released". 
140 Foucault, "The Subject and Power" Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, p220. 
141 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p220. 
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Foucault's Nietzscheanism. For Nietzsche the operations of power must not only 
be considered as bearing down upon us in an oppressive fashion, indeed philosophy 
itself must be considered as an expression of the "most spiritual will to power" .142 
F or Nietzsche, the will to power is manifest in all action and thus it doesn't make 
sense to talk of power as simply oppressive. 143 
Following in this vein, Foucault considers power as constitutive of ethical practice 
(though a fuller appreciation of Foucault's "ethics" and its relation to questions of 
power will be addressed in the last chapter); 
Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term conduct is one of the best aids 
for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. For to 
'conduct' is at the same time to 'lead' others ... and a way of behaving within 
a more or less open field of possibilities. 144 
Strategies of power are therefore unique to particular actions and their effects. As 
we have seen, these strategies differed in the Panopticon from those in the 
formation of the domain of sexuality. In the creation of the "scientia sexualis"145 
the functioning of power is not so much defined in terms of visibility and discipline 
but in terms of "anatomo-politics" and "bio-politics". These refer respectively to 
the operation of power through the individual body and through the body of the 
whole population. In conversation with Lucette Finas, Foucault elaborates on 
these; 
between every point of a social body ... there exist relations of power which 
are not purely ... a projection of the sovereigns great power over the 
142 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. RJ. Hollingdale, Penguin, London, 1973, p21. 
143 A useful commentary on Nietzsche's conception of the "will to power" is given by RJ. 
Hollingda1e, Nietzsche, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, chapter four. 
144 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p221. 
145 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, pp53-73. 
individual; they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the 
sovereigns power is grounded the conditions which make it possible to 
function. 146 
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These relations of power that function "between every point of a social body" are, 
as Gilles Deleuze points out, "local" but not "localised" .147 They do not rain down 
from a central authority, there is no locus of power, but there are movements and 
"inflections" that operate throughout the network of forces. Power does not "stop" 
at localities, this would simply be to replace the uniqueness of the sovereign with 
the uniqueness of many sovereigns, rather it operates between many points, through 
many movements and dimensions. Power is constituted as a "microphysics", or as a 
"capillary physics". 148 With the onset of the modem era, and the Panoptic diagram 
of power relations, came "the point where power reaches into the very grain of 
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, 
their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives", the form of a "synaptic 
regime of power" .149 And as one cannot know the blood running through ones 
veins, one cannot know the actions and effects of power relations. That this is the 
case is because power is characterised as a practice, as a force acting in relation 
only to other forces, while knowledge is constituted as a form of regularity - as we 
saw earlier in regard to Foucault's archaeological project. The realms of power and 
knowledge are not co-extensive, they are not identical; yet they are inextricably 
linked. It is relations of power that actually constitute the various domains of 
knowledge, be they the fields of madness, medicine or sexuality, and it is the 
techniques of knowledge that "invest" the actions of power; "between techniques of 
146 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp187-188. 
147 Deleuze, Foucault, p73. 
148 Foucault, Power!Knowledge, p39, 20l. 
149 Foucault, Power!Knowledge, p39. 
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knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have 
specific roles and are linked only on the basis of their difference" .150 
At this point we must recapture the trace of the genealogical memory. 
Openings 
Strategies of the limit are multi-dimensional; they shed light, not so much bright as 
diffuse, not so much penetrating as encompassing, and in this light time becomes 
problematic. From the limit, the cardinal point is the moment of rupture, the 
instance of discontinuity, that razes the ideological castles of teleological theory to 
the ground. The apoplectic faltering of history, the fleeting movement from one 
point to the next - but what next? - is what first draws the limit-attitude to its own 
necessary "folding". 151 With the episteme Foucault sought a closure of thought, an 
interpretation that sucked out his own presence in an attempt to overcome the 
limits of that presence; he tried to side-step the analytic of finitude. Positing the 
regularity and completeness of the discursive practices of the human sciences he 
thought he could dispense with an account of his own situation. Yet, in the event, 
this had to fold. 
It had to fold as a movement of the outside coming to terms with the need for 
interiority; the need for a critical consciousness. This is not the need to locate an 
inner sanctum from where thought may pass over its object in an undisturbed 
atmosphere, but rather it is the necessity to see the inside (the regular and the 
150 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p98. 
151 The introduction of the terminology of "the fold" is taken from Deleuze's reading of Foucault; 
Foucault, especially the chapter titled "Foldings or The Inside of Thought (Subjectivation)". The 
term can have many uses, in this case it simply denotes the internal collapse of the archaeological-
genealogical method by its own critical standards. I am introducing this terminology because I 
believe that Deleuze's reading offers a fruitful critical understanding of Foucault; an 
understanding that opens, rather than forecloses, new perspectives on his work. 
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complete) as an operation through the outside and as a constant "doubling" which 
binds the inside as of the outside. It is the experience of the madman as he is put 
adrift in his boat; 
he is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely ... a prisoner in the 
midst of what is freest, the openest of routes; bound fast at the infinite 
cross-roads. He is the passenger par excellence; that is, the prisoner of 
the passage. 152 
In the passing of his thought, the shifts and re-inventions, Foucault relocates his 
own writing as a catharsis; he exposes the limits of his thought in order that t4ese 
limits may be diffused. This is the reflexive moment, the moment where Foucau.1t 
recognises his works as "fictions", the moment, the movement, of the fold of 
thought back on itself. The limits of our finitude as knowing beings are not 
overcome but rather brought back within the domain of the analysis so that they are 
no longer constituted as "outside" of it. This is the cathartic function of self-critical 
thought. 
Yet in the attempt to diffuse ones "control" one must possess an analytic of the 
modes of diffusion; the pathways of "control" that "incite, induce and seduce" as 
well as exclude and prohibit. One must come to terms with power. In this 
Nietzschean genealogical shift, the relations embedded within the cathartic fold are 
given an immediacy, a practice in the "concrete, changing soil", through the trace of 
the interpreter's memory as a mark on the analysis. It is, as Foucault calls it, a 
"history of the present". 
In trying to write this history Foucault looked to an analytic of "regimes of 
power/knowledge". In this way a link is forged between the need to understand the 
modes of the diffusion of power across time and the operation of power in 
152 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pll. 
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contemporary institutional relations. The genealogist works on the "flash of 
lightning" across these spaces; for example, from the conception of punishment as 
an open spectacle inflicted by all, to the disciplinary structures of light and visibility 
where the inmate is individualised, to the analytic of power relations, to Foucault's 
involvement with the GIP group in seeking prison reform. 153 There are many limits 
to cross and many movements to make. 
Yet, movement and change and the act of transgression are unaccounted for in 
Foucault. Or, more correctly, they are brash in their silence, proclaiming their 
existence to hide the evidence of their non-existence. Recall how Foucault 
suggested a similar ploy was used to effect regarding sexuality. 154 Foucault reaches 
the threshold of transgression, he reaches the limits of his thought and its relation 
with the limits of "others", yet he reveals an incapacity to deal with the actual 
traversing movement that must take place. Or must it? It is my "bottom line" - or 
non-teleological, non-transcendental ontological foundation - that there must exist 
"unbounded" times of change as one transgresses ones limits. Whether they are the 
limits of analysis, of thought or of practice, these times can be usefully thought of 
as zones of liminality. 
The memory of the opening slogan is brought back to the fore; Michel Foucault is a 
philosopher of the limit not the liminal. The thought of the limit is fixed as a 
thought of the present; it is the constant striving for transgression, without an 
awareness of the field of that transgression; it becomes an impossible attempt to 
reach a ghostly and elusive immediacy. The present becomes the limiting factor of 
Foucault's genealogical catharsis to the extent that it remains as a transcendental 
condition of genealogical knowledge. Foucault talked of transgression yet could 
153 On the last of these see the useful account in Michel Foucault, Didier Eribon, trans. Betsy 
Wing, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1991, pp224-234. 
154 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p80. 
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posit only a "lightning movement", one lacking in the (paradoxical) content of 
transgression. As a consequence the genealogical project of recapturing a "history 
of the present" is unable to account for the experience of living in and through 
times of change, times of reappraisal - and all self-critical thought constitutes a 
reappraisal! The transcendental conditions of its thought ensure that the 
genealogical approach cannot cope with its own immediacy. Genealogy 
incorporates its own analytic of finitude in its conception of the present. 
It may be suggested that Foucault expressly dealt with the objection that his 
analyses are unable to theorise the content of transgression as early as The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. 155 Does he not explicitly address the concern that his 
approach implies "the vacant moment of rupture"?156 Does he not suggest that in 
examining this problem "in more detail" reveals that this is not the case?157 Is not 
the precise aim of his archaeoiogy to analyse the "system of transformations" that 
constitute the ruptures between and within discursive practices?158 Thus, in 
criticising Foucault for constituting the present as a transcendental limit, as a 
moment of vague rupture, have I not mistaken the tenor of his work several steps 
back? Have I not allowed myself to get carried away with my opening slogan to 
the detriment of a careful analysis? Surely the concept of liminality is inappropriate 
as Foucault is well aware of the subtleties of transition on all levels from the 
historical, to the theoretical and to the political? 
This would be to mistake my point, to misdirect my line of criticism and to accept 
too easily Foucault's own account of "transformation". Foucault is right in seeking 
155 See especially chapter five, "Change and Transformations". 
156 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p166. 
157 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p167. 
158 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p170 and 175. See also, The Order of Things, 
"Foreword to the English Edition", pxii. 
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to reject histories that examine the vast complexity of the past and try to "establish 
a system of differences" and overcome historical particularity in the name of a 
unifying theme. 159 Yet, his attempt to follow this with "a system of 
transformations"160 seems to give the lie to a radical break with the approach he 
criticises. The idea of "transformation" assumes the simultaneous status of an 
object in archaeological analysis and the marker of its limits, its defining 
characteristic. Archaeology creates the possibility of examining discursive 
transformations, yet this becomes its own downfall because it can only conceive of 
these in terms of the very "system" it was hoping to avoid. This must be the case 
because the archaeologist is ultimately forced to stand "outside" of these 
transformations to study them. The archaeologist succeeded in problematising the 
teleological assumptions of "History" and "the Historical subject" but did not 
succeed in overcoming the teleology within itself 
It might be further objected, that the introduction of a genealogical approach into 
his work has overcome this "methodological failure"; that genealogy situates the 
genealogist within the analysis as an active and self-critical part of it. Does this not 
mean that I can simply think in terms of genealogical (rather than archaeological) 
transformations? Is it possible that the "content of transgression" was elaborated 
by his later emphasis on power and its relationship to the discursive regularities of 
knowledge? Was it not an express concern of Foucault's genealogy to give the idea 
of transgression a more definite content by introducing the method of a "history of 
the present"? 
Such a criticism is based on a confusion between the history of the present as a 
solution to the problems inherent in Foucault's overly structuralist archaeology, and 
159 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p171. 
160 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p173. 
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the history of the present as offering an adequate conception of a critical relation 
between past, present and future. I agree that in pursuing a broadly Nietzschean 
concept of power and self-reflexivity Foucault has overcome the claim that his 
approach is self-limiting (in the teleological sense) but refute the claim that this is 
enough for an adequate conception of critical thought. Foucault's genealogy talks 
of transgressing the bounds of our thought, it talks incessantly of this, but it is 
incapable of theorising a way of passing the bounds of its own self-critical 
perspective. A history of the present may be non-teleological but at the cost of a 
transcendental understanding of the present. Is not the aim of critical thought to 
surpass the present, to find ways of conceptualising social relations that may 
transgress this boundary of our thought, the boundary of a transcendental present? 
A history of the present is scuppered by its inability to reach an immanent 
understanding of the present. Without this it will never gain a critical understanding 
of the future. 
It may be continued that I am falling into the very trap described so well by 
Foucault in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, the trap of thinking that we 
can liberate ourselves in some emancipatory leap into a better future. I criticised it 
myself. Am I now not falling back into the old ways, the old ideas of freedom that 
actually allow for (and constitute) our further constraint? Why don't I come right 
out and admit that I am siding with the champions of critical theory; that I am really 
criticising Foucault in the same way that Habermas, for example, criticises him; that 
Foucault can not offer us a theory of liberation, a way of breaking out of our 
chains, a way of rescuing the pure reason of the Enlightenment and putting it to the 
service of our freedom? If this is my point I must say so. 
I am not here to criticise Foucault in this fashion. Yes, I argue that Foucault's 
archaeology-genealogy is lacking a critical edge to it, and I also agree that his 
work offers enormous "empirical insight" though it is theoretically problematic. 
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But we need not assume that the only way of attaining this critical perspective is to 
follow the critical theorists; that Foucault's thought contains problems does not 
mean that we have to think of these problems as "normative confusions". Is there 
another way of thinking about critical thought that Foucault's own analysis can 
suggest if not fully achieve? Is it not more productive to examine Foucault by his 
own standards and push the boundaries of his thought from within? Surely, in 
pursuing his own limits we can open up his work, chase the possibilities inherent 
within it, rather than consign it to the bin of irrationalism? I shall argue that the 
concept of liminality achieves this; liminality serves to explore the possibility of an 
ontological conception of social criticism within Foucault's works that does not 
indulge the (teleological and transcendental) normative preoccupations of the 
critical theorists. It challenges Foucault's thought in the spirit of moving it on as 
opposed to stopping it dead. That I can argue this is the task of this work. 
It might be further suggested that I am indulging in a poor word-play, a play on the 
idea of the liminal as a substitute for the idea of the limit. I have yet to really 
expand on the idea of the liminal as a critical force, as a force that works against 
and with Foucault's thought. The liminal is itself a silence in this work, so far. In 
the following chapters liminality is explicated by way of its role as a critical tool in 
the discussion of contemporary debates. In the last chapter liminality is explored in 
the context of Foucault's later works. This will not constitute a complete 
investigation of the possibilities inherent in the concept. The existence of liminality 
is dependent upon facing limits, yet periods of liminality must be thought of as 
being without limits - we never know where change can take us, the ends may 
appear close yet be far-away, they may be false, they may be distorted, imagined or 
projected. Zones of liminality, the thoughts of the liminal, are N-dimensional. In 
the following chapter one such dimension is explored in the thought of Jameson and 
Baudrillard. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FAILING THE PRESENT: JAMESON AND BAUDRILLARD 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I concluded that Foucault's archaeological-genealogical 
inquiries relied upon a conception of the present that acted simultaneously as the 
object of inquiry and the limiting factor of those inquiries. The present was both 
the observed and the privileged point of observation; it became caught in its own 
finitude. By arguing that Foucault's earlier work requires an analytic of 
liminality in order to overcome this problem, it is necessary to examine further 
the relationship between liminality and the present. 
Asking the question "what is the present?" it is important to specify the character 
of the issues at stake. This can be achieved through a brief comparison of my 
approach with that of Smart in his article "Modernity, Postmodernity and the 
Present" where he explicitly addresses "the nature of the present". 1 Smart sets 
himself the task of examining the sociological question of whether or not we are 
currently living through a modem or a postmodem present. While this is a 
crucial task for many diverse areas of thought, this is not the debate that I shall 
engage in. Although I shall cover some of the same ground as Smart and others,2 
my main aim is not a sociological examination of the present but a philosophical 
See Barry Smart "Modernity, Postmodernity and the Present", Theories of Modernity and 
Postmodernity Bryan S. Turner (ed) , Sage Publications, London, 1990, pp14-30. At some points 
Smart appears to be very close to the concerns outlined above when, for example, he speaks of "the 
present as a time of significant change or transition" p26. However, this operates for Smart as an 
assumption gleaned from sociological analysis rather than a theoretical claim regarding the 
philosophical possibilities of the concept of the present - a distinction explored immediately below. 
At this point it is also worth mentioning that although I wish to stick to the distinction between a 
sociological and a philosophical approach to the nature of the present I am not making an implicit 
assumption regarding the epistemological status of these approaches. 
2 Apart from Turner's Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity another excellent collection on 
issues surrounding postmodernity is the special double issue of Theory, Culture and Society vol. 5 
numbers 2 and 3, 1988. 
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analysis of the concept of the present. My concern is not with the character of 
the present as something else (as modem, as postmodern) but rather with possible 
ways of conceiving of the present in itself. 
In order to achieve this, I shall concentrate upon two very different commentators 
on the sociological character of the present, and use their analyses to look at the 
philosophical assumptions they make about the present. The two thinkers are 
Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard. It will be argued that despite their very 
different approaches to modernity and postmodernity, both thinkers rely upon 
essentially similar philosophical assumptions about the nature of the present. This 
is revealed to be the case by comparing their analyses on three key debates in the 
discussion surrounding modernity and postmodernity: namely, the changing 
nature of the social sphere; the character of the subject; and the possibility of 
critical reflection. Close examination of these areas shows that Jameson and 
Baudrillard both presuppose firstly, that the present is a homogeneous domain; 
secondly, that the present is ultimately unknowable; and thirdly, (the proposition 
on which the first two rest) that the present is a distinct and discrete moment from 
the past and the future. Rethinking the debate in these terms helps to situate the 
sense of the present that I shall use in later chapters, as well as offering a fresh 
critical perspective on Jameson and Baudrillard. 
The method of argumentation III this chapter is intended to recall Bergson's 
intuition philosophique and his general approach to temporality and the present. 3 
Firstly, the scope of current debates is "problematised"; secondly, the issues are 
"differentiated" in a new fashion; and thirdly, priority is given to thoroughly 
3 I take my account of Bergson primarily from Matter and Memory, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. 
Palmer, Zone Publications, New York, 1991. I also intend to follow a De1euzian interpretation of 
Bergson, an interpretation that places his thought firmly within the remit of contemporary debates; 
Bergsonism, Zone Press, New York, 1991. 
72 
"temporalising" the issue at hand, in this case the concept of the present. 4 The 
elements of a "temporal present" and the insight it offers into overcoming the 
problems of the Foucauldian genealogical present are examined towards the end 
of the chapter. 
Postmodernism, Late-Capitalism and Hyperreality. 
Having rallied against confusing an investigation of the present as a philosophical 
concept with an examination of the sociological present, it is appropriate to 
redress the balance. To pursue the philosophical assumptions Jameson' and 
Baudrillard make about the present it is necessary to have a prior grasp of their 
respective positions towards the postmodem as a sociological condition. In this 
way the following analysis can be situated in the more traditional commentaries 
on their work. 
The term "postmodem" is generally accredited to Toynbee's work A Study of 
History. 5 In this work he conceives of the modem age as a period of increasing 
embourgeoisement ranging from the fifteenth century to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The modem is characterised by the belief that middle class life 
would slowly and surely come to dominate the social field leading to "a timeless 
present" . 6 Yet this belief was twice ruptured by the onset of the world wars in 
1914 and 1939. The present no longer seemed secure; the drive towards middle 
4 Deleuze' s calls the intuition philosophique "one of the most fully developed methods in 
philosophy", Bergsonism, p13. I cannot hope to give all the subtleties involved in this approach 
their full due, but I hope it will become clear how my attempt at setting up the problems in this 
chapter relies heavily on the basic thrust of Bergson's approach. 
5 See A. Toynbee A Study of History, vol. 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1954, and A Study 
of History, vol. 9, London, Oxford University Press, 1954. Smart, in "Modernity, Postmodernity 
and the Present", p26, also mentions that "an early trace" of the concept of postmodernity is found in 
the work of de Onis. Smart takes this from M. Calinescu, Faces of Modernity, Indiana University 
Press, London. 
6 Toynbee, A Study of History vol 9, p421. 
73 
class stability could hardly be considered reasonable after such catastrophic 
events. These ruptures affirmed the fragility of an unquestioned progress through 
technology; the dream of technical solutions to the problems of the age began to 
fade as the devastation of war laid waste to bourgeois ideals. Thus the "post-
Modem Age" was installed. Moreover, the hope of increasing peace through 
technology began to look barren. Technology began to assume a role that carried 
it beyond the sphere of the human. It started to outstrip the "adaptational 
capacity of a single human life "7 and exacerbated gaps of wealth and inequalities 
rather than offering a solution to them. 
The importance of this early usage is that, in many respects, it set the tone for 
future debates about postmodernity and postmodemism. It encapsulated the idea 
of changing economic structures and social conditions in the post-war era. More 
than this, it helped put the normative value of this transition on the agenda. 
Toynbee deemed the "post-Modem age" to be wholly negative, as apparent in his 
insistence that the postmodem age provided the choice of either becoming a 
"fiend" or a "robot". 8 Smart sees in this attitude an approach that would 
resurface with the work of Bell two decades later. 9 From the beginning, then, a 
key question surrounding the concept of the postmodem was whether or not to 
celebrate the closure of the modem age. Is it a matter of rejoicing in the failure 
of progressivist ideas, lamenting at their death or seeking to revitalise the 
modernist dream of progress? In many respects, the analyses offered by Jameson 
and Baudrillard engage in these debates. Yet, as it stands, this is too simple an 
interpretation. There is another strand to the concept of the postmodem that must 
be taken into account; the strand that comes from the arts. 
7 Toynbee, A Study of History vol 9, p468. 
8 Toynbee, A Study of History vol 9, p757. 
9 Smart "Modernity, Postmodernity and the Present", p28. 
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As Featherstone describes 10 , the term postmodemism became prevalent in the 
New York art scene of the 1960s. It became a way of expressing an artistic 
attitude that looked "beyond the exhausted high modernism" which was deemed 
as being too firmly trapped in the economic constraints imposed by museums and 
other institutions (especially academic institutions). At this time it was also 
picked up by architects as a useful way of describing their distrust of the grid like 
structures of Corbusier with their uniformity and lack of feeling for space as 
"habitable" .11 To this extent there existed an aesthetic element of postmodernism 
which involved the undermining of the assumptions of modernist art from an 
institutional as well as a stylistic perspective. This artistic strand to the 
postmodem in the arts is summed up by Featherstone: 
the effacement of the boundary between art and everyday life; the 
collapse of the hierarchical distinction between high and mass/popular 
culture; a stylistic promiscuity favouring eclecticism and the mixing of 
codes; parody, pastiche, irony, playfulness and the celebration of the 
surface depthlessness of culture; the decline of the originality/genius of 
the artistic producer and the assumption that art can only be 
repetitious .12 
It is this sense of postmodemism that has become the most familiar though it 
cannot actually be separated from the usage inaugurated by Toynbee. The sense 
of the "post-Modem Age" is very closely linked to debates about 
"postmodemism". As regards Jameson and Baudrillard, the perceived changes in 
10 M. Featherstone, "In the Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction", Theory Culture and 
Society vol. 5, numbers 2-3, June 1988 pp197-215. 
11 See H. Caygill, "Architectural Postmodernism: The Retreat of an Avant-Garde?", Postmodernism 
and Society, R. Boyne and A. Rattansi (eds), Macmillan Press, London, 1990, pp260-289. 
12 Featherstone, "In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction", p202. 
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technology and the public sphere are very closely associated with their theoretical 
accounts of the issues raised by the "effacement" of boundaries .13 
Turning to Jameson, one immediately notices that his analyses of postmodem 
cultural forms is incredibly sensitive to their diversity, complexity and subtlety. 
He possesses a wide ranging knowledge of the different trends that have come to 
be thought of as indicative of the postmodem. His flair for writing on aspects of 
architecture, literature or painting, for example, is scarcely rivalled by other 
commentators. Yet this undoubted eloquence is not without its drawbacks. As 
O'Neill suggests,14 the insight that he brings to the analysis of postmodem 
artefacts and effects makes his subsequent criticism of them seem "a little 
difficult". It is as if Jameson's "intellectual performance" muddies the waters of 
whatever insight he has to offer .15 
For others Jameson's complicity in the postmodem goes further than simply an 
overly eloquent appraisal of its major cultural forms. Callinicos, in Against 
Postmodemism: A Marxist Critique,16 is not only "irritated" with those who 
refuse to take up the cause of social transformation in the name of a 
postmodernist dismissal of critical foundations, he is also wary of Jameson's 
desire to become so involved in postmodernism, as if the lack of a "clear" 
perspective might rub off. He argues that Jameson's attempt at placing himself 
"inside" the postmodem forsakes the Marxist critic's responsibility to pass 
judgement on this new formation of capital. For Callinicos the task of a Marxist 
13 For an expanded account of the history to the term "postmodem" see Postmodem Theory: Critical 
Interrogations, S. Best and D. Kellner, MacMillan Press, London, 1991, especially chapter one. 
14 J. O'Neill, "Religion and Postmodemism: The Durkhemian Bond in Bell and Jameson" Theory, 
Culture and Society, vol. 5, numbers 2-3, June 1988 pp493-508, p498. 
15 R. Levitas, "Review of Postmodemism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", Theory, 
Culture and Society, vol. 9, 1992, pp167-169, p167. 
16 A. Callinicos, Against Postmodemism: A Marxist Perspective, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
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analysis is simple; to explain postmodem theory as a superstructural effect of 
current economic conditions; to stress that there is no inconsistency between "the 
scientific analysis and the ethical appraisal of a social phenomenon" .17 Jameson's 
position is too watered down for Callinicos. 
And yet Jameson is at pains to underscore the Marxist character of his analysis. 
Thus we must briefly look at the kind of Marxism Jameson has in mind. For 
Jameson there is no longer a place for "old fashioned ideological critique, the 
indignant moral denunciation of the other" .18 When we tum our critical gaze to 
the postmodem a more Althusserian approach must be adopted; that is, one" that 
understands the postmodem cultural sphere as "semiautonomous"; 
If you prefer a now somewhat antiquated language, the distinction is the 
very one Althusser used to harp on between a Hegelian "essential cross 
section" of the present (or coup d' essence), where the culture critique 
wants to find a single principle of the postmodem inherent in the most 
varied and ramified features of social life, and the Althusserian 
"structure in dominance" in which the various levels entertain a 
semiautonomy over against each other, run at different rates of speed, 
develop unevenly and yet conspire to produce a totality .19 
Without going into the realms of Hegel versus Althusser, one can see here the 
kind of distinctions that Jameson wants to make between his position and more 
traditional forms of Marxism. Postmodem cultural forms are deemed to be 
amenable to critique in an aesthetic sense, in a sense that draws upon the artistic 
and stylistic history of modem art, despite the suspicions of thinkers like 
Callinicos. Yet, following the tradition of postmodernism as a new age of 
technology and public life, Jameson also wishes to underscore his analysis with an 
17 Callinicos, Against Postmodemism, p132. 
18 Jameson, Postmodemism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London, 1991, p46. 
19 Jameson, Postmodemism, pxx. 
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account of the relations of production and consumption In "late-capitalism". 20 
The issue, thereby, becomes one of the relation between these two perspectives -
how the two aspects "conspire to produce a totality". In Althusserian fashion, 
Jameson approaches this by suggesting that, as the cultural forms of 
postmodemism have gradually spread throughout economic and social realms, 
this can only be fully comprehended if we assume that the process was actually 
initiated through the logic of late capitalism. In the last instance, then, Jameson 
can claim to cling to a Marxist political economy, while maintaining that his 
contextualisation of postmodemism, his closeness to the phenomena, constitutes 
an essential feature of his analysis (and not the self-delusions of a reactionary, as 
Callinicos broadly suggests). 
However, if old style moralising Marxism is not an option according to Jameson, 
if his emphasis on the semiautonomy of cultural production is so different, where 
exactly is his critique situated? As Levitas has put it,21 "the temptation to quote 
Jameson ... against himself is overwhelming" (though I shall use a different quote 
for my purposes); 
Weare somehow to lift our minds to a point at which it is possible to 
understand that capitalism is at one and the same time the best thing 
that has happened to the human race and the worst ... the urgency of the 
subject demands that we make at least some effort to think of the 
cultural evolution of late capitalism dialectically, as a catastrophe and 
progress all together. 22 
20 Jameson appropriates the term "late capitalism" from E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, New Left 
Books, London, 1975. Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, p133, draws attention to several 
problems in this appropriation. 
21 Levitas, "Review", p167. 
22 Jameson, Postmodernism, p47. 
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How Jameson achieves this is, I believe, unclear. Perhaps the best way of trying 
to unpack the crucial "somehow" in this quote is through the use Jameson makes 
of "cognitive mapping", a concept he borrows from the novelist Lynch. 23 
Jameson employs this concept as a way of bringing the "dialectic" of postmodern 
"alienation and globalisation" into a critical field of vision. His aim is to locate a 
new theoretical tool - it must be new given the new mode of late capitalist 
production - that can allow individuals to, "grasp our position as individual and 
collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle which at the present is 
neutralised by our spatial as well as our social confusion" .24 Jameson hopes to 
overcome the malaise at the heart of postmodern society by illustrating how the 
processes involved in cognitive mapping can reclaim social/public space for 
collective activity. In creating cognitive maps postmodern subjects are entreated 
by Jameson to reclaim "a sense of place" that gives them a feel for the whole of 
their environment; 
a reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be retained in 
memory and which the individual subject can map and remap along the 
moments of mobile, alternative trajectories. 25 
The idea of cognitive mapping IS elaborated by reference to Lacan. The 
traditional problem of classical Marxist analyses - the problem of deciding how to 
recognise the difference between science and ideology, in Althusser's terms - can, 
claims Jameson, be given a new Lacanian twist. He argues that science and 
ideology are equivalent to Lacan's categories of the Real and the Imaginary. The 
cognitive map, on the other hand, encapsulates a Marxist understanding of the 
third Lacanian category, the Symbolic. For Jameson, consideration of this third 
23 J arneson, Postmodernism, p5l. 
24 Jarneson, Postmodernism, p54. 
25 J arneson, Postmodernism, p5l. 
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term reveals the potential for a critical perspective towards postmodernism that 
avoids the pitfalls of the traditional Marxist approach. Postmodernism, rather 
than being simply an Imaginary (ideological) effect, becomes a semiautonomous 
Symbolic form with a foothold, in the last instance, in the Real. It is the idea of 
cognitive mapping which he believes most adequately captures the complexities of 
this situation.· Concluding this (allegedly) immanent critique of postmodernism 
he argues that the "world space" of late capitalism must be recognised for what it 
is (that is, essentially global and fragmentary) and it must be reclaimed in the 
name of a new dialectic that overcomes this dichotomy through cognitive 
mapping of our symbolic experience. 
However, in response to criticism regarding the vagueness of this notion of 
cognitive mapping,26 Jameson makes a surprising admission; 
Cognitive mapping was in reality nothing but a code word for "class 
consciousness" - only it proposed the need for class consciousness of a 
new and hitherto undreamed of kind. 27 
With this admission it is hard to envisage what, if any, contribution Jameson has 
made towards a Marxist understanding of the postmodern. Jameson appears to 
have added an extra layer of analysis with ultimately no gain in explanatory 
power. The postmodern Symbolic is always held in check by Jameson's Marxist 
account of the Real; that is, by his grand narrative of emergent class 
consciousness. Interestingly, though, Jameson's grand narrative employs 
assumptions about the present shared by postmodernism. To· show this to be the 
case, it is necessary to sketch Baudrillard' s account of the postmodern present. 
26 See especially, D. Kellner (ed.), PostmodemismlJameson/Critique, Washington, 1989. 
27 Jameson, Postmodemism, pp417 -418. 
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Baudrillard's early works28 were attempts to develop the scope of Marxist 
analysis in ways that would incorporate a radical understanding of language. 
With the publication of The Mirror of Production29 , however, Baudrillard's 
concerns shifted dramatically; from conceiving of his work as a supplement to 
Marxist theory, to his disillusionment with the whole theoretical system of 
political economy that sustains Marxism. In this work he argues that the systems 
of signs that have increasingly tended to dominate the post-war period (for 
example, those developed by the advertising industry) are developing a logic that 
is no longer reducible to the economic categories of Marxist political economy 
(not even in the last instance, as with Jameson). Indeed, the very foundations of 
the Marxist position, Baudrillard continues, are no more than a mirror image 'of 
the theoretical categories that underpin capitalism. To this extent, Marxism can 
only serve to reinforce the logic of the capitalist system it seeks to undermine. 
Yet, Baudrillard has a larger prey than Marxism in his sights: 
The logic of representation - of the duplication of its object - haunts all 
rational discursiveness. Every critical theory is haunted by this 
surreptitious religion, this desire bound up with the construction of its 
object, this negativity subtly haunted by the very form that it negates. 30 
The whole "logic of representation" in the contemporary world, the logic that 
created an "explosion" of different categories and concepts, has been shaken to its 
very roots. There has been an "implosion" of these categories; a loss of 
conceptual boundaries that has cut a swathe through the hierarchies and 
dichotomies that form the basis of the modern attitude. Modernism as 
28 Le System des Objets, Gallimard, Paris, 1968; La Societe de Consommation, Gallimard, Paris, 
1970; For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. Charles Levin, Telos Press, St. 
Louis, 1981. 
29 The Mirror of Production, trans. Mark Poster, Telos Press, St. Louis, 1975. 
30 Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, edited by Mark Poster, Stanford University Press, California, 
pl16. 
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characterised by Baudrillard was the process of thought drawing up its own limits 
and boundaries; its own league tables of values; and its own differentiation of 
socio-cultural spheres. The variety of categories, boundaries and ways of life 
constitutive of modernism have become increasingly remote from each other. 
The logic of specialisation immanent to modernity has led to ever greater social 
and intellectual fragmentation. 
Postmodernity, for Baudrillard, IS marked by the "implosion" and 
"dedifferentiation" of experience. In other words, postmodernity is characterised 
by the impossibility of distinguishing different areas of life; for example; the 
public and the private. The drive behind this epochal shift has been the extension 
of the cultural sphere across the whole social domain. However, the gradual 
incursion of the cultural into every sphere of social life, with which Jameson 
would agree, is not, for Baudrillard, to be met with a call to reinvigorate 
Marxism. The hope that the analysis of postmodern cultural forms can be 
redeemed through the search for an ultimate referent, a political economy of late 
capitalist production, is dismissed by Baudrillard because he believes that the 
cultural sphere has become so extensive that it only obeys its own rules; its own 
"laws" of production. At the heart of cultural production, claims Baudrillard, lies 
the inability to distinguish image from reality. The key feature of postmodernism 
is our lack of ability to differentiate the category of "real" production from 
"simulations" of that production. Thus: 
the very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is possible to 
give an equivalent reproduction - the real is not only what can be 
produced, but that which is already reproduced, the hyperreal.31 
Or again: 
31 Baudrillard, Simulations, Serniotext(e), New York 1983, p146. 
Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of 
the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as 
photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, 
becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced 
through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the 
fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but 
the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the 
hyperreal. 32 
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The background to this concept of hyperreality is Baudrillard' s belief that it is no 
longer possible to conceive of structures of communication independently from 
the global culture of the media. This most characteristic of postmodem 
phenomena becomes the focus of his analyses of postmodernity. In SimulaGra 
and Simulations33 for example, the media system is viewed as infiltrating other 
modes of production to the point where the traditional distinctions between the 
object and its representation are collapsed. This lack of distinction engendered by 
the media society is apparent in advertising in a paradigmatic form. It becomes 
impossible to dissociate the object from its image, the chocolate from the sex for 
example, to the extent that it is more accurate to refer to buying the image rather 
than the object, 34 (or so Baudrillard would have us believe). The implosion of 
the real, he goes on, extends beyond the media, beyond all "modem" boundaries, 
and into the realm of the social. As an example, Baudrillard examines the 
problems raised in trying to account for acts of terrorism. He suggests that it is 
pointless to apportion blame upon specific organisations for terrorist violence 
because there is no way of ever knowing the reality of the situation; 
Is any given bombing in Italy the work of leftist extremists; or of 
extreme right-wing provocation; or staged by centrists to bring every 
32 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p145. 
33 Simulacra and Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman, Semiotext(e), 
New York, 1983. 
34 See Poster, "Introduction", Selected Writings, p7. 
terrorist extreme into disrepute and to shore up its own failing power; 
or again, is it a police-inspired scenario in order to appeal to calls for 
public security? All this is equally true, and the search for proof -
indeed the objectivity of the fact - does not check this vertigo of 
interpretation. Weare in a logic of simulation which has nothing to do 
with a logic of facts and an order of reasons. 35 
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If this is the logic of postmodernism, the logic of hyperreality, then it seems 
pointless to even think of holding a critical stance in relation to it. Certainly, 
argues Baudrillard, if that critical stance is based upon distinctions that draw their 
roots from modernism then they are doomed to failure. But Baudrillard is not 
entirely without a concept of subversion. The key, he suggests, in a world 
thoroughly saturated with simulations operating on "the radio-active screen .of 
information"36, is to remain silent, passive to its demands, absorbing the 
information but refusing to act upon it, thus causing a haemorrhage in the flow of 
communication. Or alternatively, Baudrillard suggests a similar result is obtained 
by following the workings of the codes exactly, to the letter, because this too 
stifles the drive of postmodernity to mutate and keep the information coming. 
His attitude is summed up in a recent essay "The Masses: The Implosion of the 
Social in the Media"; 
And so the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and the 
refusal of speech; or the hyperconformist simulation of the very 
mechanisms of the system, which is another form of refusal by over-
acceptance. It is the actual strategy of the masses. This strategy does 
not exclude the other, but it is the winning one today, because it is most 
adapted to the present phase of the system. 37 
This politics of postmodernism contains none of the usual features. It is claimed 
as a new response to new times, but it is not beyond criticism. Baudrillard's 
35 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, pp174-175. 
36 Baudrillard, Forget Foucault/Forget Baudrillard, Semiotext(e), New York, 1987, p134. 
37 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p219. 
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analysis seems remarkably all encompassing in its approach. Is it not conceivable 
that the current means of information transfer can have beneficial effects to the 
extent that people may become informed and empowered? Regardless of the 
obvious problems associated with the onset of a media age, is it really necessary 
to take such a "fatalistic" approach to the issues? While the Gulf War, for 
example, may have had more than an element of staging and "hyperreality" to it, 
this does not mean that vital information concerning the reality of the situation 
was not communicated. Nor does this abolish the distinction between fact and 
fiction. As Norris succinctly puts it; 
that the gulf war provided such a telling instance of our so-called 
"postmodem condition" is reason enough to take stock of that condition 
on terms other than its own. 38 
While Baudrillard' s theories may draw attention to aspects of our contemporary 
situation they do not function as useful diagnostic devices. Baudrillard simply 
ignores too much evidence that weighs heavily against his primary theses. Where 
Jameson seems incapable of making the postmodem work in a new Marxist 
context, falling back upon old categories of class consciousness, Baudrillard' s 
attempt to think without any grand frameworks seems doomed to hyperbole in the 
process of trying to avoid narrative approaches. However, that these two 
attitudes appear so different is (on one level at least) a trick of the light. In 
representing the extremes of current thought about our contemporary situation, 
they actually rest upon the same foundation; namely, an approach to the present 
that treats it as, ultimately, a distinct moment in relation to the past and the 
future. It is a concept of the present that can be challenged. 
38 C. Norris, "The End of Ideology Revisited: The Gulf War, Postmodemism and Realpolitik", 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 17, number 1, 1991, pp 1-40, p40. 
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New Collectives and Masses 
The first assumption Jameson and Baudrillard share regarding the present can be 
extracted from their analyses of the social sphere. This assumption can be 
labelled "the idea of an homogeneous present". That is, despite the fact that their 
ideas are sensitive to the many sociological complexities of postmodem life, this 
is not reflected in a complex philosophical understanding of the nature of the 
present (whether postmodem or not). The present is conceived as an 
encompassing backdrop, immobile and impersonal; ultimately, they both fail to 
account for the possibility that "difference" is immanent to the present. I shall 
tum firstly to Jameson's account of "new collectives". 
Jameson argues that the infusion of the cultural sphere into other aspects of our 
lives, the postmodem tum in society, is accountable in terms of the logic of late 
capitalism. This entails, he argues, that we view postmodernism as a "reflex" of 
"yet another systematic modification of capitalism itself" ,39 that is as a moment of 
an already existing cultural-economic system. This presupposes the question of 
what criteria Jameson establishes for the recognition of a genuinely new social 
system; that is, social relations that are more than a modification of the prior 
(capitalist) arrangement. It is a question that Jameson addresses explicitly. His 
answer is that, "a truly new culture could only emerge through the collective 
struggle to create a new social system". 40 This requirement of "profound 
collective self-transformation"41 is a constant theme running through Jameson's 
analysis. For the present to be "truly new" there must be a wholesale change in 
the cultural-economic formation of capital. While Jameson is prepared to allow 
39 Jameson, Postmodemism, pxii. 
40 Jameson, Postmodemism, pxii. 
41 Jameson, Postmodemism, pxiv. 
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postmodernism a certain novelty to the extent that it is a semiautonomous sphere 
of development, a "cultural dominant" in the Althusserian terminology, he always 
holds this in check: 
it seems to me essential to grasp postmodernism not as a style but rather 
as a cultural dominant: a conception which allows for the presence and 
coexistence of a range of very different, yet subordinate, features. 42 
Subordinate to what? For Jameson, the fragmentary appearance of postmodern 
reality is always redeemable, via Marxist analysis. The Marxist account of 
wholesale collective transformation requires, therefore, that the present is 
structurally uniform. That is, if at any given present moment differences are 
capable of being overcome, then the present must be essentially homogeneous. It 
is a position that, he believes, is the only (sensible) option available: 
If we do not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then 
we fall back into a view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, 
random difference, a co-existence of a host of distinct forces whose 
effectivity is undecidable. 43 
The irony is that Jameson's account shares the assumptions of those who view 
"history as sheer heterogeneity". Before examining this further, however, I shall 
turn to Baudrillard' s idea of the "implosion of the social" . 
Baudrillard, as mentioned earlier, argued that the categories of modernism were 
no longer of any use; their validity could no longer be taken for granted. The 
category of "the social", a category with a long pedigree but containing a strong 
resonance of modernity, is therefore subject to his critical scrutiny. As with the 
idea of reality, Baudrillard argues that "the social" has changed so dramatically in 
42 Jameson, Postmodernism, pp3-4. 
43 Jameson, Postmodernism, pp5-6. 
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our postmodern situation that we need to rethink the issues. For Baudrillard this 
necessitates replacing the idea of the social with the idea of "the masses": "What 
is ... fascinating is the surpassing of the social, the irruption of the more social 
than the social: the masses".44 The most telling feature of "the masses", he goes 
on, is their lack of any meaningful cohesion; "the masses have no opinion". 
They are terminals of information transfer as opposed to a latent consciousness 
waiting to develop (as in Jameson). Yet, despite this lack of opinion the masses 
do posses an "evil genius", that is, an ability to undercut any theoretical attempt 
that seeks to endow them with a social consciousness: "the evil genius of the 
masses [is that by] constantly producing failure in the truth of the social.. :they 
turn themselves into an impenetrable and meaningless surface" . 45 
Leaving to one side the possible contradiction between his claims that the masses 
have no opinion and that "they turn themselves into an impenetrable and 
meaningless surface", it is interesting to note the assumptions underlying this 
notion of the masses and what these assumptions say about Baudrillard' s concept 
of the present. As with Jameson, we are confronted with an all-or-nothing 
approach; either the modernist category of the social or the postmodernist 
dissolution of the social into the masses. Where Jameson sought meaning in the 
collective realisation of a homogeneous present, Baudrillard spurns this hope in 
the "fatality" of an equally homogeneous conception of a meaningless present. 
Both authors paint a picture of the present as something that must be taken 
wholesale, a present that must be conceptualised as a homogeneous moment of 
"collective" or "mass" experience. The possibility of the present as open to 
possibilities, containing many "rhythms and tensions" ,46 is not fully entertained 
44 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p188. 
45 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p213. 
46 Bergson, Matter and Memory, p207. 
88 
despite their customary nod in the direction of the plurality of our experiences 
within the present (postmodern) domain. The potential of conceiving of the 
present as many local presents is not considered. Could the present not be 
thought of as different in different contexts? Could it not be the case that there is 
a radical heterogeneity of experiences of the present operative at "any given 
time"? In the last instance, both authors, to maintain their all-or-nothing 
approach, are forced to agree on the all-or-nothing character of the present. This 
critique can be fleshed out by way of an examination of the concept of 
subjectivity in Jameson and Baudrillard. 
The Retroactive Subject and the Simulated Object 
Jameson and Baudrillard have very different conceptions of the character of the 
postmodern subject. However, pursuing the idea that both authors misconceive 
the nature of the present an alternative picture emerges. Discussing the ways in 
which they conceive of "the subject's" relation to the present unearths hidden 
similarities in their work. Both Jameson and Baudrillard assume the subject's 
ignorance of the present. By this I mean that both authors have an account of the 
subject's relation to the present that relies upon the subject not knowing that 
present. 
For Jameson, the possibility of setting up a new social formation (as discussed in 
the previous section) is related to his account of the subject's self awareness as 
essentially after-the-fact. As the change to a new social formation is a collective 
affair, so the awareness of this change is always already implicit in that 
collectivity, but only in the a posteriori realisation of the change. Jameson 
appropriates the Freudian terminology of "retroactivity" to describe this: 
It is necessary to distinguish between the gradual setting in place of the 
various (often unrelated) preconditions for the new structure and the 
moment (not exactly chronological) when they jell and combine into a 
functional system. This moment is itself less a matter of chronology 
than it is of a well-nigh Freudian Nachtragiichkeit, or retroactivity; 
people become aware of the dynamics of some new system, in which 
they are themselves seized, only later on and gradually. 47 
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This general point is confirmed by Jameson's analysis of our experience of 
postmodern cultural, forms. Discussing the "new spatial logic" that is such a 
central feature of the postmodern (that is, the way in which the postmodern 
"forgets" history), he argues that this must have a "momentous effect" on our 
conception of historical time. The past as referent has been subsumed by the 
simulacra of pastiche and nostalgia. This creates a "pseudo historical depth" that 
replaces "real" history.48 With this entrapment in the "spatiality" of postmodern 
forms, "we seem increasingly incapable of fashioning representations of our own 
current experience". 49 This is a particular example of his general point that the 
present is unknowable. Recalling, though, that the postmodern is only partial, a 
"reflex" of late capitalism, the increasing spatiality of our consciousness is 
reprieved from a complete lack of "real" historical depth by reconsidering the 
insights of Marxism. The possibility of a revitalised Marxism is confirmed, for 
Jameson, by the lack of sense inherent in the alternative, postmodern, conception 
of subjectivity: 
If indeed the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its 
protensions and retensions across the temporal manifold and to organise 
its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough 
to see how the cultural production of such a subject could result in 
anything but heaps of fragments and in a practice of the randomly 
heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory. 50 
47 Jameson, Postmodernism, pxix. 
48 Jameson, Postmodernism, pp18-20. 
49 Jameson, Postmodernism, p21. 
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For Baudrillard, a project like Jameson's is flawed from the outset. It relies upon 
a notion of the postmodern as retrievable within a modern frame of reference; 
Jameson utilises a set of concepts and practices that Baudrillard deems to be 
irrelevant in this new age. This is especially true of attempts to create a grand 
narrative around the postmodern which relies on the coming to consciousness of 
people in a historical setting; "we sense that in our era which is that of the end of 
history all of this is invalidated". Moreover," a false sense of the radical" must 
be warded off and our "obsessive fear of the unreality of history" done away with 
if we are not going to fall into the traps of finding meaning in history. Meariing, 
Baudrillard contends, becomes apparent only in the pure event, the "catastrophe", 
that is now - the postmodern present. 51 
The subject, in the modern sense of an agent with some form of vantage point on 
reality, is no longer tenable. There is no Kantian a priori, Hegelian subjectivity, 
Marxist labourer, phenomenological or existential presence, no liberal individual 
endowed with autonomy that serves as the moment of reflection; there is no 
position from which thought may think its own object. Rather the object itself, in 
postmodernism, has assumed the privileged position, the vantage point on reality; 
or rather on hyperreality, since the object is itself only a simulation. The modern 
subject is displaced into the postmodern object: 
The object is neither the subject's double nor his or her repression; 
neither the subject's fantasy nor hallucination; neither the subject's 
mirror nor reflection; but it has its own strategy. 52 
50 J arneson, Postmodemism, p25. 
51 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p192. 
52 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p198. 
91 
The principle of the object is its own indifference, its lack of care for the 
connections it makes with other objects. It is in this sense "fatalistic" .53 But 
crucially we must not think of this as oppression in a classical sense. Human 
agents are no longer liberal individuals or Marxist labourers but consumers, 
consumed in the "fatal strategies" of the object as the only possible way of getting 
a "paradoxical"54 bearing in this postmodem world. Given the lack of historicity 
open to a subject, Baudrillard can only conclude as follows: 
What is left then but to pass over to the side of the object, to its 
affected and eccentric effects, to its fatal effects (fatality is merely the 
absolute freedom of effects).55 
What is clear is that Jameson and Baudrillard have very different conceptions of 
the character of "subjectivity" in a postmodem setting. It is also clear that these 
very different views rest upon a similar conception of the subject's relation to the 
present. They are both drawn by the fact that the subject is ultimately in a state 
of ignorance regarding the present. For Jameson, the present is only 
"retroactively" recuperable in a Marxist narrative of the past. For Baudrillard, 
the present is a purely "eventalised" moment. The "subject" is, therefore, 
dissipated into the condition of the "object": it has been become an effect. This 
picture of the "subject's" ignorance of the present that underpins both theorists is, 
however, questionable. Both Jameson and Baudrillard assume that the subject is 
unable to grasp the present in which it is immersed; that the subject faces the 
present as either wholly recuperable, but only in a discrete future, or as wholly 
unrealisable in its own discreteness. Both options place the present out of reach 
of the subject. That the subject may have a sense of the present as historical but 
53 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, pp185-206. 
54 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p203. 
55 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p205. 
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not subsumable in a grand narrative is an option they both ignore. 56 It is a 
possibility that their oppositional stances cannot but obscure. 
Maps and Shrugs 
On one level, the differences between Jameson and Baudrillard are most clearly 
expressed when considering their responses to the possibility of social criticism. 
Yet, it is also on this issue that the common ground that underpins their work 
becomes most visible. When considering the idea of critique both authors take 
the present to be. a distinct moment, a moment that is different from the 
immediate past and the oncoming future. Indeed, it is this assumption which 
explains why they came to think of the present as homogeneous and unknowable. 
That the present is a discrete moment for Jameson is apparent in his conception of 
critique as the moment of "realised totality"; that is, the moment when the 
opposite forces inherent within a given system are transcended in the dialectical 
movement of thought and practice. In this way he hopes to avoid the tendencies 
of some writers to make simple judgements on the character of the postmodem. 
In tracing the dialectical progression of postmodernism Jameson believes the critic 
can reach "the point where its facile repudiation is as impossible as any equally 
facile celebration of it is complacent and corrupt".57 Given that the cultural critic 
is embedded within the postmodem, regardless of any attempt to escape it, it is 
clear that the old traditional positions of the critic are no longer tenable. The 
only option is to let the contradictions emerge in themselves; 
56 This possibility is addressed in more detail in chapter three when I examine Taylor and Ricoeur on 
narrative identity. 
57 Jameson, Postmodemism, p62. 
So it is that, rigorously conducted, an inquiry into this or that aspect of 
the postmodern will end up telling us little of value about 
postmodernism itself, but against its own will and quite unintentionally 
a great deal about the modem proper, and perhaps the converse will 
also tum out to be true, even though the two were never to have been 
thought of as symmetrical opposites in the first place. An ever more 
rapid alternation between them can at the least help the celebratory 
posture or the old-fashioned moralising gesture from freezing into 
place. 58 
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Perhaps unwittingly, Jameson has provided the means to undermine his own 
position. In seeking to provide the cultural critic with a source of dialectical 
momentum, Jameson actually separates out the process of movement in the 
present from the understanding of that movement in the awaited future. The 
present moment is distinguished by the hind-sight to come in a markedly different 
future. Crucially, the way of linking these two elements, the way of thinking 
through the process of moving into the future, is left unsaid; dialectical critique 
can only make sense with the promise of a qualitatively different future, and yet 
this closes off the very possibility of moving into this future. The present appears 
as the failure of the future. 
Baudrillard views any attempt at reinvigorating a critical sense of time as a lost 
cause, a cause that can not be brought back to life. As he puts it; in today's 
world, "all forms that tend to advertise a miraculous freedom are nothing but 
revolutionary homilies". 59 It is useless to think of our shedding off our 
postmodern skins in a return to some (Marxist) conception of underlying causes 
in history. For Baudrillard, we have no shackles to lose; "we are no longer even 
alienated, because for that it is necessary for the subject to be divided in itself, 
confronted with the other, to be contradictory". 60 With no "other", true self or 
58 Jameson, Postmodernism, p66. 
59 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p20l. 
60 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p2IO. 
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privileged critical perspective waiting in the wings all we can do is shrug. 61 All 
that is left is to realise this, assume the "fatal logic" of the object and reconcile 
ourselves to the fact that "the pure non-causal event unfolds inescapably". 62 With 
this it is clear that time has disappeared for Baudrillard, time is of no use in the 
postmodern world, it creates obstructions to the spatial spread of objectification. 
The present becomes a series of distinct moments in time with no way of drawing 
these events together. The past and the future are lost in the failure of the 
present. 
It should be clear how this relates to Jameson's conception of the present. Both 
authors assume that the present is essentially a distinct moment. Either the 
present becomes a distinct realm that is wholly unrecoverable (as with 
Baudrillard) or it becomes recoverable only at a distinct moment in the future (as 
with Jameson). The failure of the present to live up to the future, and the failure 
of the future to live up to the present are two sides of the same coin. Both 
options can be said to "transcendentalise" the present. This can be expressed in 
the following question: how could a "new" present emerge if each present is 
thought of as distinct from every other? Because of their inability to explain this 
both thinkers fail to grasp the critical nettle with any real authority - that is, they 
fail to offer an account of how the present functions to create possibilities in and 
for the future. Because their theoretical constructions rely upon a transcendental 
present each approach mirrors the paradox that lies at the heart of the other. 
61 See "Baudrillard Shrugs: A Seminar on Terrorism and the Media, with Sylvere Lotringer and Jean 
Baudrillard". Jean Baudrillard: The Disappearance of Art and Politics, W. Stearns and W. Chaloupka 
(eds), Macmillan, London, 1992, p298. 
62 Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p19l. 
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In concluding this discussion I shall briefly outline an alternative (non-
transcendental) account of the present that treats it as a thoroughly "temporalised" 
moment. 
The Temporal Present 
It may seem surprising that the work of Henri Bergson can offer a critical 
perspective on Marxist grand narratives and postmodern nihilism. Matter and 
Memory, the primary text for present purposes, was originally published in i896 
(though I shall refer to a translation of the fifth edition of 1908). Indeed the 
concerns of the book are, at first glance, very different from those discussed 
above. However, the inclusion of Bergson in this debate is not as peculiar as it 
may initially appear. It is worth recalling the tenor and momentum of the 
argument. My initial problem was to recast the traditional debates between those 
who favour a "return" to Marxist narratives and those who deny that any 
foundation exists upon which such narratives could be based. This has led to a 
"polarisation" of the debates on a different axis: those who treat the present as a 
"spatialised" moment, discrete from the past and the future, and those who think 
of the present in an alternative manner. Around this alternative axis, Bergson's 
analysis of the present seems entirely at home. Of course, like all major 
philosophical figures, Bergson's thought has generated a variety of 
interpretations, not all of them compatible. In the following I shall rely heavily 
on the interpretation of his work offered by Deleuze. 63 
The "leading idea" of Bergson's work was, he suggested, "to see in mobility the 
only reality that is given". 64 Movement is the ontological principle of 
63 Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, Zone Press, New York, 1991. 
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Bergsonism, movement in all its appearances; from the moment that grounds 
becoming, to the illusion of immobility that is such a persistent image. 65 This 
principle can be viewed in Bergson's approach to Zeno's paradoxes; for example, 
the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Zeno pointed out that, if the tortoise is 
moving and at any given moment ahead of Achilles, then Achilles will never be 
able to catch up with the animal because by the time he reaches the point where 
the tortoise was the tortoise will always have moved on to the next point. 
Achilles may get infinitely close, but will not get past the animal. It is a 
proposition that we know to be false. Yet, asks Bergson, what is the source of 
this paradox? 
It is, he suggests, a category mistake to confuse the divisible character of space 
with the indivisibility of movement in that space. Considering the paradox of 
Achilles and the tortoise it is a confusion of categories to assume "that their 
movement coincides with their path and that we may divide it, like the path itself, 
in any way we please". 66 Space may be infinitely divisible but that does not 
mean that movement through space is similarly divisible. Instead, movement is 
never at one specific point in space and this must be made an ontological 
presupposition if Zeno' s paradoxes are to be avoided. 
The importance of this position becomes apparent when we take this reasoning 
and examine how it challenges our traditional understanding of time. To 
conceive of time as an abstract phenomenon, in principle reducible to a series of 
spatialised points, is to confuse our representation of time with real time (the 
64 Quoted in Bergson, L. Kolakowski, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, pp12-13. 
65 This general statement does need to be tempered by an account of the subtleties Bergson assigns to 
the matter of "illusions" and the related issue of perception; see for example, Matter and Memory, 
p32, where he formulates the "law", that "perception is master of space in the exact measure in 
which action is master of time". Deleuze' s discussion is illuminating on this issue, Bergsonism, 
pp33-35. 
66 Bergson, Matter and Memory, p192. 
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divisibility of space with our temporality in space). Our experience of time is not 
consistent with the abstraction that we use as a "sign" of it; clocks for example. 
In place of this confusion we must think of time as "duration" .67 The spatial, 
abstract, conception of time rests upon the idea that time is constituted by a series 
of quantitative distinctions of degree; that time is similar to a numerical series, 
for example. Bergson argues that to think of time as ontologically distinct from 
space, as duration, is to regard time as consisting of qualitative distinctions of 
kind. Time, in this sense, is analogous to a melody characterised as a fluid 
modulating movement incapable of being serialised (without doing damage to the 
melody). This conception of time has important consequences for our 
understanding of the philosophical character of the present. 
Jameson and Baudrillard presuppose that the present must be thought of as a 
discrete moment; that is, the discreteness of the present takes the role of a 
transcendental condition of their analyses. It is a transcendental account because 
it rests upon a "spatialised" conception of the present - it abstracts "real" time in 
order that a discrete present may function as the condition of possibility of their 
analyses. It is not enough to assume the temporality of the present in a manner 
that ultimately forgets the role of the present - that fails the present - by treating it 
as a discrete, spatialised, series of events. As was shown, this surfaced in their 
work as problematic assertions regarding the homogeneity and "the subject's" 
ignorance of the present. 
In order to grasp a non-transcendental conception of the present it is necessary to 
"temporalise" the present. This is the only way that the present can be examined 
without introducing an abstract, transcendental notion of the present into the 
67 It is important, though, not to think of duration as essentially harmonious and homogeneous. It 
constitutes the same error to think in terms of the one true duration, as to think of time as an adjunct 
to space, its fourth dimension; for example, Matter and Memory, p207. 
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analysis. More positively, thinking through the implications of a thoroughly 
temporal present leads to the realisation that the present can function as an 
ontological grounding for social criticism. It is this claim that will be explored, 
through Foucault's later writings, in the last chapter. 
Conclusion 
It might be objected that this discussion has nothing to do with Foucault. Or, if it 
does that I have not spelt it out. Indeed, it might be thought that Foucault, and 
other (post)structuralists, were seeking to undermine the "continuist" themes 
(apparent in concepts like "duration") established by Bergson. Am I not simply 
falling back into "old" ways of thinking about the relationship between the past, 
the present and the future? Is it possible to champion Foucault and Bergson? 
There are two issues at stake in such criticisms. Firstly, the relationship between 
the above discussion and the previous chapter can be summarised in the following 
manner. Foucault's theoretical construction of the genealogical present, it was 
argued, acted as a transcendental condition of his analyses - in a manner 
analogous to the analytic of finitude that underpins the human sciences. The 
reason for the limiting effect of the genealogical present was that it could not 
transgress its own logic of the present. In other words, Foucault's analysis 
assumed a discrete transcendental present that conditioned the limits - the finitude 
- of his own enquiry. As a means of overcoming this, I suggested that the present 
in Foucault's genealogies ought to be reconfigured as a moment of transition; that 
is, as a liminal present. Considering the character of a "temporal present" - a 
present that is located in the on-going movement between the past, present and 
future - is, therefore, the first step in this reinterpretation of Foucault. In 
introducing Bergson, then, I am not returning to a discredited approach, but 
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looking anew at the limits of Foucault's method in order to step through them. 
However, it is also clear that much remains to be said about the details of this 
approach. Chapters three and four, therefore, will elaborate further on the 
relationship between liminality, temporality and the present. The task of bringing 
this discussion back directly to Foucault is the aim of the last chapter which 
examines Foucault's later writings. 
On the second potential criticism - that Foucault and Bergson outline 
fundamentally incompatible theories - it is important to be clear that continuity 
and duration are not equivalent to progress and linearity. 68 It was the latter 
themes that Foucault was attacking. It is one thing to criticise the constructions 
historians and philosophers have placed on to history, it is another thing to 
question the ontological qualities of time - though, as I have just suggested, 
Foucault would have done well to have done just that. The use of Bergsonian 
concepts does not, therefore, constitute a necessary breach with Foucault's 
approach to history. 
A concern of a different order may also be raised. Is it not possible that I have 
chosen "easy" targets for criticism in this chapter? In constructing an argument 
around the poles of Marxism and postmodernism has the more interesting and 
subtle work that lies "in-between" these options been neglected? However, the 
reason for looking to these extremes has been to display as clearly as possible the 
critical gains achieved in problematising the traditional debates. In the following 
chapter a more subtle account of the relationship between narratives and the 
68 For a reading of Foucault's genealogy that does treat these concepts as equivalents see, E. G. 
Noujain, "History as Genealogy: An Exploration of Foucault's Approach to History", in 
Contemporary French Philosophy. Yet in this essay Noujain seems confused about the relationship 
between difference and discreteness (citing Bergson as a thinker of "continua" suggesting that this 
constitutes sameness, p 159) and this resurfaces in his uncritical appreciation of Foucault's "serial" 
view of history. Deleuze, Foucault, pp13-14, argues more persuasively that Bergson is a precursor 
to Foucault's thought, not a thinker that Foucault was reacting against. 
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present is explored. Through a critical examination of narrative identity and the 
self, as it appears in the work of Taylor and Ricoeur, the interplay between 
limits, liminality and the present can be elaborated. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NARRA TIVE IDENTITY AND THE IPSEITY OF PRESENCE 
Introduction 
As I have portrayed it, much of contemporary political theory is concerned with 
finding a middle path, or third way, between traditional theory and postmodernism. 
The same is true of accounts of the self. The self, of course, has always occupied a 
central place in the history of political thought. Recently, however, with the 
disavowal of any attempt at producing a grand and universal account of human 
nature, there has been a new urgency about the debates. Must we give up the claim 
that human beings share certain essential features? Or, is there a way to conceive 
of human characteristics that can embody both the universalism of traditional theory 
and the fragmentation of the self as presented by postmodernism? Can we respect 
otherness, driving out the ethnocentric and patriarchal structures of traditional 
accounts of human existence, while preserving the rational kernel at the heart of the 
modern project, thus clinging to the belief in an enlightened and redeemed self? 
In recent years a new way of approaching these issues has emerged. It has its roots 
in communitarian and hermeneutic accounts of the self and its most forceful and 
commanding proponents are Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur. It is no surprise that 
Taylor and Ricoeur have converged on many theoretical issues as their thought has 
developed. Corning from different educational and philosophical traditions both 
thinkers, nonetheless, have displayed a constant willingness to embrace different 
elements across the "continental divide". 
This is particularly true of the view Taylor and Ricoeur have of the self. Central to 
their concept of the self, and indicative of their theoretical alliance, is the notion of 
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narrative identity. Before examining their arguments in depth, it is important to be 
clear on the status of such an investigation. While narrative identity constitutes 
only one facet of their work on the self (and therefore a relatively small part of their 
work as a whole) it nonetheless occupies centre stage. This is not to say that the 
following critique of narrative identity undermines their whole philosophical 
outlook, but it is to say that an important weakness exists in their overall account. 
Furthermore, placing narrative identity centre stage is not a rhetorical device on my 
part. Taylor and Ricoeur repeatedly emphasise the impossibility of conceiving of a 
human life that does not fit the frames of narrative understanding.. Moreover, on 
several occasions they confirm the centrality of narrative by reference to each 
others work. Regardless, therefore, of the wider insights offered by Taylor and 
Ricoeur, the narrative construction of selfhood is worthy of study in itself 
Taylor's Project 
With Sources of the Se1f1 Charles Taylor offers us his magnum opus. It is a 
massive work in many senses. It is physically a very long book - some 600 pages -
yet more importantly it is massive in its scope of information and material. It 
covers philosophy in nearly all of its manifestations; from moral philosophical 
debates on the "range oflegitimate moral descriptions" to a very detailed discussion 
of "The Self in Moral Space"; through debates on the nature of the relationship of 
the individual to the community, on to a fascinating (if at times controversial)2 
account of the history of philosophy through the key figures of Plato, Augustine, 
Descartes and Locke; from discussions of Deism, Enlightenment, Romanticism and 
Modernity to contemporary debates surrounding Critical Theory, poststructuralism 
I Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modem Identity, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
2 See E.J. Hundert, "Augustine and the Sources of the Divided Self', Political Theory, volume 20, 
number 1, 1992, pp86-104; Q. Skinner, "Who Are 'We'? Ambiguities of the Modem Self', Inquiry, 
volume 34, pp133-153 J \ (\~\ , 
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and postmodernism. Even this IS to name only a small fraction of Taylor's 
philosophical range. 
In other areas Taylor's grasp seems equally encyclopaedic. From literature Taylor 
draws upon a vast array of sources including Sade, Proust and Joyce. In poetry 
Taylor relies heavily upon the Romantics, notably Wordsworth, though he seems 
similarly at home with Whitman and Yeats. His sweep through the sources of the 
modern self also takes on board an appreciation of artists and art movements, from 
Pissaro and Van Gogh to the Dadaists, Fauvism and Surrealism. Music is also no 
stranger to Taylor's thought with, for example, Mahler and Wagner assuming the 
role of visionaries of a "post-Romantic" age. 
Yet this mass of intellectual eclecticism is not without a pattern, or a "story" as 
Taylor prefers to call it. 3 Indeed it is a story that can be put quite simply. Taylor's 
project can be broken into two parts. On the one hand there is a historical account 
of the emergence of the modern notion of identity. On the other hand there is a 
polemical attack on current attempts to account for the modern self which Taylor 
characterises as "one-sided" and as failing to grasp the "unique combination of 
greatness and danger... which characterises the modern age". 4 As Judith Shklar has 
pointed out, these two aspects "are joined in the end". 5 It is worth briefly 
examining this idea in order to get an overall perspective on the main arguments of 
the book. 
In Part 1 of Sources of the Self Taylor suggests that the individual cannot be 
thought of as disengaged from society in any meaningful way and that we must 
3 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, pX. 
4 Taylor, Sources of the Self, pX. 
51. Shklar, "Review of Sources ofthe Self', Political Theory, volume 19, number 1,1991, pp105-
109. 
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conceive of four terms relating to the self as intimately connected; "a) our notions 
of the good ... b) our understandings of the self.. . c) the kinds of narrative in which 
we make sense of our lives and d) conceptions of society" 6 . In the main section of 
this chapter I shall concentrate on "the kinds of narrative in which we make sense of 
our lives", yet it is important that we don't forget Taylor's wish to think of the self 
as constituted by all these aspects which "evolve together in loose packages". 
However, throughout Part 1 this contextualisation remains abstract. It is in Parts 2-
5 that Taylor offers a "picture of the developing modem identity" that is both 
"analytical and chronological"; putting flesh on the philosophical bones sketched 
out in Part 1. The main figure that runs through this section of the book is St. 
Augustine. The argument suggesting that Augustine is the prime instigator of our 
modem notion of the self is one of the most significant aspects of the book, in terms 
of the history of philosophy. Briefly, for Taylor Augustine's inner battle of will as 
presented in the Confessions becomes, as Hundert notes, a motif for "post-
Reformation self-awareness and post-Cartesian epistemology". 7 Augustine's 
importance lies in his assertion of the continuity between the narrator and the 
protagonist of the Confessions, a continuity which signifies for Taylor the 
beginnings of many of the ideas that still dominate Western notions of self-
understanding, ideas that "sought the certainty of God within". 8 To be sure, Taylor 
assigns central roles to many other thinkers, for example Nietzsche, yet it is 
Augustine that Taylor returns to again and again. 
Moreover, we can now begin to understand why the two halves of Taylor's project 
- the historical account and the polemic - are ultimately joined. For Taylor the 
importance of St. Augustine's Confessions is not simply historical. Rather it 
6 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p105. 
7 Hundert, "Augustine and the Sources of the Modem Self', p87. 
8 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p140. 
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contains a message. While Augustine recognised confession as the re-establishment 
of a unified subjectivity over the traumas of a scattered sense of self, so Taylor sees 
in this a sign that, in our quest to find the good, we must dispense with the typically 
fragmented sense of modern subjecthood and avert our moral identity crisis by way 
of a retrieval of the hidden goods of hyper-Augustinianism; 9 "to bring the air back 
again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit". 1 0 Thus Taylor's account of the 
emergence of the modern self relies heavily on the influence of Augustine, while his 
polemic calls for a return to a more unified approach to subjecthood as expressed in 
Augustine's idea of confession. As Shklar has pointed out, "the hero of Taylor's 
genealogy is St. Augustine". 11 
It is illuminating to briefly contrast Taylor's account of the self and related concepts 
with that of Foucault. Throughout the book Taylor makes many references to 
Foucault, and to the "neo-Nietzscheans" in general. It is clear that he has certain 
sympathies with Foucault's approach. Initially, for example, we can see the 
similarity of Taylor's account of the emergence of the modern self and Foucault's 
notion that "man is an invention of recent date" .12 Both Taylor and Foucault agree 
that modern subjectivity is quite distinct from earlier forms. Taylor's insistence that 
"[t]alk about 'identity' in the modern sense would have been incomprehensible to 
our forebears of a couple of centuries ago"13 is reminiscent of Foucault's 
conception of discursively constituted subjectivity. Both writers point to the vast 
gulf that exists between the modern subject and subjects of a previous age. 
9 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, p246. 
10 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, p520. 
11 Shklar, "Review", plOS. 
12 Foucault, The Order of Things, p387. 
13 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p28. 
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Moreover, Foucault and Taylor share a belief in the power of history to unmask 
moral positions that contain "implicit" sources of domination; 
The neo-Nietzschean position attacks the procedural ethic mainly for its 
implicit moral inspirations; for the conception of freedom it defends, and for 
its attachment to a hypergood and consequent radical revisionism. In this it 
resembles my critique. 14 
Furthermore, Taylor and Foucault share the view that there can be no ultimate 
grounding for our "articulations" and "interpretations". For Taylor, "full articulacy 
is an impossibility ... We clarify one language with another, which in turn can be 
further unpacked and so on" .15 This bears a certain similarity to Foucault's idea 
that "everything is already interpretation". 
Of course, the differences are as important as the similarities. For instance, 
Foucault and Taylor operate with different time periods. More importantly they 
differ as to the kind of material they study. Taylor, by his own admission, is 
primarily concerned with the large philosophical and artistic movements of 
modernity and before. Foucault tended to examine the minutiae of historical texts 
and situations looking quite deliberately for "the other" of the major discourses as 
well as the dominant regimes that constituted received opinion. This, in part, 
contributes to their disagreement over the status of the subject. While they may 
agree that the modern subject is an invention of recent date, this discovery does not 
for Taylor mean that "the subject is dead". On the contrary, in a footnote Taylor 
labels the proponents of such a view "confused and dramatic" .16 He prefers to talk 
of the subject as located within "webs of interlocution". The difference between 
14 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p99. 
15 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p34. 
16 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p525. 
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this idea and Foucault's notion that the subject is constituted in discourse will 
become clearer as we look into Taylor's notion of narrative identity below. 
This brings us to the main point of disagreement between Taylor and Foucault. 
Taylor views it as unacceptable that the neo-Nietzschean position implies the 
diminution of all norms and morals. He argues that any position that asserts all 
moral commitments as equal is "deeply implausible". This is the case because such 
a perspective - one in which we take no position to be superior to another one - is 
"just not available to us humans". He goes on; "it is a form of self-delusion to think 
that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we take to be right". 17 In the 
final chapter I shall return to the issue of Foucault's "ethical commitment" and hIs 
relation to communitarianism. At present it is not my concern to directly address 
this criticism or engage in the many debates that surround Taylor's proposals. In 
what follows the emphasis is on Taylor's concept of narrative identity and the way 
that this emasculates issues of liminality. 
Historical Explanation and Narrative 
At first glance one might construe Taylor's "story" as a form of historical 
explanation. Indeed when Taylor summarises the task of Sources of the Self as the 
goal of, "illuminating the modern identity as we live it today and the understandings 
of moral sources it incorporates", 1 8 it is tempting to read this as an exercise in the 
explanation of what brought about the modern subject. Yet, Taylor is dissmissive 
of the idea of trying to give such an explanation, preferring to think of his own 
17 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, p99. See also, Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", Political 
Theory, vol. 12, 1984, pp152-183; William E. Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault and Otherness", Political 
Theory, vol. 13, 1985, pp365-376; Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", Political Theory, vol. 13, 
1985, pp377-385. For a critical theory perspective on Taylor's approach to morals see, Martin Low-
Beer, "Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility", Inquiry, vol. 34, pp217-236. 
18 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p319. 
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project as distinct from this.19 In a sense it is just this tension within Taylor's work 
that I shall seek to explore because it fuels his need to discuss the nature of 
personal, life-size, narratives. 
First, it is necessary to comment on Taylor's attitude towards historical explanation 
of the Marxist variety. In Sources of the Self Taylor spends some time distancing 
himself from any form of Marxist approach to history. Broadly speaking Taylor 
offers three reasons for the inadequacy of the Marxist theory of dialectical 
materialism. Initially, argues Taylor, it gives no weight to the intrinsic power of 
institutions like religion or moral life through its reduction of these to purely 
economic factors. Secondly, traditional Marxism allows these institutions no role In 
the causal relations of diachronic change. Thirdly, Marxism operates with a 
"unilinear causal relation of base and superstructure" that Taylor views as simplistic 
given that the relationship is "plainly circular". 20 
Without gomg into any depth regarding his criticisms of Marxism21 they are 
interesting because they point to the style of Taylor's own account. Taylor's 
preoccupations are not primarily economic or socio-historical, rather he is most 
concerned with the role of "idees-forces" such as religion, the moral life, art, 
philosophy, literature etc. It is the influence of these less tangible but nonetheless 
real forces on the modern subject that constitute the bulk of his thesis. This 
emphasis led Taylor to anticipate charges of idealism; 
. By and large I have been dwelling on certain developments in philosophy 
and religious outlook, with an odd glance at popular mentality. I have 
19 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p202. 
20 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p306. 
21 It is important to note one of the major defences of the materialist conception of history as a 
counter-weight to this discussion namely; G.A. Cohen, Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1978. 
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barely mentioned the great changes in political structures, economic 
practices and military and bureaucratic organisation which marked the 
period ... Am I perhaps offering an idealist account? ... This would be 
crazy. 22 
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It would be "crazy", suggests Taylor, because it would represent the equal but 
opposite absurdity to the Marxist account. It would deprive diachronic causation 
of the "multitude of sources" that are involved, both at the material level and the 
level of "idees-forces". Although Taylor's preference is for the world of the moral 
life he does not seek to deny the role of political movements or economic 
conditions in shaping history. Presumably, though, it would be a quite different 
kind of book. 
Having established what Taylor is not trying to do, there is still plenty scope for 
confusion about the nature of his task. As previously mentioned Taylor is 
dissmissive of the idea of giving an historical explanation of the emergence of the 
modern identity. In its place he offers the hermeneutic alternative of 
"understanding people's self-interpretations and their visions of the good". 23 He 
distinguishes the two in the following way. Historical explanation asks what were 
"the precipitating conditions" of the new form of identity, whereas an interpretive 
question asks "what drew people to this new identity, however it was brought into 
being" . 24 The interpretive question is thus one that looks for the affect of a new 
phenomenon rather than trying to consider this phenomenon as the effect of prior 
conditions. It is important that he makes the distinction in order that his "story" 
does not appear as an "idealist" account of the cause of the modern subject. 
However, Taylor does admit that "these two orders of question cannot be easily 
22 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p199. 
23 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p204. 
24 Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp203-204. 
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separated"25 and there are points in the text where Taylor appears to be offering 
the reader an account of the formation of the modern subject rather than simply the 
extent to which new forms of subjectivity had an affect: "the modern identity arose 
because changes in the self-understandings connected with a wide range of 
practices- religious, political, economic, familial, intellectual, artistic - converged 
and reinforced each other to produce it. "26 
This has led one reVIewer to write that Taylor approaches "the problems of 
historical explanation with some uncertainty". 27 However, it would be wholly 
inadequate to leave the matter at this. To examine further why Taylor may be 
uncertain over issues of historical explanation it is necessary to explore the question 
of why an affect could take such a strong hold at any given time. What is the 
mechanism offered by Taylor for the process of becoming affected? At one level 
Taylor's answers to this are quite general. Throughout Sources of the Self he 
suggests that "tradition" plays a large part in the transmission of affect. The very 
possibility of taking a stand on a certain issue (say individual rights) is, for Taylor 
"enframed in a social understanding of great temporal depth, in fact, in a 
tradition".28 Therefore, our sense of being drawn to a cause or a moral sentiment is 
in part passed down to us. 
Elaborating on this Taylor suggests that these traditions, or "schematic historical 
narratives", gain their power from their ability to "confer meaning and substance on 
peoples lives". 29 It is here that we now begin to see the importance of the personal 
25 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p203. 
26 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, p206. 
27 Harvey Mitchell, "Charles Taylor on the Self, its Languages and its History", History of Political 
Thought, vol. 12, 1991, pp335-358. 
28 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p39. 
29 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p97. 
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narrative to Taylor's project. The large scale narratives and the smaller narratives 
are portrayed as part of the same process. However, the precise nature of this 
conferral of meaning is still unclear. To get a better idea of just what is involved 
we should turn to Taylor's notions of a "practice" and a "web of interlocutions". 
A practice is "more or less any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape 
is defined by a certain pattern of do's and don'ts". 30 According to Taylor our moral 
ideals, concepts of the self etc. ''for the most part" (my italics) are aspects of our 
lives to the extent that they are embedded in practices. These practices, these 
aspects of our life that function through practices, are articulated by our ideas 
within a system of regulative commands (this is similar to Foucault's definition of 
the episteme in The Archaeology of Knowledge). In other words, practices can 
pre-exist articulations of them, and at this point Taylor has in mind the fact that 
practices are learnt at a young age. 31 Therefore, Taylor concludes: "If we 
articulate any rationale at all, it must involve an interpretation of current practice; it 
may also be projecting something new and untried".32 
Thus the relation of "large schematic narratives" to small personal narratives is 
quite complex. As individuals we are not wholly determined by tradition and the 
grand narratives of our time, rather we are able to make some innovation and we 
can change the structure of the meta-narratives. Yet, once again it can not be left 
simply at that. After all, where does the innovation come from? This points to a 
difficulty with Taylor's notion of practice, namely that it gives a very static picture 
of tradition and appears to suggest change without accounting for it. As with the 
Foucauldian episteme, there is a reformulation of stasis in the attempt to account 
30 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p204. 
31 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p204. 
32 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p205. 
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for change. Where Foucault sought to overcome this problem VIa a turn to 
Nietzschean genealogy, Taylor in Sources of the Self introduces into his schema the 
notion of a "web of interlocutions" to help account for periods of change. 
A "web of interlocutions" is defined by Taylor with reference to Wilhelm von 
Humboldt's model of an intersubjective speech situation which stresses that a 
common space must be, at least tacitly, accepted as part of a conversation. This 
common space requires the "recognition of individual speakers and their different 
perspectives" while allowing for disputes and debates to be articulated. 33 
Moreover, this forum for debate is the vehicle that allows Taylor to consider the 
possibility of practices changing. With this mechanism set up Taylor places a lot of 
emphasis on the way that practices can mutate through articulation and debate. 
However, at one point Taylor suggests that, "ideas and practices may come out of 
true with each other .. .just through drift". 34 
Here we can see why our lives are "for the most part" embedded in practices, and 
not always so - though when we come to look at the role of personal narratives in 
our lives Taylor will be much more strident in his claims. Taylor allows for the 
possibility of historical change occurring without the mediating mechanism of 
articulation and debate. Yet, the idea that change can occur "on its own" 
introduces a new element into Taylor's account. I am far from convinced, however, 
that his outlook can cope with this notion. If Taylor accepts that change can occur 
"outside" of the web of interlocutions that motivate other changes, "just through 
drift", then the possibility exists that such change can not be expressed in narrative 
form. This possibility has important ramifications for his account of narrative 
33 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p524. It is interesting to note how close Taylor is to Habermas on this 
point. 
34 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p205. 
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identity. To explore this further it is necessary to turn to Taylor's explicit use of 
spatial metaphors. 
Essentially from Part 1 Chapter 2 onwards, Taylor loads his work with metaphors 
of space. The chapter title is "The Self in Moral Space" and the primary metaphor 
becomes the notion of "orienting" oneself within bounded frames. 35 This phrasing 
is no co-incidence. Taylor is only too aware of his use of this metaphor: 
"Orientation in moral space once again turns out to be similar to orientation in 
physical space". 36 At another point he talks of "maintaining the primacy of my 
spatial metaphor". 37 Or again, "we can't distance ourselves from the issue of 
spatial orientation, or fail to stumble on it... or repudiate it". 38 Finally, he suggests, 
by reference to the psychologist Jerome Bruner's book Child Talk, that our spatial 
preoccupations are constituted by an "original, prelinguistic communion" of 
"sustained eye-to-eye contact" in childhood. 39 Taylor's insistence on the use of 
spatial metaphors to describe our moral world is, therefore, deliberate and well-
considered. 
The importance of this to the present argument (and there will be more on this in 
the next section) is that Taylor's notion of "drift" does not sit happily with his 
spatial metaphors. The idea that practices can change over time independently of 
mechanisms of interlocution implies that there is something about the character of 
time in itself that makes such change possible. Yet, Taylor's reliance on spatial 
metaphors when accounting for change does not facilitate the exploration of this 
35 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p27. 
36 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, p48. 
37 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, p44. 
38 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p31. 
39 Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp524-525. 
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possibility. Recalling the arguments of Bergson, we are reminded that the 
spatialisation of time, or the use of spatial analogies when referring to temporal 
concepts, is a highly problematic endeavour. Taylor has explicitly taken on board a 
language of spatial metaphors to refer to transitions over time, yet the notion of 
"drift", which (in this case) implies a "temporalised" understanding of time, has 
surreptitiously crept in to his analysis. This may be partly due to Taylor's 
recognition that "much of the most innovative philosophy of the last hundred years" 
has been an attempt to analyse our relationship to time. 4o Yet, this same sentence 
makes his reliance on the spatial seem odd. 
F or the moment I shall go no further than this, for the full thrust of the criticism can 
only come as Taylor himself formulates the strong thesis of narrative identity as an 
"inescapable framework". Presently it is enough to recognise the intimate relation 
that exists for Taylor between large grand narratives and personal narratives, 
namely that the latter represent a microcosm of the former. More strongly, 
personal narratives assume the role of the clear-cut example, the paradigm, for the 
larger historical" stories". I shall now turn to a discussion of personal narratives. 
Personal Narratives and Moments of Crisis 
Taylor begins his discussion of the role of personal narratives by emphasising the 
part played by "frameworks" in our everyday lives. The relation between these 
"frameworks" and the "practices" talked about above is an intriguing one. 
Recalling that "practices", "for the most part", structure our moral beliefs and 
spiritual values, it could be said that "frameworks" have a much less ambiguous 
standing. Frameworks are inescapable; "I want to defend the strong thesis that 
doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us". 41 
40 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p288. 
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This strong thesis is not simply a more fervent conceptualisation of the notion of a 
practice, rather it relates more intimately to an idea of human agency. The idea of a 
practice is concerned with collective norms. The framework operates at a more 
"local level" than the practice. For example, dismissing the claim that a framework 
could merely be "a contingently true psychological fact" capable of being overcome 
some day by a Nietzschean superman, Taylor goes on to say: " ... the claim is that 
living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that 
stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we 
would recognise as integral, that is undamaged human personhood".42 
However, it is important to remember that for Taylor there is no meaningful 
concept of a disengaged individual and that as a consequence the relation between 
these levels of framework and practice is necessarily muddied in the complexities of 
a self that exists in a communitarian setting. The framework that orients the human 
agent cannot in actuality be separated from the practices and traditions that go to 
make up the meta-context of human belief and actions. 
Yet how are we to understand these frameworks? For Taylor, the best way to 
think of these is by looking for the kind of answer that we require when we ask the 
question "who am I?". An answer based on "name and genealogy" is not really an 
adequate response. If, for example, I answered the question with an account of my 
ancestry (perhaps going back to the Gods or to single cell organisms) this for 
Taylor would not tell me anything about my identity as a decision making human 
being in a world of other similar beings; it would not give any insight into my 
commitment towards the good. What does constitute an answer to Taylor's 
question "Who am I?"? At this point Taylor's spatial preoccupations reappear; 
41 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p27. 
42 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p27. 
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To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is 
defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame 
or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is 
good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of 
making a stand. 43 
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The commitments can be moral or spiritual as in the case of socialists, Anglicans or 
anarchists; or they may be related to a nation as with many Scots, or a region that is 
still seeking nationhood; or they may even be defined negatively in terms of "I will 
do all in my power to stop that happening again", as may be the case now with 
many of the people of ex-communist countries; or they may arise out of a stan~e 
that is (supposedly) a-political, a-religious etc. as may be the case with the resigned, 
apathetic later writings of Jean Baudrillard. Moreover, one could be a socialist 
Scot or an anarchist from the old Soviet Union. 44 Whatever the particular 
"commitments and identifications" the point for Taylor is that it is this kind of 
orientation that provides the answer to the question "who am I?". 
To back up this claim Taylor looks at the counterfactual case of "identity crisis". 
An identity crisis is described by Taylor as "an acute form of disorientation ... a 
painful and frightening experience" . 45 It is, he suggests, to live without 
frameworks; to live in a world where one is not able to situate oneself within a 
community that would help one to answer questions as they arise; it is a feeling of 
vertigo as one realises that one has no basis for belief. This, for Taylor, proves that 
identity cannot be located within some bodily or spiritual inner sanctum, but that it 
must be found in our relation to a world of other people, and the frameworks, 
43 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p27. 
44 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p36. 
45 Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp27-28. 
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practices and so on that engender these relations. The counterfactual case of 
identity crisis, "brings to light. .. the essential link between identity and a kind of 
orientation. To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space".46 
It is important at this stage to take a slight detour. As presented so far Taylor 
comes across as a thorough going universalist on this issue of identity. This is 
slightly misleading. Taylor recognises that the very notion of identity is one that is 
of recent date and that it "would have been incomprehensible to our forbears of a 
couple of centuries ago". Moreover, the importance of the concept is that "certain 
developments in our self-understanding are a precondition of our putting the issue 
in terms of identity" ,47 thereby signalling a qualitative change in the way we thillk 
about ourselves. This change brought about the revelation that to try to "solve" a 
crisis of identity did not require making that identity fit with a predetermined, 
universally accepted notion of the right way to live, as was (and in some places still 
is) the case in many overtly religious cultures. Thus Taylor is well aware that the 
question of identity cannot be put in "simply universal terms", and the frames that 
constitute human agency are many and varied. We shall soon see, however, that 
Taylor's conception of the self does in fact contain strong universalist elements. It 
is the limits to his universalism that shall come under scrutiny. 
Returning to the example of identity crisis as it relates to Taylor's notion of our 
orientation in moral and spiritual space it might be suggested that a person could 
choose to live outside all frames and commitments "and not suffer this absence ... as 
a lack". 48 Yet Taylor, in a crucial passage, immediately responds that; "a person 
without a framework. .. would be outside our space of interlocution; he wouldn't 
46 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p28. 
47 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p28. 
48 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p31. 
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have a stand in the space where the rest of us are. We would see this as 
pathological. "49 
A person without frameworks is, therefore, not really a person. This is as "strong" 
as this thesis can get. Yet there are a few specific points on this passage that need 
to be mentioned. First, despite his claim that the modem sense of identity is 
constituted as a non-universal concept, Taylor seems to group us all in the same 
"space". This may be a slip of the tongue. Secondly, and more importantly, Taylor 
appears slightly confused over the meaning of the term "pathological", suggesting 
that it constitutes a space outside of our capacities of discourse. Yet, if Foucault 
has taught us anything it is that the process of medicalisation is inherently one that 
is dependent upon the figuration of the taboo in discourse. 
There are more stringent criticisms of Taylor's approach. I have already said that 
Taylor lacks a strong sense of the temporal character of life. He relies too heavily 
on his spatial metaphor of orientation thus producing a picture of these frames as 
too static and cumbersome to really account for the flow of everyday existence. It 
seems to lead to a notion that once you are in these frames you are there for good; 
once a Scottish socialist always a Scottish socialist. However this is slightly unfair 
and to see why it is necessary to look at the use Taylor makes of the notion of 
"becoming" . Perhaps recognising the possibility that his use of frames as the core 
of identity could be restricting Taylor tries to show how, in fact, his metaphor is 
very sensitive to the notion of changes in belief; "the issue of our condition can 
never be exhausted for us by what we are, because we are always also changing and 
becoming" . 50 This "becoming" is thought of as where we think of ourselves as 
going, what we think our goal (long-term or short-term) might be. If I should want 
49 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p31. 
50 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p47. 
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to be a football player then I am able to gauge the extent to which I am fulfilling 
that aspect of my identity by assessing my position as it stands now relative to my 
aim. It is for this reason that Taylor distinguishes questions of the being of identity 
as relative and questions of the becoming of identity as absolute: 
So the issue for us has to be not only where we are, but where we are 
going; and though the first may be a matter of more or less, the latter is a 
question of towards or away from, an issue of yes or no. That is why an 
absolute question frames our relative ones. 51 
So Taylor is aware of "becoming" as a central facet of the modern subject. 
However, Taylor has a quite different notion to the one that I would wish to 
endorse. In my usage "becoming" is precisely not an absolute question, "an issue of 
yes or no", and I hope to show why it is inappropriate to think of it in these terms. 
To facilitate this the relation Taylor posits between this notion of becoming (and of 
being) and narrative structure must be explored. Taylor configures narrative 
understanding as consisting of two parts. The first of these is associated with 
becoming. This narrative of what I wish to become guides my present actions; "my 
life always has this degree of narrative understanding, that I understand my present 
action in the form of an 'and then'; there was A (what I am), and then I do B (what I 
proj ect to become)". 5 2 
The second aspect of narrative understanding as suggested by Taylor is that of 
being. In this case my present situation is assessed in terms of how I got to be 
where I am now; "what I am has to be understood as what I have become". For 
example, if I want to be a football player I have to understand my present situation 
in terms of the fact that I smoke too much and am not really very fit. This is just 
the kind of narrative that according to Taylor orders all our lives "inescapably". 
51 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p47. 
52 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p47. 
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My critique of Taylor follows quite simply. Surely it is possible to conceive of the 
following, "what I am in relation to what I am"? This may appear trivial but it is 
not simply to fill a gap in Taylor1s representation of narrative understanding. What, 
then, is the force of the rather simple formula, "what I am in relation to what I am"? 
It is fourfold. Firstly, it indicates the possibility of questioning ones life outside of a 
framework as a reference point. It may not matter to me, I may not know, why I 
am in the situation I am in, nor what I would wish to do about it, yet I am not 
necessarily unable to question my own position- do I stay? do I go? what lies in 
front of me? and so on. This is particularly important at times of identity crisis. 
During such transitional/liminal periods the essentially unbounded character of an 
agent1s relation to herself requires that we think of the process of transition as 
outside of narrative structures (as defined by Taylor). To put it in Taylor1s terms, it 
is possible to formulate a "locution" of the liminal experience, that captures the 
experience of going through the transition from the "inside". It is a mistake to 
conceive of people going through times of crisis as "outside our space of 
interlocution". Secondly, temporal duration is distinct from narrative structure, a 
distinction that is rarely found in Taylor. The formula, "what I am in relation to 
what I am", implies in its very layout a temporality that is not predetermined by the 
need for the" story" to unfold along arranged lines. Taylor1s sense of narrative time 
is constituted by the emphasis he puts on becoming as a question of absolutes. At 
moments of transition this sense of an absolute question is missing but the sense of 
a temporal process is not. A self may experience transition without this being tied 
to what the subject has become and projects to become. This, as described in the 
Introduction, is the "paradoxical" element of liminality. Thirdly, becoming is no 
longer a question of absolutes, of yes or no, but a constant reappraisal of oneself 
and one1s changing goals as they are affected in time, rather than a simple stock-
taking of one1s position in relation to a target. The "I" that experiences periods of 
liminality is one that is in principle unbounded. The issue of becoming, therefore, 
120 
121 
far from validating a unified narratively structured self, creates the possibility for 
fragmented selves to emerge. Fourthly, and in sum, periods of liminality are the 
"outside" of Taylor's narrative, the point at which we have found and crossed the 
limits of his discourse. This must be the case given that Taylor has already stated 
that "a person without frameworks ... would be outside our space of interlocution". 
The sense of self Taylor describes is "traditional" to the extent that it excludes 
certain categories of existence, in this case those that involve liminal transitions. 
Taylor may respond that the temporal sense I ascribe to questions of identity is not 
empirically true. Perhaps the experience of asking "what I am in relation to what I 
am" is not an actual phenomenon. There are two replies to this. First, human 
experience of personal crisis and/or conversion pay testimony to periods of intense 
questioning that cannot (by definition) be guided through reference to established 
frameworks. It is precisely this temporal movement between established frames 
that is highlighted by "what I am in relation to what I am". Secondly, it would 
surely be sufficient to point Taylor to his own text where he recognises, albeit 
remotely, the very possibility of living through a time when the human agent may 
cease to be related to one set of circumstances and is yet to be configured in a 
whole new set; though strangely he doesn't believe it to be part of Western culture. 
Talking of "imagined cultures", he says: 
Perhaps at some age, say forty, people go through a horrendous ritual 
passage, in which they go into ecstasy and then emerge as, say, the 
reincarnated ancestor. That is how they describe things and live them. In 
that culture there is a sense to treating this whole life cycle as containing 
two persons. But in the absence of such a cultural understanding e.g. in 
our world, the supposition that I could be two temporally succeeding 
selves is either an over dramatised image, or quite false. It runs against 
the structural features of a self as a being who exists in a space of 
concerns. 53 
53 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p5I. 
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Taylor's example of "ritual passage", far from being a facet of an "imagined 
culture", is immediately recognisable as an aspect of all cultures. His unwillingness 
to include this possibility derives from the fact that it undermines his account of the 
"inescapability" of narrative structures. Indeed, in order to defend his central claim 
Taylor finds it necessary to adopt such a problematic phrase as "our world". Taylor 
may respond, though, by claiming that my emphasis on the relationship between 
agency and narrative structure misses the central concern of his work. The case of 
"ritual passage" may indeed bring the idea of a continuous narrative structure into 
question but the real point of Taylor's work is to show that without a narrative 
structure the agent is without the capacity to hold moral commitments. Such a 
"valueless" person, he would contend, must be outside of our space of 
interlocution. Perhaps I have over-emphasised narrative identity as an end in itself 
whereas I should have considered its mediating role in the construction of a moral 
life? 
To this charge I would readily concede that this chapter has focused on Taylor's 
account of narrative identity in isolation from the larger moral claims he is making. 
However, the criticism, that a life is conceivable outside of narrative structures, 
retains its critical impact. To the extent that narrative structure is not inescapable, 
moral commitments (to the extent that Taylor views them as mediated through 
narrative) are also not inescapable. Therefore, at the moment of reorientation into 
moral space, that is at the time of aggregation, the agent draws upon moral sources 
that can not be mediated through narrative structures (as the narrative process has 
been ruptured). The reconstruction of "undamaged human personhood" through 
the period of crisis relies upon an agent recovering moral values which arise in a 
manner that does not require a narrative account of identity. It is just this move 
that Taylor makes in response to one of his critics. 54 Taylor posits two features of 
54 Taylor, "Comments and Replies", Inquirv, vol. 34, pp237-54. I am referring to his response to 
Martin Low-Beer, "Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility". 
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"the human condition" - that, a) ideals demand "a notion of what gives human life 
value" and b) that an undamaged human being must have a least "a modicum" of 
respect for others. Two points can be made about this move. First, in pursuing this 
line of argument Taylor seems to impute moral values independently of narrative 
structures. Therefore the role of narrative as an "inescapable" mediation between 
agency and the moral life is unnecessary. Secondly, his account leads to the 
problem identified by Shapiro in his review of Taylor's Philosophical Papers: 
Although he tries to conceive of his moral notion of the human subject as 
a "philosophical anthropology", it is difficult to construe his claim that 
humans have an innate sense of a higher good which takes the form of 
Christian self-denial in many of his examples, as anything but a bald 
attempt to establish a synthetic, ethical a priori that will vindicate his more 
applied arguments about agency. 55 
However, it is not my concern to engage in debate surrounding the existence (or 
not) of innate moral values. It is enough to recognise that Taylor's account of 
narrative identity is, ultimately, an unhelpful way of understanding the self Taylor 
sought to deploy narrative identity as a mechanism that would give sense to human 
life as an on-going process of becoming while retaining universal features at the 
core of our self-understanding. In this he has failed. Narrative identity, when 
pushed to its limits, can not be sustained. Taylor has not met his own criterion of 
"inescapability" . 
This said, it does not actually disprove the validity of a narrative approach to 
personal crises, transitions, conversions, and other such phenomena - only that 
Taylor's version of it is suspect. Perhaps, "what I am in relation to what I am" (as 
one way of conceptualising the problem raised) is itself the very kernel of the 
narrative approach? If this could be shown to be the case then the role of narrative 
55 Shapiro, "Charles Taylor's Moral Subject", Political Theorv, 1986, pp31l-324. 
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identity as the mediating mechanism between the abstract agent and the moral agent 
could be established once more. This possibility is examined in the next section via 
a discussion of Paul Ricoeur's paper "Narrative Identity". 56 
Ricoeur, Narrative Identity and Crises 
In his three volume work Time and Narrative,57 Paul Ricoeur deals with the 
relationship between fictional narratives and historical narratives. At the end of the 
third volume he was drawn to ask if there existed a "fundamental experience 
capable of integrating these two great classes of narrative"?58 In looking for an 
answer, Ricoeur has turned to the hypothesis that, "narrative identity, whether of an 
individual or a historical community, was the plane to search for this fusion between 
history and fiction".59 It is interesting to note that Ricoeur makes no distinction 
between "an individual or a historical community" in this talk of narrative identity. 
Yet it seems highly improbable that the two can be so easily elided into one 
category. As we saw earlier Taylor, by contrast, makes some concession to a 
distinction when he suggests subtle differences between the ideas of a tradition, a 
practice, a web of interlocution, and a framework. It may be that Ricoeur is tacitly 
assuming Taylor's conclusion, namely that the case of individual identity acts as a 
paradigm for all other notions of the operation of narrative identity. Assuming this 
56 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", Philosophv Today, 1991, pp73-81, trans. Mark S. Muldoon. For 
more detailed accounts of the relationship between Ricoeur's account of narrative identity and his 
ethical commitments see; "Self as Ipse", Freedom and Interpretation: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 
1992, Barbara Johnson (ed), Basic Books, London, 1993; and Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen 
Blarney, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992. While these studies are interesting in 
themselves for the light they shed on Ricoeur's project I shall concentrate on the "Narrative Identity" 
essay as it encapsulates his position on the key relationship between agency and narrative that is at 
stake. Moreover, in the later works he has not significantly changed his position from that outlined 
in the essay. 
57 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. K. Blarney and D. Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1988. 
58 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p73. 
59 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p73. 
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we shall look at the way Ricoeur deals with the point of fusion between fiction and 
history. He begins by making three "assertions": 
a) knowledge of the self is an interpretation, b) the interpretation of the 
self, in turn, finds narrative, among other signs and symbols, to be a 
privileged mediation, c) this mediation borrows from history as much as 
fiction making life a fictive history, or if you prefer, an historical fiction, 
comparable to those biographies of great men where both history and 
fiction are found blended together. 60 
In many respects, therefore, Ricoeur is starting from the same position as Taylor, a 
fact they both acknowledge. 61 Ricoeur shares with Taylor a very strong sense of 
the "inescapability" of narrative in a subject's construction of identity. This is clear 
from his assertion that narrativity is "pre-comprehended" in the manner that we 
equate life with a story. Though still at a quite general level we shall see how this 
pre-comprehension is fixed for Ricoeur as we follow through his argument. 
According to Ricoeur, there are two major uses of the concept of identity, uses that 
have at times been confused or conflated. These two concepts of identity are, 
identity as sameness (idem) and identity as self (ipse). Idem consists of four aspects 
each of which can be clarified in relation to its opposite: 
1) the re-identification of the same, opposite = plurality 
2) resemblance, opposite = difference 
3) the continuity of a process, opposite = discontinuity 
4) permanence over time, opposite = diversity 
60 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p73. 
61 David Wood (ed), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Intemretation, Routledge, London, 1991. 
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In marked contrast the notion of ipse cannot be so easily codified. The essence of 
ipse, according to Ricoeur, is the "range of responses" to the question "who?", as 
distinct from the questions of what, where, why etc.. Thus one can begin to delimit 
the range of ipse by listing the "plane of personal pronouns and all other diectics 
which depend on it; adjectives and possessive pronouns (my, mine, your, yours 
etc.) and adverbs of time and place (now, here, etc.)". It is this form of response 
that, for Ricoeur, constitutes the answer to "who?". This, it should be apparent, is 
directly analogous to Taylor's notion of a subject oriented in moral space (though 
Ricoeur's approach to the moral self is not directly explored here). The similarity is 
further apparent in the fact that Ricoeur also suggests that a person "without 
properties becomes at the limit unidentifiable" and that the "unidentifiable becomes 
the unnameable". 62 This echoes Taylor's notion that such a person would be 
"outside our space of interlocution" . 
Ricoeur's analysis of identity takes him in to more subtle and challenging areas than 
Taylor's over -spatialised account. For Ricoeur, a loss of identity, an identity crisis, 
is not the same as being without qualities. Therefore a person experiencing a crisis 
can still be a person. While a crisis of identity may rob a person of their sense of 
sameness (idem) it does not, can not, rob them of their sense of self (ipse): "in the 
extreme case of loss of identity as sameness ... we have not left behind the 
problematic of ipseity. With regard to the category of the subject, a non-subject is 
not nothing". 63 
The last sentence contains the kernel of Ricoeur's position. If we remove idem 
from an identity, however, what is this ipse that is left behind? Ricoeur suggests 
that it can be only one thing, the question "who am I?". Not the "who?" that 
62 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p77. 
63 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p78. 
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demands a situation in an oriented world but the "who am I?", "simply reduced to 
the nakedness of the question itself'. 64 Indeed the lack of response in terms of an 
identity as sameness "intensifies" the nature of the self as ipse; "Who is 'I' when the 
subject says that he or she is nothing? Precisely a private self in need of an identity 
as idem".65 
Thus, despite the fact that a person may not be able to situate themselves in an 
oriented space they must still be thought of as a self, with some form of identity 
captured within the very phrasing of their disavowal of identity. The "I" who is lost 
is still an I no matter what. It is "paradoxical" to say "I am nothing" given that 
"nothing would not mean anything if it were not assigned to an 1".66 Ricoeur 
concludes that the question "who am I?", "cannot be abolished". 
Yet what is the relation between this analysis of identity and the earlier comments 
on the nature of narrative as a part of our everyday lives? For Ricoeur it appears to 
show the inescapability of the narrative form in the construction of identity. 
Talking of the experience of "nothingness" he suggests that, "many narratives of 
conversion pay witness to such nights of personal identity." He seems to be 
suggesting that if we can accept these narratives at such a limit case then we must 
accept them for all cases, including crises of collective identity. However, Ricoeur 
has not demonstrated how this experience could be related to a narrative, except 
after the fact. Only when one has been through a conversion, for example, could 
one then formulate the experience in terms of a narrative that would situate your 
experience in a framework, or on an ascribed plane of answers to the question 
"who?". This is precisely the implication of Ricoeur's talk of "narratives of 
64 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p78. 
65 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p79. 
66 Ricoeur, "Narrative Identity", p80. 
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conversion"; an after the fact rationalisation in terms that could not possibly have 
been known to the agent, by definition, during the process of conversion. His 
analysis of the notion of identity tries to get "inside" that moment of conversion, 
and to a certain extent succeeds in doing so, yet if in any way it is related to the 
formulation of a narrative it becomes too late. Ricoeur's account of narrative 
identity is in fact an account of narrative and an account of identity but fails in its 
ultimate aim of trying to relate the two so that they become necessarily joined. The 
moment of change, or of personal crisis, is not amenable to an analysis in the form 
of narrative, ultimately because the stories one can tell demand that one supposes 
the end. In the throes of a period of change the story itself becomes the 
"unidentifiable", and as Ricoeur has put it "the unidentifiable becomes the 
unnameable". To return to my earlier, rather crude, schematisations Ricoeur's 
"indestructible" question 'who am I?' becomes in fact a shorthand for 'who am I in 
relation to what I have become which I am now judging according to a story that I 
had no conception of when I was asking the original question who am I?'. This is 
an eminently "destructible" question, as I hope to have shown via my discussion of 
Taylor. In other the words, the single "I" that Ricoeur posits as indestructible 
becomes a plurality of 1's each occupying a different moment in time. If this is the 
case, the potential for moments of crisis existing through this time is opened up -
the different 1's are not necessarily the same 1. The unity of the subject that Ricoeur 
claims to have located in the narrative structure of subjectivity is ruptured, and the 
need to examine the liminal features of selfuood is created. As with the discussion 
in chapter two, the concept under interrogation, in this case narrative identity, must 
be temporalised. Starting with agency and then trying to impute a temporal 
dimension through narrative leads to problems. Starting with the temporality of 
"the self' as a means to investigate narrative identity may lead to openings and new 
questions surrounding "the self'. 
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Taylor and Ricoeur: A Summary. 
Implicit in the discussion thus far are two arguments - a weak and a strong version 
of the claim that narrative identity is mistaken. The weak version argues that, while 
it may be a useful approach to understand much of our sense of self, narrative 
identity is not as "inescapable" or "indestructible" as Taylor and Ricoeur suggest. 
This is particularly relevant 'to Taylor who seems to deliberately occlude moments 
of transition, crisis, conversion and liminal periods in general. In doing so his 
attempt to construct a communitarian self sensitive to the demands of otherness and 
difference is scuppered by a lurking ethnocentrism. The debate is closed off in a 
manner characteristic of the "traditionalist" resolve to turn a blind eye to one's own 
assumptions. 
I am aware, however, that this could have been argued without reference to the 
formulation "what I am in relation to what I am". Does this obscure more than it 
reveals? Initially, the formulation arises out of Taylor's own insistence upon 
narrative structure as containing only the two elements of being and becoming 
mentioned above; "what I am in relation to what I project to become and what I 
have become". There appeared a prima facie case to look at "what I am in relation 
to what I am". Furthermore, this proves to be illuminating in highlighting the 
weaknesses of Taylor's account, particularly from the perspective of periods of 
liminality where the self is no longer and not yet fixed by a set of structured 
narratives. The formulation, therefore, elicits the potential for a conception of the 
self that doesn't insist upon strong narrative continuity. In other words, it is· not a 
narratively structured formulation, it creates a problematic sense of self irrespective 
of a "story". If this alone is achieved then Taylor is wrong to place as much 
emphasis as he does on narrative frameworks. The force of the construction "what 
I am in relation to what I am" is also to be found in the way that it links into the 
discussion ofRicoeur. 
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Ric 0 eur, in contrast to Taylor, accepts that a person may experience narrative 
breaks (periods of liminality) but asserts that such moments should only reinforce 
our need to conceive of the unity of the self and the indestructibility of narrative 
structures. On the one hand, I argued in a vein that continued the critique of 
Taylor; Ricoeur, while recognising moments of liminality, doesn't construe such 
moments adequately. They are only thought of as "after the fact" phenomena and 
the essentially paradoxical character of such moments is, therefore, occluded. 
However, a stronger claim can be imputed regarding my critique of narrative 
identity. Putting it simply, the sense of narrative structure proposed by Ricoeur as 
integral to the unity of the self fundamentally misconstrues the nature of human 
existence. This claim requires that we assume the sense of temporality implicit at 
moments of crisis - its paradoxical and problematic character - is paradigmatic of 
the temporality in which we are embroiled at every moment of our lives. The 
narrative structure imputed by Taylor and Ricoeur, in other words, is radically out 
of step with the transience of each present moment. It is not merely that narrative 
structures exclude specific aspects of our experience but that they can not fully 
account for the "temporality of time". It is this claim that would open up the full 
effect of a discussion of liminality and the self. The self would be viewed as, to 
some degree, permanently in transition. This strong claim is, though, only an 
undercurrent in the above discussion. Without bringing the debate to a close, in the 
following section I shall look at another account of the self which incorporates the 
radical sense of temporality that this strong claim requires. 
Nancy and the Ipseity of Presence 
The "ipseity of presence" as a way of conceptualising the self occurs in Jean-Luc 
Nancy's "Introduction" to the collection of essays, Who Comes After The 
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Subject?67 To begin to understand the relevance of the term one can break it down 
into its two constituent parts. "Ipseity" is taken in a very similar way to Ricoeur's 
use of the term "ipse", namely it refers to the identity of a self in distinction to a 
mathematical or logical identity. However, there is an important shift of emphasis 
in the fact that they use different grammatical forms. Ricoeur's "ipse", as he tried to 
suggest in his essay, is in some sense a fixed and a given that survives all crises. 
Nancy's "ipseity" should really be read as "ipseity of' thus indicating a motion or a 
point of time from which the "ipse" proceeds. The "ipse" in this sense is given as 
belonging to a movement, a quality or mark in time and space. Initially, therefore, 
"ipseity of' helps situate us in the point of crisis that had to be excluded from the 
narrative "ipse"; it places our thought in the time of becoming. This may not be an 
infinite time, but it is a time without end, or with ever shifting end; it is liminal time. 
It is clear that "of' must be "of something", and in this case it is of "presence". 
What is this notion "of presence"? Presence, as Nancy remarks, "takes place, that 
is to say it comes into presence". 68 Presence is the "place" that can only "take 
place". It is not the site of being, its disposition is not to posit but rather "it is that 
which comes indefinitely to itself, never stops coming, arriving". The "of presence" 
indicates the origins of a never beginning process. In "the ipseity of presence" we 
find that the subject must never be thought of as a subject unto itself. It is folly to 
think that I establish "I", that I can resolve my identity in a "dialectic" of ipse and 
idem or that I engender myself in the "I" that is my narrative framework. The 
power of Nancy's construction is its ability to face the "pathological" head on, to 
redraw the lines of what we are allowed to speak about. Not in some ultimate 
sense, but in a sense that must itself be on-going. 
67 E. Cadava, P. Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds), Who Comes After the Subject?, Routledge, 
London, 1991. 
68 Nancy, "Introduction", p7. 
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This must be the case given that we can not be "presence to ourselves"; "there is no 
one that is One". 69 But can we be presence to itself? Is this not the way that the 
pathological, the crises driven, can become the centre of the frame? Is this not the 
way that the narrative structure of our lives can be pushed into the realm of the 
Other? Yes, it is. But what is the use, if the only use is to find the liminal point and 
exploit it. The methodology of the "ipseity of presence" does not, necessarily, lead 
to presence becoming presence unto itself in a circle that could only enclose and 
exclude. The idea of "the ipseity of presence" does not, in other words, reduce 
everything to the pathological. Rather it is presence not becoming anything unto 
itself except the simple description of "presence to". In this way presence is not 
seen to engender presence (as I engendered "I") rather presence exists to engender 
the indeterminate process of becoming. Presence is not analogous to "property". 
The "property" of narrative identity is the after the fact control of the at-the-time 
inexplicable. Property, in this example, is the essence imbued in the question 
"who?". It is the "I" that is the "who?", the "who?" that is the "I". In an interview 
with Jacques Derrida, Nancy asks; "is not the interrogative "who?" ... determinative? 
By which I mean that it predetermines ... a response from someone, from some 
one. "70 The narrative property is the question "who?". It is the transcendental 
presupposition of their thought that is a law unto itself. It cannot be removed from 
their thought, Ricoeur is open about this as we saw. "Who?" is the assumption that 
situates the humanity of the narrative approach in this thing called a human, a 
describable thing, in a framework or a self referential ipse, that ultimately we can 
grasp. 
69 Nancy, "La ComparutionJThe Compearance: from the Existence of 'Communism' to the 
Community of Existence", trans. Tracy B. Strong, Political Theory, vo1.20, 1992, pp37l-398. 
70 Nancy, "'Eating Well', or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida", 
Who Comes After the Subject? pp96-ll9. 
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Narrative identity is a lively enough concept for it still to be worth exploring, 71 and 
therein lies the interest of the work of Taylor and Ricoeur. Yet it is not a concept 
that is all encompassing. It is not one that has no other, that is inescapable or 
predetermined in our very fabric; to think so is to make narrative the being of 
philosophy coming apparent in its own story; to think so is to dominate the other by 
placing it in the field of the pathological where it can be monitored in safety with 
the powerful eyes of the master concept; to think so is to forget history, or more 
subtly, to place history in one's own history thus excluding it from the domain; to 
think so is to indicate that the mark of the process can only exist in the regime of 
the sign. 
Conclusion 
Contemporary political thought places a great importance on constructing an idea 
of the self that captures the fragmentation of the (post)modern subject while 
retaining a critical and active agency. Taylor and Ricoeur, with their work on 
narrative identity, are part of the attempt to occupy this space. Yet, both writers 
ultimately fail to tread this middle path. Throughout this chapter the limits of the 
~ 
narrative approach have been brought to.tfore; that is, the ways in which it, at least, 
excludes certain categories of human experience and, at most, fails to grasp the 
paradoxical and unbounded character of the way time bears upon "our selves". 
That Nancy offers a vocabulary that emphasises the immanent transience of our 
existence suggests a useful starting point for further investigation of "the self as 
ipseity". I am not wishing to suggest that Nancy has got it "right" but that his 
philosophical grammar of selthood opens up new avenues within the work of 
Ricoeur and Taylor. In this context, such a claim can be no more than bald 
assertion. As I said in the introduction, though, one of my aims is to create 
71 For a useful discussion of narratives in "critical psychology" see; Mark Freeman, Rewriting the 
Self: History, Memorv, Narrative, Routledge, London, 1993. 
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openings for the incorporation of "obtuse" texts into current debates. Solving "the 
problem of the self' is not on the agenda. 
In the next chapter a similar goal is intended - to criticise established conceptions of 
linguistic communication in contemporary political thought and suggest an 
alternative source of inspiration in the French tradition; in this case, the writings of 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. It is also a chance to see that the concept of 
liminality functions not only at the level of epochal conceptions of the present, or 
around concepts of the selfbut also in the very workings of communication. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
UNIVERSAL PRAGMATICS AND THE IMMANENT TRANSIENCE OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
Introduction 
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In this chapter I shall examine some current debates on the character of 
communication, specifically relating these debates to my earlier discussions of 
liminality. I shall concentrate on the thought of Jurgen Habermas and his project 
aimed at outlining a "universal pragmatics of communicative action". I shall exarlline 
whether or not such a conception of linguistic interaction can shed light on the 
processes of transition that have been highlighted in previous chapters. Or, to put it 
another way, is it possible that the problem of the liminal in Foucault, suggested at 
the end of chapter one, can be overcome by the incorporation of a Habermasian 
account of communication? Is it possible, as Nancy Fraser has put it, that Foucault's 
"empirical insights" can be retained while his "normative confusions" are 
reformulated?l Is a broadly Habermasian project the most appropriate way to 
achieve this, as Thomas McCarthy and Stephen White suggest?2 To what extent can 
my critique of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical work as inquiries that lack 
an analytic of the liminal, be accommodated by a reconstruction of the universals of 
communicative action? Finally, can Foucault's history of the present be given a 
critical edge that will engender a "regulative ideal"3 from which to judge the present 
and conceive of a more rational future? 
1 See "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions" in Nancy Fraser 
Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Late-Capitalist Social Theory Polity Press, 
London, 1989, pp17-34. 
2 See Thomas McCarthy, "The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School"; and 
Stephen White "Foucault's Challenge to Critical Theory", American Political Science Review, vol. 
80, 1986, pp421-432. White puts the case very clearly; "Habermas's work provides a framework 
that can incorporate many of Foucault's key ideas without at the same time leading us into a 
conceptual cuI de sac", p421. 
3 McCarthy, "The Critique of Impure Reason", p456. 
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The importance of Habermas in creating a critical discourse around Foucault's work 
can not be underestimated. All too often commentators sympathetic to Foucault have 
either ignored all together, or summarily dismissed, the impact of critical theory on 
his work - no doubt due to Foucault's unwillingness to enter into the debates himself.4 
F or example, in the otherwise excellent special issue of Philosophy and Social 
Criticism entitled "The Final Foucault: Studies on Michel Foucault's Last Works", 
there is only one mention ofHabermas's critical response to Foucault, that is, Thomas 
Flynn who describes Habermas as a thinker who proposes "some kind of 
transcendental (re)turn", a return which lacks any credibility to those familiar with 
Foucault's thought. s Even granting the character of Foucault's later works and the 
many diverse issues it invokes, such banal caricatures and omissions do nothing to 
enhance the debate between critical theory and poststructuralism. Moreover, where 
careful debate has taken place it has proved to be revealing,6 and where F oucauldian 
responses to this set of critics has occurred they are similarly illuminating7. 
4 See, "Politics and Ethics: An Interview" and "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations: An 
Interview with Michel Foucault", both in The Foucault Reader, for brief discussions by Foucault of 
his relation to Habermas and his approach to engaging in "polemics". 
5 See, Thomas Flynn, "Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at the College de France (1984)", in 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 12, 1987, p229. I would also like to mention Foucault by 
Gilles Deleuze as an excellent reconstruction of the various Foucauldian problematics, but one that 
omits explicit reference to Foucault's Anglo-American reception (much of which is inspired by 
Habermas). As I hope to show, however, Deleuze's thought (through Foucault) offers a promising 
challenge to Habermasian criticisms; a challenge that contains an immanent political project that I 
shall explore at the end of this chapter and in the last chapter via Foucault. 
6 I am thinking here of the exchange between Habermas and Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow in 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, David Couzens Hoy (ed), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, where the 
discussion of Foucault's reading of Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?" helps clarify many points 
of contact. I say this despite McCarthy's suggestion that Dreyfus and Rabinow are "misleading on 
key points" of Habermas's position; "The Critique ofImpure Reason" p466 n34. I shall return to this 
debate towards the end of the next chapter. For a different perspective, Lois McNay, Foucault and 
Feminism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, gives a sound overview of the debates with an important 
discussion of the implications for feminist discourses. 
7 A useful book in this respect is Domination and Power, Peter Miller, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1987. Two good articles are, Jon Simmons, "From Resistance to Polaesthics: Politics After 
Foucault", Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 17, 1991, pp41-56; and T Carlos Jaques, "Whence 
Does the Critic Speak? A Study of Foucault's Genealogy", Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 17, 
1991, pp325-344. 
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With this context mapped out, I wish to return to the specific problem examined 
below: can we give a universal pragmatic account of experiences of transition and 
becoming, the experience of liminality? If this can be shown to be the case then the 
critique of Foucault in the first chapter, and the explorations of liminality that 
followed in the subsequent chapters, would have to be viewed, to some extent, as a 
derivation of the Habermasian critique. I hope to show, however, that this is not the 
case. To explore the issues I shall first elucidate the context and content of 
Habermas's theory, noting some general criticisms and his replies along the way. 
Secondly, the idea of the immanent transience of communicative action will be 
introduced. Thirdly, the critical impact of this conception will be highlighted in the 
context of the debate between Habermas and Searle on the requirements of a general 
theory of communication. Fourthly, the idea of "immanent transience" is explored 
through Deleuze and Guattari's work on linguistics. 8 Lastly, I shall relate the 
discussion back to the larger critical context mentioned above; that IS, the issues 
involved in conceptualising a basis for social criticism. 9 
8 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, especially section four. 
9 At this point I feel driven to explain the relation between Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault. Why 
is it that in framing the debates of this section around Foucault and Habermas I have now turned to 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari? On this three points can be raised. First, the works of Deleuze 
and Guattari and Foucault exhibit many similarities, similarities that they themselves frequently 
acknowledged. For example, Foucault's "Preface" to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
trans. Robert Huxley, Mark Seem and Helen Lane, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1983, is very generous in its praise of their work. Moreover, Foucault has gone so far as to suggest 
that philosophically speaking the end of this century will be known as "Deleuzian". In the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari the compliments have been reciprocated; for example, see "Intellectuals and 
Power", Language. Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel 
Foucault. Secondly, and more specifically regarding the character of language, we find Deleuze and 
Guattari explicitly citing Foucault as an influence (A Thousand Plateaus, p66, p530-531 n39, p536-
537 n16). Massumi, in A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze 
and Guattari M.LT. Press, London, 1992, p46, states: "As the frequent references to Foucault were 
meant to indicate, Deleuze and Gauttari's theories of language are closer to Foucault's than to any 
other thinkers". In this context, however, the arguments of Deleuze and Guattari are more useful 
than Foucault's because they come into more direct contact with those of Habermas and Searle. 
Finally, and more generally, I would suggest that to broaden out the terms of the interaction between 
the differing schools of thought at issue is a productive step in the all toooften polarised philosophical 
community. 
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Habermas and Critical Theory 
Thomas McCarthy, in his introduction to Communication and the Evolution of 
Societyl0, succinctly summarises the Habermasian "research project". He claims it 
has three levels: 
The ground level consists of a general theory of communication - or as 
Habermas calls it a universal pragmatics - at the next level this theory 
serves as the foundation for a general theory of socialisation in the 
form of a theory of the acquisition of communicative competence; 
finally at the highest level, which builds on those below it, Habermas 
sketches a theory of social evolution which he views as a 
reconstruction of historical materialism. 11 
My primary concern is with the first of these levels, the level of communicative 
action, of a universal pragmatics. 12 To begin though, I must briefly explain why 
Habermas came to make his "linguistic turn", and the importance of this manoeuvre in 
the context of critical theory. 
The Frankfurt School for Social Research was established in 1923, and the leading 
members of this institute were to become known as the Frankfurt School. 13 One of 
these thinkers, Max Horkheimer, coined the term "critical theory" to account for their 
10 See Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Heinemann, London, 1979, 
trans. Thomas McCarthy. "Translators Introduction" ppvii-xxiv. 
11 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pxvii. 
12 Habermas refers interchangeably to universal pragmatics and formal pragmatics. In more recent 
works he has taken to refering to formal (rather than universal) pragmatics presumably because of the 
possible misinterpretations raised by the term "universal". I shall use the terms interchangeably 
below though with the recognition that "universal" is understood in the "post-conventional" sense 
Habermas places on this term. 
13 For a full account of the history of the Frankfurt School there is M Jay, The Dialectical 
Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950, 
Heinemann, London, 1973. 
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approach, and he opposed it to the "traditional theory" that had preceded it.14 
Briefly, the innovative character of Frankfurt School critical theory emerged in the 
way that it distanced itself from contemporary Marxist orthodoxies. IS First, they 
sought to rethink and explore Marx's writings from a philosophical perspective, a 
perspective that firmly rooted his thought in the German philosophical tradition. In 
this way the Frankfurt theorists tried to avoid the "economism" of the classical 
Marxist approach, one that reduces social/cultural/political spheres to superstructural 
effects of the economic relations of production. A clear example of this non-
reductionist attitude can be found in Horkheimer's essay "Authority and the Family": 
To understand why a society functions in a certain way, why it is 
unstable or dissolves ... demands a knowledge of the contemporary 
psychic make-up of men in various social groups. This in turn requires 
a knowledge of how their character has been formed in interaction with 
all the shaping cultural forces of the time. 16 
Such an explicit appeal to the autonomous role of cultural spheres, and the character 
of a human agent's interaction with them, is a markedly non-Marxist account (if we 
take Marxism to involve the premise of economic reductionism). It was an attitude 
that also manifested itself in the work of Adorno on the aesthetic. Adorno refused to 
apply "a systematic position already established to problems of art and of the 
aesthetic judgement", preferring instead to allow the aesthetic an autonomous role in 
a shifting philosophical analysis. 17 
14See M. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory", trans. Matthew J O'Connell, Critical 
Theory: Selected Essays, Seabury, New York, 1972, p188-243. 
15 See, R. Bubner's Modem German Philosophy Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981. See 
also LB. Thompson's Critical Hermeneutics: A study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen 
Habermas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981. 
16 M. Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family" trans. Matthew J O'Connell, in Horkheimer, Critical 
Theory pp54-55. 
17 See Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p182. This must, of course, be tempered by the fact 
that both Horkheimer and Adorno still gave a vast importance to the role of the economy in the 
modem forms of alienation that they studied. 
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Partly as a consequence of their conception of autonomous social and political 
spheres, the second break with orthodox Marxism came with their critique of the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat and the corresponding assertion of a critical 
and enlightened self-emancipatory process. They no longer viewed the transition to a 
more rational social order as an inevitable product of contradictions within the 
economic base. They proposed instead that self-reflection in an expressly 
philosophical manner can overcome the totalising effects of alienation in the modern 
world. Of course, this must take the form of critical self-reflection (as opposed to 
the self-reflection of a Cartesian cogito ).18 Talking of this type of critical reflective 
agent, Horkheimer outlines the characteristics required: 
He exercises an aggressive cntlque not only against the conscious 
defenders of the status quo but also against distracting, conformist or 
utopian tendencies within his own household 19 
In this way the Marxist problem of how to simultaneously account for the inexorable 
march of history towards revolution and the need to endow the proletariat with a 
revolutionary consciousness that must be developed, is transcended into the concept 
of critical self-emancipation and enlightenment. It is in terms of this debate, the 
debate over the relation of theory and practice, that Habermas's place in the tradition 
of critical theory can be outlined. 
In his inaugural address at Frankfurt entitled "Knowledge and Human Interests",2o 
Habermas sought to reconstitute critical theory as a project that disavows the claims 
18 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, cites the beginning of traditional philosophy, in its modem form, 
with Descartes' Discourse on Method. 
19 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p2l6. 
20 J. Habermas, "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective", appendix to Knowledge 
and Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro, Heinemann, London, 1971, pp301-317. 
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of pure theory, recognises the practical intent of all theoretical claims (as Horkheimer 
had done before him) yet also seeks to create a new conception of critique that differs 
in some essential aspects from Horkheimer's approach. Responding to Edmund 
Husserl's transcendental phenomenological grounding of an "interest free" scientific 
approach to understanding (which he characterises as a modern variant of the 
Cartesian traditional theory criticised by Horkheimer) Habermas restates his position 
as a thinker firmly within the tradition of critical theory. However, in criticising 
Husserl's search for "pure theory", Habermas also begins to explicate a more complex 
model of the relations between theory and interests than that offered by Horkheimer's 
dichotomy of traditional and critical theory. To this end, Habermas conceptualises 
three differing "knowledge-constitutive interests", the technical, practical and 
emancipatory. There is no need to go into the details of these concepts,21 except to 
say that in outlining a more subtle approach Habermas illustrates the weakness of 
Horkheimer and Adorno's original formulation which he viewed as tending inevitably 
towards pessimism and resignation in the face of modern forms of power. The sharp 
dichotomy of traditional and critical theory offered no way of adequately relating 
critique to the dominatory and totalising forces they described so well. The divorce 
of the two seemed so thorough that it paradoxically lacked a grounding in anything 
but philosophy and theory, thus placing it on the margins of the traditional thought 
they tried to get away from. 22 It required a new conceptualisation, one that situated 
critical theory at the very nub of differing interests and that could bring to light an 
emancipatory project, rather than a "resignative" one. 
Although Habermas's reconceptualisation of the relation between knowledge and 
interests allowed a greater subtlety than Horkheimer and Adorno's account, the 
21 Apart from the text itself, Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, an excellent commentary 
can be found in T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1984. 
22 A useful account of this paradox is given in A. Honneth, The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages 
in Critical Social Theory, trans. K. Baynes, M.I.T. Press, London, 1991, pp99-103. 
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problem of trying to justify an emancipatory project still remained. Was it not the 
case that Habermas's critical attitude entailed a simple restatement of a meta-language 
which he claimed was "beyond" the oppressive interests that dominate other forms of 
knowledge? As White has put it, Habermas was still open to the criticism that "his 
scheme constitutes a mode of philosophical foundationalism"; that is, a form of 
traditional theory.23 In this case the enlightened self-reflection of critical theory was 
no further on, still caught in rarefied philosophical discussions unable to gain a 
practical intent. Habermas, of course, realised this. As a way to deal with these 
problems he turned to an analysis of contemporary theories of language. In this 
respect he hoped to provide a grounding for the unity of theory and practice: 
The interest in emancipation is not merely before the mind, it can be 
understood a priori. What elevates us out of nature, that is to say, is 
the one fact that we can be acquainted with in its nature; language. 
With its structure emancipation is posited for us. With the first 
sentence, the intention of a universal and unconstrained consensus is 
unambiguously articulated. 24 
Language, in its very internal structure, offers a way to go beyond "the illusions of 
pure theory" in maintaining the "actuality" of critical thought in such a manner that 
unfettered consensual communication independent of external constraints is 
"universally and at all times possible". This very early formulation of Habermas's 
linguistic turn was to grow immeasurably in its subtlety. I shall try to map out these 
changes in what follows. 
Work and Interaction 
23 S. White, The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p27. 
24 I have used the translation offered by Bubner in Modern German Philosophy. For Shapiro's 
translation, where "autonomy and responsibility" is used in place of emancipation, see Habermas, 
Knowledge and Human Interests, p312. 
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At the root of Habermas's reconstitution of critical theory is the distinction he makes 
between work and interaction. For Habermas, and in distinction to the early Marx 
who dwelt upon the creative potential of labour, work is constituted solely by the 
instrumental domination of nature; "governed technical rules based on empirical 
knowledge".25 In this respect, work is the means of fulfilling the continuation of 
humanity through the appropriation of an objective, external nature. Similarly, 
communication is also a form of activity necessary for the reproduction of humanity 
as a social species. Yet, in contrast to his conception of labour, Habermas views 
communication as a broadly hermeneutic-interpretative act that operates on an 
intersubjective level of social praxis, a level which aims at finding the inherent 
meaning in a given system of rules and norms of behaviour. He sums up the 
distinction, in an early form, in "Technology and Science as Ideology": 
While the acceptance of technical rules and strategies depends upon the 
validity of empirically true or analytically correct statements, the validity 
of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of mutual 
understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition of 
obligations.26 
In this irreducible dichotomy lies the root of the critical standard that Habermas aims 
to bring to bear on present ideologies. In distinguishing instrumental and 
communicative action he has laid "the foundation" for a critical response to the all 
embracing dominatory forces outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno. It is the character 
of this foundation that I shall examine below. 27 As a preliminary, however, I wish to 
mention Bubner's critique ofHabermas's distinction between labour and interaction. 
25 See Habermas's "Technology and Science as Ideology", Toward a Rational Society trans. J. 
Shapiro, Beacon Press, 1970, pp91-92. Bubner, Modern German Philosophy, p191, gives a 
genealogy of this concept of labour. He describes it as "developed by the early Hegel and 
reinterpreted by Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" then contaminated "with 
Weber's theory of purposive rational action". McCarthy also elaborates the subtleties of the 
labour/interaction distinction; McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p24. 
26 Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, p92. 
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In Modem German Philosophy, Bubner criticises Habermas's account of the 
distinction between labour and interaction as "essentially idealist abbreviations" of the 
reality that he seeks to describe. 28 Tracing the origin of the distinction to Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the discussion of the master/slave dialectic, Bubner 
suggests that Hegel realised that the intersubjectivity generated by the growing self-
consciousness of the slave (as a result of labour) is of a qualitatively different basis 
than "the uncertain acceptance of the temporary roles by temporary partners". 29 
Habermas, by contrast, "avoids the decisive difference of level"30 because the 
transition from labour to communicative interaction is insufficiently thought through. 
It looks very much as if the self-same subjects who initially came under 
the law of external determination and object-relations have the 
possibility of going over to a social condition defined in terms of self-
determination and subject-relations .. .I am concerned with the question 
whether in the transition the subjects remain the same subjects to 
whom, quite simply, two alternative forms of self-activity and 
development of powers are open ... Habermas to a large extent 
suppresses these differences because he is seeking a single all 
embracing social model. 31 
Bubner's criticism greatly under-estimates the subtlety of Habermas's approach. As is 
demonstrated by some of Habermas's more sensitive critics, for example Honneth and 
McCarthY,32 Bubner presents an incomplete picture of the issues at stake. Moreover, 
regardless of the validity of this criticism, as it stands it would require significant 
27 The term "foundation" is used here as a short-hand for Habermas's "post-metaphysical" grounding 
of universalism in the social sciences. I do not propose to explicitly enter into this debate. 
28 Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p192. 
29 Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p194. 
30 Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p195. 
31 Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p195 (Bubner's italics). 
32 See Honneth, The Critique of Power, pp250-251 and 291-293 and McCarthy, The Critical Theory 
of Jurgen Habermas, p29 for a more thorough examination of this distinction in Habermas. 
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modification given Habermas's recent work in which the labour/interaction dichotomy 
is substantially re-worked (as we shall see). However, Bubner's approach can begin 
to shed light on a major flaw in Habermas's thought. The central claim of Bubner's 
argument, namely that Habermas is ill-equipped to conceptualise the theoretical 
implications involved in transition, is valid. Although Bubner's accusation is of a very 
sweeping character and linked very closely to interpretations of the German 
philosophical tradition, I hope to show how a criticism of this kind can also be 
applied to Habermas's recent work on the universal pragmatics of communication. In 
this regard the critical stance that opens up the possibility of a transition to a more 
rational future shall be questioned on the basis that Habermas's "reconstruction" 'of a 
linguistic foundation for critical transitions is problematic. Thus, I shall try to explore 
how Bubner's very broad claim can function in a very specific sense in Habermas's 
later work. I shall return to this idea below. Before this can be carried out, we must 
examine the shift in Habermas's work from the labour/interaction dichotomy to the 
distinction between purposive-rational action and communicative action. 
The Linguistic Turn 
Accepting McCarthy's clarification of the terms "purposive-rational" and 
"communicative",33 one can elaborate these concepts as follows. Purposive-rational 
action, closely defined, refers to forms of action where systems of instrumental, 
means-end, technological reason are the predominant principles in operation. Such 
action is typified by the technical domination that humans exert over objective nature. 
On a broader scale, however, purposive-rational action also includes strategic action, 
that is, action that occurs at an intersubjective level within norms or rules of 
behaviour, but that is also determined by the pursuit of individual interest over 
consensual agreement. Social interaction, thinly defined by Habermas, is 
33 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, pp24-25. 
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communicative action; action oriented towards mutual understanding and consensus. 
Of course, on a broader scale, strategic action is also social interaction, with certain 
qualifications. 34 
With this reconceptualisation of the work/interaction model the innovative aspect of 
Habermas's approach, the linguistic turn in his critical theory, becomes apparent. 
Moreover, the critical nub of his approach is now evident. It is crucial for the 
Habermasian project of reconstruction that each of these domains is thoroughly and 
self-reflexively investigated. More specifically, as a critical perspective on the 
historical development of knowledge in the modern period, it is imperative that 
Habermas delineates the boundaries of communicative action. In this way he is able 
to formulate a standard - the regulative ideal that McCarthy argues is missing from 
Foucault - from which to judge forms of strategic action and domination. As 
Habermas puts it, if critical theory "accepts as its task the explanation of 
systematically distorted communication, then it must have the mastery of the idea of 
undistorted communication or reasonable discourse".35 Stressing the importance of 
this, McCarthy suggests that "the success or failure of such an effort cannot be a 
matter of indifference to a social theory defined with a practical intent".36 
In turning to outline the characteristics of such "reasonable discourse", it is first 
necessary to show the need for a pragmatic approach to this task. The linguistic turn 
in philosophy has taken many forms, yet one of its most persistent aspects has been 
the search for the components of language that would allow a logical analysis of 
34 I have used the typology outlined clearly by McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, 
p29-
30. This is repeated by Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the 
Rationalisation of Society, Heinnemann, London, 1984, p285. 
35 Quoted in J. Thompson, "Universal Pragmatics", Habermas: Critical Debates J.B. Thompson and 
D. Held (eds), MacMillan Press, London, 1982. 
36 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p273. 
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language. The discipline of semantics is a typical expression of this desire to delimit 
the "object-domain" of linguistics by abstracting the "performative" features of 
speech. The idea, developed by Chomsky, that to speak a language one must know 
the formal rules of that language before one subsequently speaks it, is an example of 
the reductionist tendency in much of modern linguistics. It is a tendency that 
Habermas wishes to argue against: 
This abstraction of language from the use of language in speech 
(langue versus parole), which is made in both the logical and 
structuralist analysis of language, is meaningful. Nonetheless, this 
methodological step is not sufficient reason for the view that the 
pragmatic dimension of language from which one abstracts is beyond 
formal analysis. 37 
Habermas is concerned that many approaches to language and communication reduce 
the performance aspect of speech to an empirical side-show, while simultaneously 
privileging only one aspect of language, namely the ability to follow certain rules of 
that language. It is part of the Habermasian project to redress the balance between 
language and speech in the study of communication: "like the elementary units of 
language (sentences), the elementary units of speech (utterances) can be analysed in 
the methodological attitude of a reconstructive science. "38 
The most promising starting point for such a reconstruction, suggests Habermas, is 
the work of Austin and Searle.39 The importance of this "ordinary language 
approach" is the emphasis it places on the speech act as the primary unit of linguistic 
interaction. As Austin pointed out, "to say something is also to do something". This 
realisation balances the need for a logical analysis of the means of representation in 
37 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p6. 
38 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p6. 
39 The primary texts here are Austin, How to do Things with Words, Blackwell, London, 1962, and 
Searle Speech Acts:, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969. 
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language with the need for a pragmatic perspective on the act of speaking. Even if 
the speaker appears to be describing a state of affairs, a situation that might suggest a 
logical analysis, Austin claims that in also doing something the speaker is performing 
an utterance irreducible to the formal structure of the sentence spoken. 
For Habermas, this move to an examination of speech acts is crucial in the 
formulation of a pragmatic analysis of language, and also distances his approach from 
the" abstractive fallacy" of logical semantics. Yet, he is equally careful to distance his 
work from the empirical analysis of Austin and Searle. Their concern with particular 
speech acts does not, he suggests, "push through the level of accidental contexts to 
general and unavoidable presuppositions". 40 Thus in trying to tread the thin line 
between the logical and the empirical approach he suggests that we view his project 
as a universal pragmatics, an attempt to reconstruct the pragmatic elements of speech 
in such a way that it will bring to light the universal presuppositions of all everyday 
speech acts.41 
To be clear, a speech act is "not a symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of a 
symbol, word or sentence; it is the 'production or issuance of a sentence token under 
certain conditions', the employment of a sentence in an utterance". 42 Moreover, the 
"standard form" of speech acts can be examined in terms of their "illocutionary force" 
and their "propositional component".43 The illocutionary force of a speech act is 
40 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p8. 
41 A further distinction of some importance here is that between a universal approach and a 
transcendental one. Habermas, while holding an enormous amount of respect for the work of Karl-
Otto Apel, does make a keen distinction between Apel's transcendental analysis and his own. For the 
distinction see Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp21-25. In the following 
discussion the possibility that Habermas fails to offer a non-transcendental account of everyday 
communication will be raised. 
42 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p275. The quote within the quote is taken 
from Searle, Speech Acts, p16. 
43 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p36. 
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exhibited when, for example, a person makes a promise by uttering a promise, puts 
forward an assertion by uttering an assertion, issues a warning in uttering a warning. 44 
This is the foundation of our conception that to say something is to do something; a 
foundation, moreover, for all forms of speech acts. This may not be immediately 
apparent in the "surface structure" of the speech act but, claims Habermas, can 
always be unearthed in the "deep structure" that underlies it. 45 
The propositional component of a speech act is the part of the utterance that, first, 
names or refers to an object about which the speaker wants to say something and 
secondly, contains a "predicative expression" that places the speaker in a relation to 
that object.46 The importance of this distinction for Habermas is that the 
propositional content of a speech act can be "differentiated out" from the 
illocutionary force of the same utterance. F or example, I may utter "This is my 
chair", in which case the propositional components of reference and predication are 
easily recognisable ("chair" and "my"), yet the illocutionary force of the utterance is 
indeterminate until it is put in the context of a speech act; I may be asserting, joking, 
commanding and so on. The conclusion Habermas draws from this is that there must, 
therefore, exist two levels on which a speaker and a hearer can interact in any given 
speech situation, namely the level of objects referred to and the level of 
intersubjectivity which generates the communication between speaker and hearer. 
Yet, with this conception of a speech act comes the question of how exactly the 
speaker and hearer come to form an intersubjective relationship which allows them to 
communicate? Once again distancing himself from Austin, who he characterises as 
stopping at the "trivial" distinction of illocutionary force and propositional content, 
44 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p34. 
45 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p36. 
46 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p36. 
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Habermas wishes to look further towards the "peculiarly generative power of speech 
acts". This power, he goes on, "consists in the fact that the speaker, in performing a 
speech act, can influence the hearer in such a way that the latter can take up an 
interpersonal relation with him. "47 Yet, how does this generative power implicit in all 
speech acts operate to forge a relationship between the speaker and hearer? What, as 
Habermas puts it in The Theory of Communicative Action, is the "binding force" 
inherent in an utterance?48 Moreover, can this illocutionary aspect be given a 
universal grounding and a "rational motivation" that will serve as the foundation for a 
new form of critical theory? This pragmatic analysis is in mind when Habermas says: 
I have proposed that we do not set illocutionary role over against 
propositional content as an irrational force, but conceive of it as the 
component that specifies which validity claim a speaker is raising with 
his utterance, how he is raising it, and for what. 49 
On the one hand, Habermas's account of the source of the binding force of many 
speech acts is straightforward, that is, in the case of "institutionally bound speech 
acts". In this case the generative power of speech acts is located in the context of 
other norms and routines that constitute the "normative background" of the speech 
act. An example of this is the utterance "I do" in a marriage ceremony, which gains 
its binding force from being part of a larger series of conventions that surround the 
ritual of marriage. Yet, such an account of the binding force of speech is clearly 
insufficient for Habermas if he wants to move beyond Austin's empiricism towards a 
universal theory. Thus Habermas turns in more detail "to paradigmatic cases of 
47 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp34-35. In Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action, p295 he accuses Austin of being "fixated on the model of institutionally 
bound speech acts" and therefore unable to conceptualise the bond inherent in all speech acts". I shall 
say more on this below. 
48 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, pp278 and 302, for example. 
49 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p278. 
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linguistically explicit action that is oriented to reaching understanding", that is, to the 
paradigm case of communicative action. 50 
In this respect we can delimit the question more clearly; in the case of institutionally 
unbound speech acts51 what is the source of the binding force that forges the 
intersubjective relation between speaker and hearer? In his own words, "in the case 
of institutionally unbound speech acts .. .illocutionary force cannot be traced back 
directly to the binding force of the normative context". 52 In the paradigm case, 
suggests Habermas, the binding force of intersubjectivity is located in the validity-
claims generated in every speech act: 
In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer 
and vice-versa, because speech-act-typical commitments are connected 
with cognitively testable validity claims - that is, because the reciprocal 
bonds have a rational basis. 53 
50 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p35. 
51 The distinction invoked here between institutionally bound and unbound speech acts is far from 
unproblematic. I shall briefly examine this distinction via a discussion of White's analysis of the 
debate between Habermas and Derrida on serious and unserious utterances (White, The Recent Work 
of Jurgen Habermas, pp34-35). White is in "no doubt that a clever Derridean could discover a way 
to deconstruct Habermas' position" [that there is a distinction between serious and unserious 
utterances], however "there are good reasons for suspecting that deconstructionism, rather than being 
simply the revealer of all forms of metaphysics, is itself a concealed form of metaphysics". He goes 
on to argue that the Habermasian account gives "stronger insights into social action". I wish to 
suggest that the line of this argument seems peculiar in its retreat. In arguing that no ground can be 
given to eliminate deconstructionist approaches other than "stronger insights into social action", 
White is relying upon a concept of social action that is empirically/conceptually very dubious. Or to 
put it another way, what ground does White (or Habermas) have for a critical theory if the only 
ground that can be produced is that for the distinction of serious and unserious utterances to stand we 
must assume that we need a critical theory of society? The circularity of this argument is quite 
remarkable. Thus it seems that the only way of distinguishing institutionally bound and unbound 
utterances would be to rely on the argument that this is the only way we can achieve a critical stance 
on society. A similarly circular approach. Bubner, Modern German Philosophy, pp 199-202 also 
recognised the circularity of Habermas's argument. I shall say more on this below; for the moment I 
shall accept the distinction. Yet, on the subject of Habermas and Derrida, I feel it is appropriate to 
mention that Christopher Norris has persuasively argued that Habermas (and thus to my mind White) 
have gravely miS-interpreted Derrida as a Rortyan pragmatist, while in fact he is in a long 
philosophical tradition of post-Kantian thought; see Norris, "Deconstruction, Post-modernism and 
Philosophy: Habermas on Derrida", What's Wrong with Post-modernism, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Hemel Hempstead, 1990, pp46-76. 
52 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p62. 
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In Habermas's scheme there are four such testable validity claims inherent in all 
speech acts. 54 First, the speaker claims that the issued utterance is intelligible to the 
hearer. Secondly, it is claimed that the propositional content is true. Thirdly, a 
speaker implies that the performative element of the utterance is correct. Lastly, all 
speech acts imply a claim to sincerity on behalf of the speaker. These four validity 
claims constitute the background consensus, the implicit presuppositions of a "happy 
employment" of speech acts. For example, to return to my earlier example of a 
speech act, the utterance "This is my chair", we can conceive of this utterance 
"engaging" a hearer by its intelligibility, truth, correctness and on the basis of the 
speaker's sincerity. Conversely, the hearer may challenge any of these claims in the 
following way. First, the speaker's intelligibility can be challenged by asking, "What 
does that (utterance) mean?". Secondly, the speaker's claim to the truthfulness of the 
content can be raised by asking, "Is it really a (or your) chair?". Thirdly, the 
performative component of the utterance can be brought to the fore by questions like 
"Is it right to say this?". Lastly the sincerity of the speaker is at stake if the hearer 
asks, "Why should I believe that this is your chair?". To be clear, Habermas is not 
trying to examine the empirical contexts of speech acts, rather he is hoping to 
demonstrate that all speech acts exhibit the four-fold structure of validity claims just 
outlined. Moreover, the "reconstruction" of these universals provides the framework 
for the critical approach to society that he seeks. Any competent speaker55 engages 
53 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p63 (italics removed). 
54 This refers to the project of formal pragmatics outlined in "What is Universal Pragmatics?", 
Communication and the Evolution of Society. In subsequent discussions Habermas has tended to 
refer to the validity claim to intelligibility as "grammatical well-formedness". This change may 
reflect Habermas' s awareness that intelligibility is largely a matter of context - an utterance may be 
ungrammatical but intelligible in a given context. It may be, as Maeve Cooke has suggested, that 
Habermas does not take well-formedness to be "a condition that has to be met if understanding is to 
be possible, but that it is a strong idealization implicit in everyday communicative action"; Maeve 
Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics, MIT Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 1994, n.90, p187. In the following discussion I shall adhere to the formulation of 
"What is Universal Pragmatics?" as the modifications do not affect the major thrust of the argument. 
55 On linguistic competence see Habermas, "Toward a theory of Communicative Competence", 
Recent Sociology, no.2, Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed), Macmillan, New York, 1970, ppl14-48. 
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another by way of this common grounding, although the subtleties of his approach 
can not be gone into here. 56 Presently my concern is to show how this generates the 
Habermasian idea of an "ideal speech situation". 
The ideal speech situation IS the communicative arena defined by "pure 
intersubjectivity", that is, an arena where the engagement of the interlocutors is 
simply on the basis of an equal chance to contest the validity claims implicit in every 
discursive act. 57 All external forces such as institutional constraints are removed and 
"the unforced force of the better argument" is all that remains. In this way a 
"rationally motivated" agreement can be secured, an agreement, that is, that relies 
upon the mutual comprehension and consensus of not only those involved but that 
also warrants "that at all times and at all places, if only we enter into a discourse, a 
consensus can be arrived at under conditions which show the consensus to be 
grounded".58 
However, it is important to be clear on the status of this "symmetrical" 
communication. It is an "ideal"; that is, Habermas is fully aware that this description 
of communicative action is counterfactual to our everyday experiences of 
communication. Yet it is certainly not an ideal generated by a solipsistic reflection on 
the character of language, nor is it a utopian ideal. For Habermas, the ideal speech 
situation is "presupposed" in the very structure of communication: 
56 Habermas spends a lot of time in "What is Universal Pragmatics?" detailing the various "domains 
of reality", "modes of communication", types of speech act", "themes" and "general functions" of 
speech. A useful summary is given in Thompson and Held, Habermas: Critical Debates, table 6.1. 
57 It is important at this stage to distinguish between speech acts and discourse, as defined by 
Habermas. He suggests that the participants of a dialogue move into the discursive realm when they 
begin to question the validity claims inherent in their speech acts. Thus the discursive realm is a 
break with normal communication, in that the validity claims are regarded as problematic. As 
Habermas puts it: discourse consists in the "virtualisation of validity claims". 
58 Quoted in McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p308. 
The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a 
mere construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally 
made in discourse. The supposition can, but need not be, 
counterfactual; but even if it is made counterfactually, it is a fiction that 
is operatively effective in the process of communication59 
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By way of summing up this introduction to Habermas's universal pragmatics, and to 
present it in its most recent formulation, I shall turn to explicitly examine perhaps the 
central claim involved, namely: 
it can be shown that the use of language with an orientation to reaching 
understanding is the original mode of language use, upon which 
indirect understanding, giving something to understand or letting 
something be understood, and the instrumental use of language in 
general are parasitic. 60 
In order to demonstrate this Habermas turns to Austin's distinction between 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The locutionary act refers to the 
way that each speaker "expresses states of affairs; he says something".61 The 
illocutionary act is the performance of uttering a speech act. The perlocutionary act 
is the effect of the speaker on the hearer by uttering a speech act. Habermas sums up 
the distinctions with "the following catch phrases; to say something, to act in saying 
something, to bring about something through acting in saying something". 62 The 
crucial distinction for Habermas is between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. 
While recognising that the distinction "has given rise to an extended controversy" he 
summarises the main points of difference in the following four ways.63 Firstly, the 
illocutionary aspect of a speech act only suggests that the hearer "understand the 
59 Quoted in McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p310. 
60 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p288. 
61 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p288. 
62 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p289. 
63 My aim here is simply to summarise his thought. More detail can be found in Habermas, The 
Theory of Communicative Action, pp290-293. 
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manifest content" of the speaker's utterance, whereas the perlocutionary aspect does 
not follow from the content of the utterance (it will be recognised here that we are 
reworking the distinction made above regarding illocutionary force and performative 
component). Secondly, any given speech act can yield the information for the success 
of an illocutionary act but not the success of a perlocutionary act which "goes beyond 
the speech act". Thirdly, and as a consequence of the previous two points, we can 
conceive of illocutionary acts as internal to speech, and perlocutionary acts as 
external to it. Lastly, it can thus be inferred that perlocutionary acts can be hidden in 
any given speech act, while an illocutionary act, to be successful, must be expressed. 
Taken together these arguments help confirm for Habermas that: 
Perlocutionary effects, like the results of teleological actions generally, 
are intended under the description of states of affairs brought about 
through intervention in the world. By contrast, illocutionary results are 
achieved at the level of interpersonal relations on which participants in 
communication come to an understanding with one another about 
something in the world. In this sense they are not inner worldly but 
extra mundane. Illocutionary results appear in the life world to which 
the participants belong and which forms the background for their 
processes of reaching understanding. They cannot be intended under 
the description of causally produced effects. 64 
In this way, Habermas argues that the illocutionary aspect of a speech act has priority 
over the perlocutionary effect. The teleological, perlocutionary, component of a 
speech act is only possible if the illocutionary background has been established. Thus 
it only remains for Habermas to make the following connection in order to show the 
priority of communicative action: "I have called the type of interaction in which all 
participants harmonise their individual plans of action with one another and thus 
pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation, communicative action. "65 In this 
64 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p293. 
65 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p294. Once again, however it is important to 
realise the differences between Austin and Habermas. Habermas accuses Austin of not recognising 
that the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts were "different in type", confusing them instead 
with the context of the speech act. For Habermas, "the difference between a speech act and the 
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way Habermas is able to claim that the task of providing a critical ground upon which 
to overcome the difficulties of the early Frankfurt school theorists is well on the 
way.66 The claim that we can reconstruct the purely intersubjective character of 
everyday speech is central to the idea that we can then spot the systematic distortions 
that Horkheimer and Adorno detailed so well. However, it is not a theory without its 
critics. 
Abstractions and Standards 
In turning to a critical appraisal of Haber mas's universal pragmatics, I must first point 
out that many thinkers have criticised his conception of communication.67 My aim is 
not to chart all of the possible lines of reply to Habermas but to follow one particular 
line that for my purposes proves illuminating. The key protagonists that I shall draw 
upon are Bubner (as mentioned already), Thompson and Searle. 
In Modern German Philosophy, Bubner articulates a clear criticism of Habermas's 
reconstructive project. He chides Habermas for proposing an ideal dialogue with no 
grounding at all in actual discourse; "the counterfactual postulate of ideal conditions 
is nothing more than an abstract antithesis to the actual situation".68 In this way, 
suggests Bubner, Habermas has robbed his project of the very foundation he sought 
to give it. The" abstractness" of this universal pragmatic approach, the necessary 
"fiction" of an ideal speech situation, remove "those substantive criteria on which a 
context of interaction that it constitutes through achieving a co-ordination of the plans of different 
actors can be recognised the more easily if one is not fixated on the model of institutionally bound 
speech acts, as Austin was", p295. 
66 1 say this with some reservation, given that there is much more to the Habermasian project than the 
reconstruction of a universal pragmatic of communication, as 1 pointed out above. 
671t would be impractical to give a list of these criticisms; one can follow them through the literature. 
However, I can point to the range of criticism which goes from the sympathetic work of Apel and 
McCarthy to the wholly unsympathetic, and unargued responses of some post-structuralists. In the 
middle are liberals, linguists, Marxists etc .. 
68Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p190. 
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critique would have to be based". 69 Thus any" serious" questions which emerge in an 
actual dialogue can not really be dealt with because "the ideal dialogue turns out to be 
superfluous".7° Bubner repeats this criticism in his essay "Habermas's Concept of 
Critical Theory": 
Not with every sentence that we speak do we imply the 'general and 
unforced consensus'. Not all intersubjective relations in the medium of 
language lose their meaning if they do not conform to the pattern of 
equality. Habermas continually invokes the pragmatics of language as 
a starting point; but in compressing the entire spectrum of practical 
communication in society into the model of the seminar discussion in 
Humboldt's sketch for university reform, he is essentially abandoning 
his starting point.71 
For Bubner the Habermasian project is not a reconstruction of actual pragmatic 
speech but simply the construction of an ideal intersubjective dialogue that cannot 
possibly be related to the practice of speech and discourse. Bubner is, in effect, 
charging Habermas with the Habermasian criticism of the early Frankfurt School - the 
critical yardstick proposed is a mere echo of traditional theoretical approaches to 
normative social criticism. As it stands, however, Bubner's criticism is off the point. 
In his reply to Bubner, Habermas claims to be very "nervous" about such assertions. 
This nervousness springs from the fact that he has, on several occasions, denied that 
he is creating an abstract ideal which serves as a basis for a "rationalistic utopian 
society". Habermas argues, as I pointed out earlier, that" discourses are islands in the 
sea of practice, that is, improbable forms of communication; the everyday appeal to 
validity-claims implicitly points, however, to their possibility". 72 Habermas is well 
69Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p190. 
70Bubner, Modem German Philosophy, p190. 
71 Thompson and Held, Habermas: Critical Debates, pS2. 
72 Thompson and Held, Habermas: Critical Debates, p235. 
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aware that communication based on the ideal of intersubjectivity is "diffuse, fleeting, 
occasional and fragile", yet it is precisely this recognition that gives the counterfactual 
element a "central place in everyday action", thus in Habermas's reconstruction of 
them. To accuse Habermas of proposing an idealisation is to neglect the amount of 
importance he gives to describing everyday language use. In this respect, Bubner is 
wide of the mark in his criticism. Yet, the intuition that Habermas's project is in some 
way abstractive of actual communication can be refined to make the critique more 
plausible. The first step on the way is to turn to Thompson's view of universal 
pragmatics. 73 
Thompson, who accepts that Habermas is engaged in a reconstructive project as 
opposed to a process of idealisation, questions Habermas's claim that the universal 
presuppositions of actual speech acts can be deciphered through an analysis of the 
"standard form" of a speech act. We can recall that for Habermas every speech act 
involves raising four validity-claims, that is, truth, correctness, sincerity and 
intelligibility. It is this claim which bolsters Habermas's thesis that he can restrict 
formal pragmatic reconstructions to a standard form that incorporates these validity 
claims. However, it is also this claim that Thompson finds "implausible and 
misleading". Is it not the case, asks Thompson, that "reading a poem, telling a joke 
or greeting a friend" do not raise a validity claim to truth? Is not the "light-hearted 
activity of 'taking the mickey'" a case where the claim to sincerity is suspended? 
Indeed such an activity, argues Thompson, can only be operative when it is 
suspended. Thus, we can surmise that the required universality of Habermas's project 
is seriously in question: 
So far as the justification for restricting the analysis to speech acts in 
the standard form remains problematic, then so to the extent to which 
73 Thompson, "Universal Pragmatics", J. B. Thompson and D. Held (eds), Habermas: Critical 
Debates, pp116-133. 
Habermas's programme qualifies as a universal pragmatics must be held 
in doubt. 74 
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The same point is made by Thompson in his book Critical Hermeneutics, when he 
questions the need for an ideal speech situation. This is not because he feels that it 
operates outside actual discourse, but that it is not implicit in every speech act. This 
seems a more pertinent criticism than Bubner's, beginning as it does to find the core 
of Habermasian universal pragmatics. 
Habermas's reply to these charges can be reconstructed as follows. First, in The 
Theory of Communicative Action Habermas suggests that one of the reasons for 
concentrating on the standard form of a speech act was that it was "expedient" to do 
so: "considerations of expediency suggest beginning analysis with idealised or pure 
cases of speech acts",15 Of course, this on its own hardly constitutes sufficient reason 
for this decision. Thus Habermas argues that the "pure cases" that he analyses 
contain precisely the salient elements of speech acts necessary for the examination of 
communication. In this way, his "methodological decision to begin ... analysis with the 
speech acts in the standard form"76 is not merely expedient but a necessary 
requirement towards a pragmatics of everyday speech: 
I am assuming only that the standard form explicitly calls attention to 
just those features that are essential for the rational binding effect of 
using symbolic expressions with an orientation to reaching 
understanding. 77 
74 Thompson, "Universal Pragmatics", p126. 
75 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p309. 
76 Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", Thompson and Held, Habermas: Critical Debates, p270. 
77 Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", p270. See also Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, p298 on essential conditions. 
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Thus Habermas contends that we can view the mechanisms of linguistic engagement, 
the rational binding force, most clearly when we remove the dimensions of actual 
speech from the equation. The illocutionary force of an utterance can be analysed on 
its own terms, far away from the institutional complexities of everyday 
communication. As we saw earlier, it is precisely this aspect of communication that is 
the key for an intersubjective understanding of speech. 
Yet, to be able to back-up this claim Habermas must be able to accommodate 
Thompson's counter-examples, the jokes, poetry and "taking the mickey" that 
Thompson suggests are equally primary in our use of language. To deal with this 
criticism Habermas asserts that one can only comprehend a joke, as a joke, if one has 
already come to a prior understanding of the rules and claims inherent in all speech 
acts. They are thus secondary elements of communication; 
Jokes, fictional representations, irony, games and so on, rest on 
intentionally using categorical confusions which in the wake of the 
differentiation of validity claims and corresponding modes 
(being/illusion, is/ought, essence/appearance), are seen through as 
category mistakes. 78 
In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas further explains this propensity 
for the "linguistic construction of a fictive reality" as part of the "training" of the 
"growing child" .79 However, if we accept, for the moment, Habermas's explanation 
of such linguistic constructions as secondary derivations of the standard form there 
may still remain a puzzle. Is it not the case that one characteristic of poetry, for 
example, is that it accepts that certain phenomena are unsayable and can only be 
written around; that language is a tool for delimiting the unsayable?80 Is it not 
78 Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", p271. 
79 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, pp331-332 
80 I am grateful to Robert MacKenzie for this suggestion. 
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possible that the power of poetry is in its recognition that the inexpressible is 
meaningful as a communicative act, that is, that meaning can be communicated 
without recourse to the standard form of a speech act? Is there a way of engaging 
with an other person that is not reducible to the standard form of the speech act? 
Alive to this possibility, Habermas utilises a slightly "weakened" version of Searle's 
"principle of expressibility". This principle requires "that in a given language, for 
every interpersonal relation that a speaker wants to take up explicitly with another 
member of his language community, a suitable performative expression is either 
available or, if necessary, can be introduced through a specification of available 
expressions".81 Thus, any attempt to assert "body language" as a counter-example to 
Habermas's standard form of a speech act falls flat, he argues, because such forms of 
expression can be "expanded into explicit speech acts" in a linguistic form, so that 
"symbolic forms like dance, music, painting, etc. drop out of consideration".82 In 
short, if it cannot be turned into a speech act then it does not constitute 
communication at all. 
In criticising Habermasian universal pragmatics as a counter-factual ideal or as resting 
on an inadequate account of the standard form, both Bubner and Thompson highlight 
the fact that language and communication appear to be more complex phenomena 
than Habermas envisages. This view certainly has intuitive appeal. Yet, it falls short 
of the target. In questioning the priority of communicative action over other forms 
neither Bubner nor Thompson is able to give an immanent critique of communicative 
action. In characterising it as an ideal, or producing counter-examples, the question 
of priority can, as we saw, be dealt with by Habermas. Given the tremendous 
subtlety of Habermas's position it is important to engage Habermas on his own 
81 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p40. 
82 Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", p270. 
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territory - that is, on his characterisation of communicative action. My aim is not to 
debate about the variety of speech acts - it is not to pit different speech acts against 
each other, for example the perspicuous versus the ironic. Rather, I shall discuss an 
immanent characteristic of speech acts that Habermas elides in his reconstruction. 
This elided aspect can be labelled the "immanent transience" of speech acts, a factor 
that points us towards a different conception of the paradigmatic conditions of 
communication than that offered by Habermas. Of course, the transience of speech 
acts is not always an extant feature of communication - Habermas's account of 
institutionally bound speech acts is a clear discussion of the appropriation of our 
speech in fixed networks of power - yet, the transience of communication is 
immanent to (or presupposed in, to use Habemas's formulation) every act of 
communication. The effect of this presupposition is to problematise Habermas's 
position that every speech act contains redeemable validity claims. 
A useful starting point for the discussion is to exarrune some key moments in 
Habermas's texts which refer to time and its relation with language and 
communication. The first instance to cite is Habermas's admission in "A Reply To 
My Critics": 
I readily admit that the formal-pragmatic analyses I have carried out so 
far neglect the dimension of time and thus do not take account of 
phenomena having to do with linguistic creativity, with creative ways 
of dealing with language. 83 
The implication of this is clear. Habermas readily admits to eliding a factor in the 
process of communication, yet at the same time feels no threat exists in the analysis of 
this unthought component. One can reconstruct Habermas's reasons for feeling 
secure. Firstly, he would surely assert the "expediency" of having to start 
somewhere, and secondly, he would claim that his starting point contained all the 
83 Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics" , p272. 
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essential elements to allow further development on topics such as the temporality of 
the communicative process. Is it not the case that the relation of time to 
communication can be similarly derived from the basic presuppositions of universal 
pragmatics as in the analysis of secondary forms of language use, like painting, jokes, 
dance and poetry? In this respect, it is simply a question of having the time to carry 
out such a reconstruction; it is a technical application of already grounded principles. 
This line of response is apparent in a later reference to the temporality of 
communication. 
In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas makes explicit reference to a 
number of "linguists and socio-linguists" who present an "empirical pragmatics" that 
situates communicative acts in "social spaces and historical times". 84 Such an 
approach seeks to contextualise actual-empirical communication rather than delimit 
the formal-pragmatic presuppositions of speech acts, and to this extent they can claim 
to account for "a linguistic creativity that gives new forms of expression to the 
innovative mastery of unforeseen situations" .85 Thus, as Habermas recognises, the 
temporal dimension of communication is given a high priority in their work. For 
example, are participants in a communicative situation orienting to the past, present 
or future? Habermas suggests that the "advantage" of such an empirical approach is 
the insights it brings to sp~cific linguistic situations, and the "complexity of natural 
scenes" that engender the communicative process. 86 However, it is also important for 
Habermas to distance himself from this overtly empirical project. Thus, he argues 
that: 
They pay for this advantage by relinquishing the intuitive evidence of 
classifications that link up with semantic analyses and take account of 
84 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p321. 
85 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p321. 
86 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p332. 
the elementary functions of language (such as the representation of 
states of affairs, the expression of experiences and the establishment of 
interpersonal relations) ... they lack the theoretical power to illuminate 
our intuitions. 87 
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In this we can recall the similar reasons Habermas gives for distancing his approach 
from that of Austin. And as a criticism of empirical pragmatics and the way that it 
accounts for the temporal dimension of communication, I broadly agree with 
Habermas. In trying to contextualise the qualities of a given speech act situation the 
empirical approach misses the immanence of the temporality of speech acts, resting as 
it does on the particularity of an institutional setting. This is not, of cours~, to 
suggest that such empirical work is not fruitful - it surely is - but that it overloo!<:s 
time as a quality of speech acts in themselves. 
However, the irony is that in dismissing such an empirical approach Habermas throws 
out the baby with the bath water. Habermas seems to suggest, in the absence of any 
further material on the topic, that having seen off the problems of the temporality of 
communication as presented by the empirical approach that he can go on to ignore 
the temporal dimension all together. As I have just indicated this is not necessarily 
the case; that is, there is at least one other option for conceiving of the temporality of 
speech acts, namely as an immanent aspect of communication (not simply as a 
contingent institutional arrangement). This omission by Habermas is all the more 
curious given his particular interest in the immanent presuppositions or "fictions" of 
communication. 
What is meant by the immanent transience of communication? Initially, when 
considering the transience of communicative acts, we must recognise that the process 
of formulation of an utterance implies a past that moves into the present as a seamless 
construction. The speaker draws upon past utterances in the production of a wholly 
87Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, pp322-323. 
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unique/present one. Secondly, the hearer ensures that this "virtual" past is 
pragmatically actualis"rj. that is, the hearer participates in formulating a temporal 
interaction between the interlocutors. Thirdly, the fact that the past and present of 
the utterance cannot but coexist in the present ensures that the distinctions of the first 
two moments are recoverable as a harmony of the process of communication. The 
speaker and hearer, as communicators in the present, help gel the past and the 
present. Finally, the hearer's reply ensures the "performance" (the continued 
presence, in other words) of the utterance as a present act. In replying to the speaker 
the hearer acknowledges the speaker's presence/present. Thus the performance of a 
speech act would appear to be complete. In this detailing of the temporality of 
linguistic interaction there is little to worry Habermas's universal-pragmatic account 
of speech acts. It seems to confirm the possibility of a closed temporality that can be 
effectively removed from the equation, leaving speech acts atemporal in terms of their 
essential reconstruction. Yet, we must also take into account the presentness of the 
hearer's utterance in reply, which is of a quite different order - it must be to support 
our intuition of the present as an on-going process. Thus we are left with the 
displacement of the speech act as a "present that is different from that which has 
been". This difference, this displacement, is the immanent temporality, or transience, 
of linguistic interaction. In the next section the implications of this shall be explored. 
Debating the Transience of Communicative Action 
Why is the transience of communicative action a problem for Habermas? Habermas 
is aware that the process of communication takes time. It seems bizarre to assert that 
he has ignored this component of communicative action. As I have endeavoured to 
show in previous chapters, however, neglecting the temporal dimension can take the 
form of treating it as a homogenous background or theoretical constant. To explore 
how this affects Habermas's attempt to ground a critical project on the formal-
pragmatic universals of speech it is necessary to take a look at expressive speech acts. 
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For Habermas, expressive speech acts are those that directly raise the validity claim to 
truthfulness. 88 More specifically, expressive speech acts raise the possibility of 
questioning the speaker's "inner experience". Typically they are defined by the 
appearance of the first person in an utterance; "I long for. .. ", "I wish that. .. " and so 
on. To the extent that they are validated by reference to the speaker's subjective 
truthfulness they should (initially at least) be thought of as distinct from speech acts 
that, for example, assert the existence of things in the world. Nevertheless, we can 
redeem the validity claim to subjective truthfulness by reference to the speaker's 
consistency of action. If a speaker utters "I long for a drink" and then appears to 
make no effort to get one the truthfulness of the speaker's intentions can be 
legitimately raised. 
However, problems occur with this account when considering evaluative and 
aesthetic speech acts. As Maeve Cooke points out, in making an evaluation - of the 
kind, "I enjoy the rich river-smell of mud" - it is possible that a speaker may be 
"perfectly truthful yet wrong".89 The mud may not have a river-smell nor be 
enjoyable. Evaluative utterances, therefore, do not sit easily with Haberrnas's 
discussion of the validity claims implicit in expressive speech acts.90 A similar 
problem arises with aesthetic utterances. It is not clear that contestable validity 
claims are raised by the utterance, "This is a good painting". The claim to subjective 
truthfulness would appear to be inappropriate in this case - what criteria for the 
testing of subjective truthfulness could be applied? The problem in both cases 
(evaluative and aesthetic utterances) is, according to Cooke, that these utterances 
88 While each speech act raises one direct validity claim, the other validity claims are indirectly raised 
in the same speech act. The following discussion assumes, therefore, that the other validity claims 
are raised indirectly. 
89 M. Cooke, Language and Reason, p74. 
90 I am assuming that such utterances can not be wholly redeemed by reference to the validity claims 
inherent in other forms of communication. I shall say more on this below. 
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disclose states of affairs rather than referring directly to validity claims. Yet, if these 
forms of utterance do not refer directly to validity claims then, by Habermas's own 
definition, they can not constitute core elements of communicative action. To put it 
another way, evaluative and aesthetic claims, for Habermas, are not oriented towards 
reaching understanding and must therefore be excluded from the category of 
communicative action. 
This need not be a problem for Habermas if we take the aesthetic and evaluative 
aspects of language as exceptional cases of everyday language use. Yet it seems 
highly plausible to consider the disclosing role of language as one that occupies a 
central place in everyday communication. If this can be shown to be the case then the 
scope of Habermas's formal pragmatics would appear to be curtailed. Maeve Cooke 
addresses this possibility.91 She characterises the difference between the validity 
claims raised by communicative action and those raised by aesthetic utterances as 
follows: communicative action raises a claim to truthfulness implicit in the speech act 
while aesthetic and evaluative acts "refer to a potential for disclosing truth". By way 
of the work of Mary Pratt, Charles Taylor and Martin Seel, she examines the different 
ways in which everyday (not just aesthetic or evaluative) utterances "function to 
disclose". Charles Taylor, for example, highlights the act of "formulating something" 
as a common feature oflanguage. As Cooke characterises it: 
In this dimension language often functions to open up reality: it leads 
to my seeing something that I had not seen up to now, or to my seeing 
something in a new way. It can also, of course, have this effect on 
others. In such instances, therefore, acts of formulating fall into the 
category of speech acts that function to disclose. 92 
91 Cooke, Language and Reason, chapter three, especially section six. 
92 Cooke, Language and Reason, p8I. 
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Without going into further detail, the idea that speech acts which function to disclose 
are a central feature of everyday language use seems (at the very least) plausible. 
There is, therefore, a need to account for such utterances. Two strategies are of 
interest in this regard. First, there is Cooke's attempt to show that the inclusion of 
disclosing utterances in Habermas's account poses no substantial problems for his 
overall critical project (if a few modifications are accepted in his account of 
communicative action). Secondly, there is the possibility that the disclosing function 
of language points to a fundamental flaw in Habermas's account. I shall look at each 
in turn. 
Cooke maintains that the inclusion of evaluative, aesthetic and disclosing utterances 
poses no substantial problem to Habermas's project. She argues that if we define the 
realm of communicative action as consisting of utterances that "raise a claim to the 
validity of what is said' - rather than speech acts that solely raise a claim to 
understanding - then a broader and more flexible account of the different kinds of 
validity claim raised in everyday language can be formulated. While this requires a 
broader conception of the validity claims raised in communicative action than 
Habermas's original account it does not lose sight of the trajectory of Habermas's 
argument as it still relates speech acts to redeemable validity claims. Indeed, she 
argues that increasing the flexibility of the communicative realm adds to Habermas's 
aim of redressing the "logocentric balance of traditional philosophy". 93 
However, there is another trajectory that can be taken regarding the character of 
disclosing utterances. The act of disclosure is more properly thought of as an act of 
creation (Cooke recognises this but does not explore the consequences of such a 
position).94 In uttering "I enjoy the rich river-smell of mud" a speaker is (potentially) 
93 Cooke, Language and Reason, pp82-83. 
94 See Language and Reason, especially chapter three, sections 4 to 6, where Cooke conflates speech 
acts that disclose with speech acts that are "world-creating". The difference in emphasis is important. 
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involved in the creation of a state of affairs - for example, the creation of a new 
linguistic expression or the formulation of a new relation to oneself. Upon what 
grounds, though, can such an act of creation be subject to validity claims? This 
problem is recognised by Habermas when he discusses literary discourse (as discourse 
explicitly involved in linguistic creation). In literary discourse: 
The neutralization of the bindinglbonding power frees the illocutionary 
acts (now robbed of their power) from the pressure to reach a decision 
which obtains in everyday communicative praxis; it removes them from 
the sphere of normal speech and reduces their role to that of the playful 
creation of new worlds - or rather, to a pure demonstration of the 
world-disclosing power of innovative linguistic expressions.95 
This is consistent with my claim that the utterance "I enjoy the rich river-smell of 
mud" could not be subject to validity claims (assuming its "creative" quality). 
However, if all speech acts could be shown to be "acts of creation" then the link 
between everyday speech and validity claims would be broken. It is just this claim 
that the immanent transience of communication facilitates. 
The seemingly banal point that speech acts take time to perform and that the 
transience of communication is given by the displacement that always already exists in 
the communicative process leads to the possibility that every utterance is an act of 
creation. As every utterance comes into being in a permanently displaced present, 
every utterance is immanently singular. Each utterance, to put the same point 
another way, immanently creates a new set of relations between speaker, world and 
hearer. Yet, if this is the case, the rational link between everyday utterances and 
redeemable validity claims collapses. If every utterance is immanently transient then 
it makes no sense to seek to affirm or deny it - utterances simply exist in the 
transience of their performance. 
Disclosure implies revealing something previously hidden where creation refers to bringing 
something new into existence. 
95 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p20l. 
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It is granted that this account is profoundly counter-intuitive. How is communication 
possible if every utterance is taken to be a unique moment of linguistic creation? 
Two points are relevant here. First, in stressing the immanent transience of 
communication it is admitted that actual speech acts do not, for the most part, display 
their transience - that is, they operate in a system of rules and regulations that curtail 
their displacement. Yet, as Habermas's own project makes clear, this does not 
preclude the recognition of features immanent to communication. Secondly, the 
question - how is communication possible if every utterance is taken to be a unique 
moment of linguistic creation? - makes sense. The phenomenon to be explained is 
communication; communication, on this account, is not taken as a primordial given 
but this does not preclude an explanation of the communicative process. Habermas 
(and Cooke's reconstruction) presupposes that the structure oflanguage can operate 
as a foundation while it is the transition from unique utterances to communicative 
structures that must be explained. Thus, when Habermas counters the criticism that 
his formal-pragmatic approach offers no insight into actual speech - "reversing" the 
abstractive process - he is making a category mistake in the very first step by eliding 
the transience of communicative action. 96 Temporality is not something that can be 
added to communication in order that it can regain its "empirical" character - though 
in his reversal Habermas doesn't even mention the need to account for the relation 
between temporality and communication. A consideration of the role of time in 
communication must be present from the very outset of the investigation in its most 
immanent form. That this is not the case makes Habermas's "reconstruction" a 
technical-instrumental appropriation of actual speech rather than a genuine 
pragmatics of the processes of engagement. 
96 The details of this reversal can be found in Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
p330. 
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In the following section I shall explore the idea that Haberrnas presupposes what he 
has to prove by way of the debate between Haberrnas and Searle. In the penultimate 
section the "collective pragmatics" of Deleuze and Guattari are offered as an 
informative account of the ways in which the transience of an utterance can be 
combined with an account of the pragmatic features of communication. 
Habermas and Searle 
The debate between Habermas and Searle can be succinctly summarised. Haberrnas 
in his article, "Comments on John Searle: Meaning, Communication and 
Representation",97 contrasts two differing "intuitions" on "the processes of linguistic 
communication"; the intentionalist approach of Searle and the intersubjective view 
that he proposes. The intentionalist intuition is that a speaker is successful in any 
given speech if the hearer recognises the speaker's intention in the utterance; "S 
makes H understand something by means of X" .98 The intersubjective intuition, 
which we have examined in more detail above, is summarised by Habermas: 
The expression X is not a device used by an individual to communicate 
something by making the addressee recognise his belief or intention; 
rather the expression X is an element from a common repertoire which 
enables the participants to understand the same matter in the same 
way.99 
This distinction may appear strange gIven the reliance of Habermas on specific 
aspects of Searle's formulation of speech acts. In explaining the relation of his 
thought to Searle's, Habermas also explains the major criticism he has of Searle now: 
97 In John Searle and His Critics, pp17-29. 
98 Habermas, "Comments on John Searle: 'Meaning, Communication and Representation''', John 
Searle and His Critics, p 17. 
99Habermas, "Comments on John Searle", p17. 
Searle originally analysed such conditions [for a correctly performed 
speech act] on the basis of sentences which typically occur in standard 
speech acts and in doing so he proposed that both speaker and hearer 
speak the same language, that is, they share an understanding of the 
same language. However, more recently he believes that he can 
renounce such a strong presupposition, and that he can treat the 
common language itself as a phenomenon which needs to be explained. 
On these grounds he revives the intentionalist approach. 100 
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This revival is a mistake for Habermas who suggests that the concept of validity 
claims inherent in all speech acts cannot be given a sufficient grounding if they are 
thought of as the product of an intentionalist monologue existing prior to the 
dialogical setting; "validity claims open to criticism and designed for intersubjedive 
recognition constitute the rails without which the speaker could not reach rus 
illocutionary purpose".IOI For Habermas, Searle presupposes what he ought to be 
trying to prove, namely the (inter)subjectivity of a linguistic agent. This 
presupposition, he argues further, rests on a misappropriation of the metaphor that 
language is an institution, and that therefore the illocutionary forces that bind speaker 
and hearer must be thought of as "institutional forces", i.e. a normative background 
that legitimates speech acts in an extralinguistic manner. While this may be true in 
some cases, admits Habermas, it certainly does not account for all illocutionary 
effects, or binding forces. A truly universal approach to linguistic pragmatics must 
rest on the immanent illocutionary force of all speech acts, not the external factors of 
contingent backgrounds. He sums up: 
Searle elucidates the intrinsically linguistic force of the very act of 
raising a claim to validity with the force of an institution that enables a 
speaker, via his social roles, literally to call something into existence. 
In order to turn the elucidation into an explanation, Searle has to 
assimilate language to institutions. Language, however, is an 
institution only in the metaphorical sense. 102 
100 Habermas, "Comments on John Searle", pi8. 
10lHabermas, "Comments on John Searle", p27. 
102Habermas, "Comments on John Searle", p28. 
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Searle's response to this charge is illuminating. Initially he suggests that the 
difference of approach outlined by Habermas is "not as great as he thinks", suggesting 
that they offer "non-competing answers to quite different questions" .103 Yet, he 
quickly goes on to a detailed point by point rebuttal of all Habermas's major claims. 
He suggests that Habermas is, in the end, "deeply flawed". The following two quotes 
put it succinctly; 
Habermas takes the existence of the validity claims as a primitive given. 
I think they require explanation. I think my analysis enables me to 
explain them, whereas his analysis precludes their explanation. 104 
Or again: 
It is philosophically back to front to suppose that the validity claims 
provide a basis for the understanding of the phenomena of speech acts 
rather it is the theory of speech acts that has to explain the validity 
claims. lOS 
The reason for Habermas's mistake, argues Searle, is due to his conception of 
illocutionary force, that is not "just an alternative use of technical terms" .106 
Habermas has failed to see that action oriented towards understanding cannot even 
begin to take place until an intentional meaning has been communicated; "the attempt 
to achieve consensus cannot constitute meaning, understanding, communication etc., 
because it presupposes all these phenomena." 107 Thus, the "onus" is firmly on the 
side of Habermas to prove that language is not an institution. Indeed, argues Searle, 
103 Searle, Response", p89. 
104 Searle, "Response", p92. 
lOsSearle, "Response", p93-94. 
106 Searle, "Response", p92. 
107Searle, "Response", p92. 
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is it not the case that language is "the paradigm" institution. To claim otherwise is to 
make a number of presuppositions that find no pragmatic grounding in the analysis of 
speech acts. In this respect Searle implies that Habermasian formal-pragmatics does 
not significantly differ from the transcendental-pragmatics of Ape1. 108 
The previous discussion of the transience of communicative acts can add a third voice 
to the conversation. This can take two related forms. First, it has been noted that for 
Searle, expression X communicates the intention of the speaker to the hearer, while 
for Habermas it is an "element in a common repertoire" which facilitates 
understanding. On the principle of the immanent singularity of expression X both the 
speaker's intention and the background consensus must be explained. Importantly the 
explanation could allow for both options to be viable elements of language use. 
Intentionality and common understandings are not mutually exclusive if they are 
thought of as features that serve to "make the link" between the singularity of an 
utterance and the structures of communication. This has a consequence that we can 
view through the second intervention in the debate. While Habermas gives priority to 
the redemption of validity claims as a defining feature of a speech act, Searle argues 
that a theory of speech acts must be prior to an explanation of validity claims in 
speech acts. While Habermas accuses Searle of basing communicative structures on 
extralinguistic backgrounds to subjectivity, Searle accuses Habermas of having no 
extralinguistic basis to account for the formation of speech. A third option, implicit 
in the account of the transience of communication, is that the elementary units of 
language function precisely to bridge the gap between the linguistic and the 
extralinguistic. In this sense language is an institution (contra Habermas) but one 
whose structures can only be understood as emanating from collective structures 
(contra Searle). To give this claim some weight, however, it is necessary to examine 
the account of collective pragmatics given by Deleuze and Guattari. 
108Searle, Response", pp96-99 discusses Apel's criticism of his intentionalist approach and compares 
this with Habermas' s point of view. 
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Deleuze and Guattari: Collective Pragmatics 
Throughout plateau no.4 of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari engage in 
criticising, and offering alternatives to, the "postulates of linguistics". It is not 
possible to examine each step of their approach in detail, though I shall extract a 
series of arguments that bear upon the discussion of a pragmatic conception of 
language. Furthermore, the approach of De1euze and Guattari can illuminate the 
presuppositions implicit in the earlier account of the transience immanent to 
communication. 
Initially, it is important to recognise the similarities between Habermas, Searle and 
Deleuze and Guattari. All these theorists reject the empirical-scientific view of 
language, that is, the view that language is a structure for the transmission of 
information that can be analysed by means of abstract logical-semantic rules. Deleuze 
and Guattari begin plateau no.4 with a broad-side against the idea that "language is 
informational and communicational". Their primary source for this criticism is 
Austin: 
Austin's famous theses clearly demonstrate that the various extrinsic 
relations between action and speech by which a statement can describe 
an action in an indicative mode or incite it in an imperative mode, etc., 
are not all there is. There are also intrinsic relations between speech 
and certain actions that are accomplished by saying them (the 
performative: I swear by saying 'I swear') and more generally between 
speech and certain actions that are accomplished in speaking (the 
illocutionary: I ask a question by saying 'Is ... ?'; I make a promise by 
saying 'I love you ... '; I give a command by using the imperative, etc.). 
These acts internal to speech, these immanent relations between 
statements and acts, have been termed implicit or nondiscursive 
presuppositions, as opposed to potentially explicit assumptions by 
which a statement refers to other statements or an external action. 109 
109 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p77. 
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Deleuze and Guattari, therefore, share the aim of Habermas and Searle of finding a 
pragmatics of language. This, they go on, was the great insight of Austin and "it has 
made it impossible to define semantics, syntactics, or even phonematics as scientific 
zones of language". In speaking we act and this "performative" component to speech 
has been elided by linguists in their search for a science of codes that underpins 
communication. Rather than pragmatics being the "trash heap" of linguistics - a 
secondary feature of grammaticality - Deleuze and Guattari suggest (in common with 
Habermas and Searle), that "pragmatics becomes the presupposition behind all of the 
other dimensions and insinuates itself into everything" .110 As witnessed above, 
though, sharing a belief in the need for a pragmatic approach to language does not 
guarantee a similar outlook. While they are all heavily inspired by the work of Austin 
the various appropriations of his work are, to borrow a term from Lecercle, 
"misprised" . 111 
The novel interpretation of Austin offered by Deleuze and Guattari can be best 
viewed from the perspective of their critique of intentionality as the cornerstone of 
communication. We can recall that for Searle communication is to be considered in 
terms of "primitive underlying forms of intentionality". In making a statement a 
speaker is essentially expressing a belief in a given state of affairs and any validity 
claims that then arise are a secondary condition of communication. Deleuze and 
Guattari, in criticising this approach adopt a position similar to that of Habermas's 
critique. For Deleuze and Guattari, Searle, in trying to ground language in "self-
referentiality" - by making the "I" and "You" of language the defining characteristic 
of performativity - is missing the essentially social character of language. This social 
110 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p78. 
111 J. J. Lecercle, "The Misprision of Pragmatics: Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French 
Philosophy", Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series: 21. Supplement to Philosophy 1987, A. 
Phillips Griffiths (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. 
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character is not considered as the empirical context of language, that is, the secondary 
effects of intentional statements in social settings, but as a factor intrinsic to language 
itself. Drawing on the work of Oswald Ducrot, Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
intentionality can only be adequately explained as an effect of more fundamental and 
intrinsic "collective assemblages of enunciation". As Habermas criticised Searle for 
displacing the intersubjectivity of communicative acts into the realm of intentionality, 
so Deleuze and Guattari argue that Searle's approach fails to grasp certain primordial 
and "collective" relations effective in language. 
Yet, it is important not to over stress the relationship between Habermas and Deleuze 
and Guattari. To see why Deleuze and Guattari may be able to bring new 
perspectives to the debate on pragmatics it is important to reconstruct their critique 
of Habermas (I say reconstruct because they don't mention Habermas at all in their 
book). Initially we can view their critique of Habermas as a continuation of the 
position taken against Searle. For Deleuze and Guattari, the question of intentionality 
is not adequately overcome by adopting the notion of intersubjectivity; 
"intersubjectivity gets us no further". They argue that even complex intersubjective 
relations are effects of the "assemblages" intrinsic to language. The attempt to place 
intersubjectivity at the core of communication ignores the fact that "subjectifications 
are not primary" . For Deleuze and Guattari the theory of intersubjective 
communication may represent a subtler version of Searle's approach but it is, 
nonetheless, driven by similar assumptions; namely, that universals of communication 
can be traced to the notion of subjectivity (however complexly reconstructed as 
intersubjectivity). It is this that is the mistake. From a different philosophical point 
of view, Wagner and Zipprian also demonstrate that the attempt to locate 
communication in an intersubjective realm "remains committed to the overextended 
doctrines of the philosophy of consciousness". 112 Habermas, in other words, has not 
112 G. Wagner and H. Zipprian, "Intersubjectivity and Critical Consciousness: Remarks on 
Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action", Inquiry, vol. 34, pp49-62. 
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sufficiently shaken off the traces of individualism and intentionality in his universal 
pragmatics. In pointing to the reasons Deleuze and Guattari give for this view the 
outlines of their alternative conception can be discerned. 
Central to their understanding of a pragmatic understanding of language is the notion 
that, while they recognise the relationship between saying and doing as "internal and 
immanent", this relation is not "one of identity. Rather, it is a relation of 
redundancy".113 To appreciate the concept of redundancy, however, we must trace 
back the steps of their argument. The starting point of the critique of linguistics 
offered by Deleuze and Guattari is in their reconceptualisation of the content of a 
statement. The statement, which is the primary unit oflanguage, is usually thought of 
as a container of information, a capsule of data about the world ready to be moulded 
into complex utterances and sentences. For Deleuze and Guattari, the statement is 
most fruitfully thought of as an "order-word", for example, "Go!", "Ready?", "Yes" 
and so on. Language, they argue, is not about the flow of information, rather it is 
premised on primitive commands and orders: "language is not made to be believed 
but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience". Alternatively: "a rule of grammar is a 
power marker before it is a syntactical marker". One example given by Deleuze and 
Guattari is the teacher who, in teaching children rules of grammar, is not 
communicating information but "imposing" on the children "all of the dual 
foundations of grammar (masculine-feminine, singular-plural, noun-verb, subject of 
the statement-subject of the enunciation, etc)". Language is embroiled in power 
before it is embroiled in communicating information; "Language is not life; it gives 
life orders" .114 Another example draws upon their antipathy to capitalism as well as 
hinting at the scepticism that Deleuze and Guattari have of Marxist accounts of 
human production: "words are not tools, but we give children language, pens and 
113 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p79. 
114 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p75-76. 
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notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes" .115 Language is, therefore, to 
be understood in terms of the relations of power it embodies. As Massumi puts it, 
the" order" implicit in language is to be considered in both senses of the word; that is, 
as a command and as "positioning in a social field" .116 The "redundancy" implicit in 
language is a function of the power relations inherent in communication. To pursue 
this further, though, requires an examination of the notion of "collective assemblage". 
In defining language as primarily an expression of power relations Deleuze and 
Guattari point to the "social character of enunciation". As stated above, though, this 
is not merely the context of a given enunciation but an intrinsic aspect of every 
enunciation. This intrinsically social element of language is labelled the "collective 
assemblage". Broadly speaking it can be defined as the impersonal series of 
connections existing between order-words (these do, of course, exhibit varying 
degrees of fluidity). Yet having defined language as necessarily a function of 
order/power the connections that exist in language are outside of language itself. For 
example, it is in language that the judge labels a person a criminal, but this ordering is 
only possible in the framework of a collective assemblage of power relations 
designated as judicial. It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari state that the place 
to look to comprehend language is in the "acts immanent to language that are in 
redundancy with statements or constitute order-words". 117 
In this way we can see why they talk of the relation between saying and doing as 
containing a necessary redundancy - a necessary non-linguistic relation. Yet as it 
stands this idea of redundancy would not in itself upset the Habermasian notion of a 
universal pragmatics. That comes as we pursue the idea of redundancy through the 
115 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p76. 
116 Massumi, A User's Guide, p31. 
117 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p80. 
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notion of the collective assemblage. At present I have defined both language and the 
collective assemblage oflanguage in terms of the notion of redundancy. This smacks 
of circularity. Therefore, we need to ask exactly what it is that is made redundant in 
language. On this point, Deleuze and Guattari state that it is "the set of incorporeal 
transformations current in a given society"; the moment the accused becomes the 
perpetrator; the man and woman become the husband and wife in saying "I do". 
These "incorporeal transformations", recognisable by their "simultaneousness and 
immediacy", by the "simultaneity of the statement expressing the transformation and 
the effect the transformation produces",118 are driven by the "order-words" that are 
the unexpressed element of that which is expressed. As Massumi puts it, "It is the 
unsaid doing of a saying" .119 In other words, the performative element oflanguage is 
to be characterised by the re-ordering of people in power relations - "every utterance 
is struck, however faintly, with the redundancy of an anonymous murmur", the 
murmur of the social imperative. 
This brief account of Deleuze and Guattari's "collective pragmatics" suggests two 
concluding points. First, in relation to Habermasian universal pragmatics, accepting 
the analysis given by Deleuze and Guattari would be sufficient to dislocate the 
structure of intersubjective validity claims Habermas posits. Emphasising the power 
relations immanent to language shatters the consensus that Habermas believes is 
presupposed as a facet of the validity-claims inherent in communication. Consensus 
can never, in principle, be achieved because each utterance contains an irredeemable 
element; an element intrinsic to the assemblage that enunciates language, the "unsaid 
doing of a saying". Secondly, the stress Deleuze and Guattari place on this redundant 
element of speech as an "incorporeal transformation" suggests an opening in which to 
situate the earlier discussion of the transience of communicative acts. By focusing on 
118 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p80-81. 
119 Massumi, A User's Guide, p33. 
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the immediate and immanent condition of such transformations in relation to the 
expression of them, Deleuze and Guattari place the micro-level analysis of transience 
in a macro-level framework of the collective assemblage of enunciation. The 
transience of communicative acts, in other words, does not curtail the need for an 
account of the way in which language functions. On the contrary, it treats utterances 
as essentially transient in order to raise the question of how language operates in a 
given social field; be it the school, the factory, the hospital and so on. Of course, to 
follow through this analysis would require a major departure into the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari that is beyond the scope of this piece. For the present I merely 
wish to argue that an opening exists for further fruitful work in the area. 
Conclusion 
At the start of this chapter I related the above discussion to the quest for grounds of 
social criticism. It was suggested that Habermasian universal pragmatics may offer a 
way of grounding a critical perspective while accommodating the theme of liminality 
that has run through the thesis. If this was the case then the critique made of 
Foucault in the first chapter would amount to no more than a version of the 
Habermasian position. It would suggest a turn to Habermas's theory as the most 
insightful on offer. However, it has been shown that Habermas's theory is open to 
criticism on the grounds that his universal pragmatics ignores the transience immanent 
to the communicative process. It remains to assert that the immanent transience of 
communicative acts displays a core feature of liminality in order to argue that 
Habermas's project cannot account for the earlier criticism of Foucault's approach. 
In this and earlier chapters various applications of the concept of liminality have been 
. explored; from the epochal character of a liminal present, to the construction of the 
self in liminal periods, to the micro-level operation of liminality in processes of 
communication. The function of these chapters has been primarily critical. It remains 
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to follow through the discussion by looking at a constructive use of the concept. Can 
the concept of liminality help to illuminate the character of social criticism? If it does 
not then the discussion of liminality would seem to lead towards crippling relativism -
and a turn to Habermasian critical theory may be the most fruitful (though flawed) 
option. However, if the outlines of a critical foundation which incorporates liminality 
can be presented then there is good reason to believe that a distinctive 
poststructuralist account of social criticism is worthy of pursuit. This will be the 
focus of the last chapter through an examination of Foucault's later works. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER FIVE 
LIMINALITY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE 
Michel Foucault is a philosopher of the limit not the liminal. 
183 
The echo of this slogan appears far removed from the initial sounding. It is 
certainly not a simple return, a naive revocalisation, of my preparatory motif. The 
walls from which it has rebounded are not in an easy alliance. Nor are they smooth 
and flat - they do not return each phonic unit intact. Alternatively, we may imagine 
Foucault's decaying body. Or, not decaying but radiating its energies - literally the 
diffusion of his biological energy - into new outcrops that appear here and there; 
then, now and in the future. Foucault becoming plant and animal through the 
dissipation of his body into the ecosystem. Is it this that Massumi talks of when he 
claims that "deaths ... breathe new life into our lungs"?! 
The slogan at the head of this chapter is an attempt to reassemble a small number of 
Foucault's bodily parts into a new monster, a monster whose primary purpose is to 
abuse the body of Foucault. We can recall that it was Foucault's wish to abuse the 
body of Nietzsche.2 The mechanism for my abuse of Foucault is the concept of 
liminality. It is liminality that has served to undermine the limits of a "history of the 
present" in chapter one. Furthermore, it corroded the shared logic of neo-Marxism 
and postmodernism in chapter two. In the third chapter the relationship between 
moments of crisis and liminality challenged the account of narrative identity given 
by Taylor and Ricoeur. In the previous chapter the search for a grounding of social 
1 Brian Massumi, A User's Guide, p41. 
2 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, pp53-54. 
183 
184 
criticism In a universal pragmatics of language was challenged by way of an 
examination of the transience immanent to speech acts - transience being an 
essential component of liminality. In this chapter some of the disassembled parts 
will be remoulded through Foucault's later work. 
Prior to this, it is important to reconsider the concept of liminality. Judging by the 
general application of the concept in previous chapters it may be contended that the 
concept has become vague and ill-defined. Does the idea of liminality occlude 
hidden tensions in the discussion? Would I have been better to employ a range of 
different terms rather than stretch this concept to its limits? As stated in 'the 
Introduction, though, the aim has been precisely to employ a range of different 
terms within the discussion of liminality - "temporality", "crisis", "transience", 
"becoming" and so on. The need to relate these concepts to the umbrella category 
of liminality is due to the insight it affords to the critique of Foucault (a theorist of 
the limit). In other words, I am not suggesting that liminality carries a pre-
eminence over these other concepts, except to the extent that it is expedient in 
relation to the overall discussion. Every concept is, after all, multiple. 3 
A more substantive problem is generated by the relationship between liminality and 
the present. Anthropologically defined, liminality has tended to refer to the period 
of marginality after separation and before aggregation (though Turner broadened 
the scope of this definition). It is a time of transition between social fields. This 
would appear to be inapplicable to the concept of the present. My intention, 
however, has been to analyse the present precisely as a time of transition between 
the past and the future. It is in this sense that I refer to "the liminal present". In the 
current chapter, though, confusion may emerge when I refer to the need to 
3 To phrase the argument in Deleuzian terms, liminality functions as a conceptual persona on a plane 
of immanence engendered by Foucauldian problematics. See, Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?~ 
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engender a liminal present. If the liminal present exists what is the need to 
engender it? The discussion in the previous chapter is relevant here. The liminal 
present is more properly thought of as an immanent feature of the present. In other 
words, the potential of marginality is presupposed in the idea of the present. Lastly, 
if this is the case what is the link between the idea of liminality as traditionally 
conceived and the liminal present? It is no more or no less than the connection 
Foucault sought between a history of the limits of regimes and a history of the 
present. To put it another way, I am assuming the need for a critical position 
situated in the present which in addition presupposes liminality as an immanent 
feature of the present. 
Foucault the archaeologist/genealogist sought a point of critique in a "history of the 
present", a history that brought knowledge and "local memories" together in an 
attempt to "make use of this knowledge tacitly today". Yet at the end of chapter 
one this attempt to situate critique in "the present" appeared to be floundering in an 
awareness that this condition of genealogical thought could not cope with its own 
immediacy. Genealogy could not become anything Other; anything other than a 
transcendental thought of the present defined by the diffuse operations of power 
and knowledge. One can think of this another way. Foucault's genealogy presents 
the future as a void, a nothingness that occupies a space outside of our thought. 
The future is not simply unknowable, but in a real sense does not exist. Our 
relation to it is qualitatively different from our relation to the past or the present, in 
that it lies beyond the barrier of relations of knowledge and power. 
This is the Foucault that is so often the target of Frankfurt School inspired critical 
theory. This is the Foucault that offers us no hope, no way to make things "better", 
no possibility for a normative source of critique to right the wrongs of our lives. 
Surely, they claim, we can and do criticise things? Surely there must be a value, or 
values, that we can use to judge the inequalities and injustices of our present 
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society? Is language not based on presuppositions that we can tease out and use as 
a source of these critiques? When pursued, such criticisms create an image of 
Foucault the nihilist; Foucault the neo-conservative; Foucault with no sense of 
individual autonomy; Foucault the individualist; Foucault who robs us of our 
freedom, who sees nothing but power. 
This is the charge. Shall I open the court and let session begin? No, I shall not. 
The task of this chapter is not to rebut these charges and in doing so erect a saintly 
Foucault devoid of paradox and contradiction. I am not defending Foucault -
whatever that could mean - but abusing his remains; necrophilosophy. My principal 
aim is to examine the effect of thinking about liminality as a continuation of thought 
within a space defined by Foucault. No, not a space. To think of Foucault in terms 
of space is to situate him in the discourse of critical theory as just suggested, 
namely to ask of Foucault what is the other side of the present? how do we get 
there? and how can we make it better than the present? Rather we must think of 
the temporal in Foucault. In this way the liminal, as a means of conceptualising the 
temporality immanent to transgression, can be used to flood the void of the future. 
By excavating the liminality immanent to the present the future is not barred by the 
immediate (genealogical) present but opened up by the processes of becoming 
XY.Z.A. .. ; that is, it becomes possible to identifY the field of possibilities implicit in 
the present. The limit of the present is folded back upon itself and a critical arena is 
displayed, an arena that reveals openings. It is a critique facilitated by the virtuality 
of our passage inC to) time. 
In presenting elements of Foucault's later writings I shall argue that the ethical axis 
he sought to develop contains within it an appreciation of liminality that serves to 
ground his thought. In excavating this aspect of his work I shall maintain that it 
opens up new lines of inquiry into Foucault's approach to social criticism. It is to 
shift the emphasis away from the view that Foucault was introducing "the subject" 
186 
187 
into his analyses as an end in itself towards the idea that this new axis represents an 
attempt to locate the ontological grounds of social criticism. In this way the notion 
of poststructuralism as a body of ideas that rests upon foundations that provide an 
alternative to the normative grounds of neo-enlightenment positions will be 
suggested. I shall return to this theme towards the end of this chapter and in the 
conclusion. 
Many Silences 
I think that any child who has been educated in a Catholic milieu just 
before or during the second world war had the experience that there were 
many different ways of speaking as well as many forms of silence. 4 
Deleuze; "What happened during the fairly long silence following The History of 
Sexuality?".5 He is right to talk of a silence, yet we must be aware of its specificity, 
as one of the "many forms" of silence. It was certainly not a traditional silence. 
Foucault did not appear gagged - though in one interview he appeared masked. 6 
He did not stop talking to interviewers, nor giving lectures or writing essays. Yet 
we can still talk of Foucault's silence. It was not the brash silence that Foucault 
himself talked about in his first look into the problematisation of sexuality. It was 
not the kind of silence that proclaims itself from the rooftops; the silence that talked 
sexuality "out of' the discursive domain. Rather it was a quite different silence. It 
was the silence that one experiences lying half-asleep in a sleeping house. The 
silence that is constituted by the little noises, creaks and rumblings that randomly 
punctuate the air. This was the silence of Foucault's last years, shaped by his 
numerous interviews, the newspaper articles, the lecture courses, and so on. 
4 Foucault, Politics. Philosophy. Culture, p3. 
5 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, p94. 
6 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp323-330. 
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Yet, "there is always thought even in silent habits".7 As the silence drifted on 
towards his death (Foucault's last two major books, The Use of Pleasure and Care 
of the Self, were published, in French, just days before his death), one could begin 
to hear the formulation of a new tone, a new sound to Foucault's words that was 
not exactly unknown to his previous work but, nevertheless, was being constituted 
afresh out of the disparate silence. Foucault began to talk of "a new axis" to his 
thought. Where power and knowledge had been Foucault's concerns before, he 
now added a new dimension, subjectivity: "I now had to undertake a third shift in 
order to analyse what is termed the subject. It seemed appropriate to look for·the 
forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes 
himself qua subject. "8 
Did this theoretical move constitute a break from his previous works? Although 
this new axis constituted a change of emphasis in Foucault's later writings, he did 
not abandon his earlier thoughts on power and knowledge. We can recall from 
chapter one that, in changing his emphasis from the archaeological to the 
genealogical, Foucault did not abandon his research into the discursive practices 
that constitute the social sciences. Rather his genealogy of power functioned as a 
complementary approach to the earlier archaeology of the human sciences. In tum, 
Foucault's examination of subjectivity is most fruitfully viewed as a complement to 
his previous projects. It required, however, a new way of looking at historical 
phenomena: 
It seems to me that in Madness and Civilisation, The Order of Things and 
also in Discipline and Punish a lot of things which were implicit could not 
be rendered explicit due to the manner in which I posed the problems. I 
tried to locate three major types of problems: the problem of truth, the 
7 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p155. 
8 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p6. 
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problem of power, and the problem of individual conduct. These three 
domains of experience can only be understood in relation to each other, 
not independently. What bothered me about the previous books is that I 
considered the first two experiences (the problematisations of truth and 
power) without taking the third (the problematisation of individual 
conduct) into account. 9 
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The introduction of this new set of problems, therefore, does not constitute a 
radical break with his earlier work. Rather, it is an investigation of already implicit 
themes. Of course, it is not necessary to take Foucault's self-assessment at face 
value. Was Foucault not constantly defending his work by reference to his current 
concerns? It doesn't mean that we have to accept these self-assessments. 
McCarthy provides a useful example of this line of argument. For McCarthy, 
Foucault's earlier works are characterised by a "holistic bias" which neglects the 
emancipatory capacity of individuals while his later works tend towards a 
"desocialised aesthetics of existence" .10 In other words, the earlier Foucault was 
not sufficiently concerned with the role of individuals in shaping social norms 
whereas the later Foucault forgot social norms altogether and concentrated solely 
on individual self-expression. While fitting into McCarthy's Habermasian position 
on Foucault, this criticism is wide of the mark. Though Foucault goes into a lot of 
detail regarding individual "aesthetics of existence" and the mechanisms that 
facilitate these, it does not mean that Foucault neglects the wider social sphere in 
which the individual operated. To take one example, Foucault is clear that the 
analysis offered in the later works is "situated at the point where an archaeology of 
problematizations and a genealogy of practices of the self intersect".l1 Throughout 
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, this promise is adhered to in the way 
that Foucault always defines the aesthetics of existence in terms of norms of 
9 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p243. 
10 McCarthy, "The Critique ofImpure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School". 
11 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pl3. 
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behaviour and "systems of morality". Making one's life a work of art, as Foucault 
suggested, does not mean that the social forces that prevail upon such an act must 
be ignored. Thinking of Foucault as caught between the poles of "holism" and 
"individualism" is to construct a "straw man". Taking Foucault seriously is to 
assume the continuity of his work but also recognise the differences that emerged. 
Yet, in thinking of Foucault's work as a whole we must not think of it as being 
complete. The editors of Technologies of the Self suggest that we view Foucault's 
later work on the subject as the "logical conclusion" of his historical inquiries. 12 
This characterisation is misleading. It suggests that Foucault's later works "solved" 
the problems of his earlier inquiries. Rather we must think of Foucault as 
permanently "straying afield of himself' by way of his investigations.13 Foucault 
was constantly trying to "cross the line, to pass over to the other side"14 and 
operate on his historical material in new and different ways. 
Assuming the investigation of subjectivity to be a new axis in an on-going project, 
what is it that Foucault is examining? It cannot be a new look at the relation 
between knowledge and power, as subjectivity constitutes a new axis to his 
thought. However, in as much as it is related to power and knowledge, Foucault 
opens up a new field of interactions between subjectivity and the power/knowledge 
relation. Nor does subjectivity claim to be a more basic concept (or a secondary 
concept) in relation to the power/knowledge axis. Instead, these concepts come 
together to form a "cluster". 15 Yet we must still ask what Foucault is actually 
studying via his analysis of these three related notions. The answer is that the 
12 Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton (eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar 
with Michel Foucault, Tavistock Publications, London, 1988, p3. 
13 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p8. 
14 Deleuze, Foucault, p94. 
15 See The Foucault Reader, p12. 
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object of Foucault's thought is thought itself. If there is a Foucauldian question it 
asks: "what are the ways that thought is brought to bear upon itself?". How can 
thought fold back on itself and create an arena that thinks thought; that places 
thought in the domain of thought; that looks for the traces left by thought on the 
surfaces of life? Tracing thought through history is Foucault's speciality. He 
locates the knots of thought that call themselves institutions, and the ruptures of 
thought that thought often tries to hide. Foucault's project is to chart and 
interrogate these "indefinite knots" .16 In this respect his project is similar to that of 
the Frankfurt School. However, where the Frankfurt School construe the 
institutionalisation of thought as the bifurcation of reason into technical and 
"authentic" reason, Foucault sees each manifestation of thought in practice as 
containing its own logic (which may be related to "reason", and may be related to 
other manifestations of thought). 
The cathartic engagement of thought with itself that drives Foucault's work is not, 
however, analogous to the "playfulness" apparent in postmodern bracketing and 
formatting (though this kind of playfulness can help to destabilise established 
patterns of thought - for example the simple point being made by (his)story). To 
think that the theorist can "play" with thought is simply to emphasise our difference 
from the past to such a degree that the present can only be defined negatively and 
the future not at all (see chapter two). It is to think that one can distance oneself 
from the implications of the past. It is to place "lack" at the centre of the frame of 
the present, making the past and the future wholly Other. This is Baudrillard's 
reading of Foucault. It opposes any interpretation of Foucault except that which 
"forgets Foucault" - which takes Foucault to such an extreme that he is no longer 
visible. 17 In general terms, it is to refuse to acknowledge that thought takes the 
16 Foucault, Power!Knowledge, p187. 
17 Baudrillard, Forget Foucault, Semiotext(e), New York, 1987. 
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form of concrete realities. In other words, thought becomes embroiled in relations 
of power, knowledge and subjectivity that always undermine the art of theoretical 
"seduction". Baudrillard makes apathy a way of life: Foucault reveals the 
theoretical lifelessness of apathy. 
Returning to the question at the head of this section - "what happened during the 
fairly long silence following The History of Sexuality?" - Deleuze provides his own 
answer. He claims that from 1975/6 onwards Foucault "went through a crisis of all 
orders, political, vital, philosophical."18 This crisis instigated the new approach that 
would dominate his later work. Yet, the crisis not only enabled Foucault to "stray 
afield of himself' it was also accompanied by an appreciation of the role of crises In 
the formulation of an ethical commitment. More specifically, the later work is 
premised upon an understanding of the character of liminality that is absent from his 
earlier theoretical justifications of his work. While the analysis of subjectivity is of 
great importance, the later writings begin to delineate a "fourth axis" to Foucault's 
thought, an axis captured by the idea of liminality. I am not suggesting that the 
analysis of subjectivity and ethics offered by Foucault in the later works is not 
worthy of study in itself For many feminists, to take one example, it is precisely 
this aspect of his work that is crucial to their interpretation of Foucault. 19 For my 
purposes, however, the debates around subjectivity are secondary to the question of 
transgression and liminality in Foucault. As such I shall focus on the later work as 
containing a new conceptualisation of transgression - one that overcomes the 
paralysing conception of "lightning transgression" he had employed in earlier work. 
The remainder of this chapter shall excavate this novel axis via a discussion of his 
investigation of subjectivity. 
18 Quoted in Rajchman, Truth and Eros: Foucault. Lacan and the Question of Ethics, Routledge, 
London, 1991, pS. 
19 See, for example, Lois McNay, Foucault and Feminism,. 
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Individuality, Subjectivity and Subjectivisation 
In the following sections it is important that we are clear on the meaning of the 
terms individuality, subjectivity and subjectivisation. To put it simply, individuality 
is a modern configuration of our subjectivity. It is the way in which "we" 
(Occidental moderns) think of ourselves, and create ourselves, in relation to who 
we are. It is historically specific and dependent upon a whole host of factors, 
including the individuating affects of Protestantism and modern capital as well as 
the disciplinary procedures of modern government. In this respect, Foucault is 
aligning himself with a school of thought broadly descended from Hegel and Marx. 
To put it another way, Foucault is critical of the liberal notion of an autonomous 
self as the primary site of freedom and source of moral worth - "the individua1. .. is 
not the vis-a.-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects" .20 However, the 
difference Foucault, and other post-structuralists, bring to the classical debates 
concerning individuality is in their conception of subjectivity. 
This is clearly illustrated by comparison to Marxist accounts of the self For 
Marxists the idea of the liberal individual is a product of "false consciousness" - it is 
an ideological construction of human agency that supports the dominant economic 
class. This Marxist approach, however, relies upon a correlate conception of a 
"true consciousness". The features of this true self are usually defined in terms of 
humans as social and creatively productive beings. In other words, the true 
subjectivity that is obscured by the ideology of individuality can be ascertained by 
way of a Marxist analysis. Foucault, in contrast, radicalises the idea of subjectivity 
by calling into question the whole idea of a "true account of subjectivity". Not only 
is individuality contingent but subjectivity is also contingent. 
20 Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, p98. 
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Subjectivisation, is the interplay of this double contingency: "I will call 
subjectivisation the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or 
more precisely, of a subjectivity which is of course only one of the given 
possibilities of organisation of a self-consciousness" .21 In his earlier works, 
Foucault analysed this procedure via institutions such as hospitals and prisons. In 
the later works that are the subject of this chapter Foucault examines 
subjectivisation as a facet of the ethical and moral spheres. As the earlier work 
looked at techniques of knowledge and power the later work involved Foucault in 
an examination of "techniques of the self'. 22 
The Genealogy of Desire 
Foucault's interest in the processes of subjectivisation can be used to shed light on 
his view of social criticism as the experimentation into new formsftife. In order to 
establish the connections between these areas it is necessary to examine, following 
Foucault's own genealogy, the different ways in which subjectivity has constituted 
itself in thought; "How did we directly constitute our identity through some ethical 
techniques of the self which developed through antiquity down to now?". 23 The 
specific aspect of our identity that Foucault investigates is our relations to ourselves 
as subjects of desire. By focusing on the character of "the desiring subject" 
Foucault is not proposing this aspect of our identity as definitive of our relations to 
ourselves. Rather, it is to be viewed as only one avenue through which to examine 
the notion of "techniques of the self'. Perhaps Foucault's choice was influenced by 
21 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p253. 
22 In, 'About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth', Political 
Theory, volume 21, 1993, pp198-227 Foucault refers to 'techniques of the self as a fourth 'type' of 
technique alongside Habermas's categories of labour, communication and emancipation. While 
worthy of further study it is inappropriate to pursue this idea at present. 
23 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, p146. 
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his own sexuality and desires, as his biographers suggest?24 While sexuality may 
have proved a pertinent example for Foucault's research into techniques of the self, 
this does not mean that techniques of the self revolve solely around matters of 
sexuality and desire.25 Such a view is reinforced by considering Foucault's work on 
"governmentality" . 26 In his researches into the practice of government Foucault 
began to develop the idea that one of the major features of Western societies was 
the way in which the government of all was secured by the internalisation of rules in 
single individuals. In these studies we can witness Foucault's emergent interest in 
techniques of the self. Two points follow from this: first, Foucault does not equate 
techniques of the self with the domains of sexuality and desire - even though it was 
these areas that formed the focus of his later work. Secondly, techniques of the self 
are concerned with the relationship between the macro-political operations of 
power and the micro-political internalisation of these processes as ethical practices 
and commitments. Techniques of the self are not concerned with disembodied 
autonomous individuals. 
Anticipating further confusion, Foucault suggests that a "genealogy" of the desiring 
subject: 
does not mean that I proposed to write a history of the successive 
conceptions of desire, of concupiscence or of libido, but rather to analyse 
the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on 
themselves, to decipher, recognise and acknowledge themselves as 
subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves a certain 
24 See, James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault Harper Collins, London, 1993; David Macey, 
The Lives of Michel Foucault, Hutchinson, London, 1993; Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, trans. 
Betsy Wing, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1992. 
25 O'Farrel, Foucault: Philosopher or Historian?, pl18, makes a similar point. 
26 A useful collection of essays including reprints of Foucault's work in this area is, The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality, G. Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. 
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relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being 
be it natural or fallen. 27 
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As with his studies of madness, medicalisation or imprisonment Foucault is not 
concerned with the truth of desire but with the discourses and regimes that require 
people to search for the truth of desire. The question is not, "what is desire?" but 
"how is the idea of desire operationalised in discourse?". Foucault's aim is to 
debunk theoretical approaches to the self that focus on the universality of desire 
(and its structures). He seeks to reveal the specificity of each invention of desire; 
that is, to show that relations of desire are always intricately bound up with regimes 
of power-knowledge. In this later work, though, the regimes of power-knowledge 
function alongside a new realm, the realm of subjectivisation. 
Broadly speaking, Foucault traces the following dominant conceptions of desire and 
its relation to subjectivity. Most recently, the Freudian revolution in psychoanalysis 
has made it commonplace to think that one must be faithful to one's true desires, 
that is, not sublimate or repress any of one's emotions. Before Freud, in the 
Christian tradition, the dominant view was St. Augustine's notion that we think of 
our lives as made up of signs that must be decoded in order to understand our 
selves as fundamentally fallen and desiring beings. For example, Adam's desire 
wrapped around ourselves in a multitude of different ways that we must strive to 
unravel and understand. Biting the forbidden fruit was a sign of our inherent desire 
for things that we constitute as outside of our "good" selves - not a sublimated 
desire within us, as Freud may surmise. In antiquity, desire was constructed as an 
excessive act operating within a controlled economy of self-mastery. Desire was 
not constructed as a semiotic of the sins of the flesh nor a principal operating at the 
heart of a science, but as a specific set of practices bound up with the actions of 
everyday life and the forum. This three-fold history provides the merest hint of the 
27 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p5. 
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different constructions of desire that have, according to Foucault, permeated 
Western culture. The nuances of each historical period - for example, the 
differences between the Greek and the Roman conception - are important but not in 
the present context.28 
Foucault refers to the practices of desire as "games of truth". These games are the 
means through which people constitute themselves as objects of thought. They are 
the means "through which being is historically constituted as experience, that is, as 
something that can and must be thought" .29 In antiquity these "games" were 
inextricably linked to a free man's relation to the household economy, to the civic 
life and to relations with young boys.30 The relation of games of truth to the 
actuality of living out a life in accordance with these other practices, Foucault calls 
"the arts of existence": 
What I mean by the phrase are those intentional and voluntary actions by 
which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to 
transform themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an 
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic 
criteria.31 
Thus, arts of existence were thought of in two different ways in antiquity, as "rules 
of conduct" and as a style of living. This is an important distinction for Foucault 
and he generally refers to it in terms of the distinction between morality and ethics. 
28 James Bernauer offers an insightful and detailed of the development of Foucault's later writings; 
Bernauer, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethic for Thought, Humanities Press 
International, New Jersey and London, 1990. 
29 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p7. 
30 It is noticeable that Foucault's investigations into antiquity don't explicitly address the role of 
women during this time. Some commentators have taken this as a sign that Foucault is not sensitive 
to feminist issues and interpretations. For the debates surrounding Foucault's work and its relation to 
feminism see; McNay, Foucault and Feminism; J. Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power 
and the Body, Routledge, London, 1991; Diamond and Quinby (eds), Feminism and Foucault: 
Reflections on Resistance, Northeastern University Press, Boston, Mass., 1988. 
31 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p 10. 
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F or a person to lead a moral life that person must submit themselves to a set of 
preordained rules and prescriptions, as may be found m a text or m the 
commandments of a guru. An ethical life, by contrast, IS constituted by the 
relations one has to oneself rather than the relation one has to a code. Rajchman 
puts it as follows: "There are thus moral problems about the code, its principles and 
its applications: and then there are ethical problems about how to turn oneself into 
the right kind of person".32 Or, as Foucault puts it, a person can "practice" the 
same moral code in many different ways.33 Furthermore, different historical epochs 
may be characterised by a preponderance of moral codes over "practices of the self' 
or VIce versa. For Foucault, the Christian era was one dominated by the 
applications of moral codes whereas antiquity was more concerned with ethical 
techniques of existence. While one type may be dominant, however, moral codes 
and ethical practices can not, according to Foucault, be separated. Understanding 
technologies of the self, therefore, demands an examination of the relation between 
the moral code and the ethical practice. Foucault summarises it like this: 
In short, for an action to be moral, it must not be reducible to an act or a 
series of acts conforming to a rule, a law or a value .... There is no specific 
moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral 
conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; 
and no forming of the ethical subject without 'modes of subjectivation' and 
an 'ascetics' or 'practices of the self that support them. Moral action is 
indissociable from these forms of self-activity, and they do not differ any 
less from one morality to another than do the systems of values, rules and 
interdictions. 34 
This reinforces the interpretation, suggested earlier, of Foucault's later works as 
being concerned with more than an abstract subject devoid of social bonds. This is 
equally apparent when Foucault refers to the ways in which "individuals are urged 
32 Rajchman, Truth and Eros, p90. 
33 Foucault, The Care of the Self, Penguin, London, 1986, p16. 
34 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p28. 
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to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct". 35 In both cases, the 
ambiguity surrounding the character of subjectivisation is deliberate - our identity is 
self-constructed but our sense of self is itself a product of discursive strategies and 
relations of power. It is the relationship between the ethical and the moral, the 
technique and the code, that occupies many of Foucault's later works. 
Yet, there is still room for confusion regarding Foucault's object of study. In 
pursuing his research into the desiring subject Foucault is not concerned with the 
re-establishment of a humanist discourse of the self; this much is clear from the 
emphasis he puts on the relationship between the macro and micro level operations 
of power constitutive of the techniques of the self. It is not the case, though, that 
Foucault's later writings, are only concerned with the processes of subjectivisation 
that constitute the self. It is in the later writings, through his analysis of 
subjectivisation, that Foucault begins to elaborate a concept of transition that 
incorporates the 'limit-attitude' present in his earlier writings while not becoming 
trapped by the 'finitude' of his own position in a "spatialised" transcendental 
present. In other words, the later writings forsake the present as an absolute limit 
of his genealogies and point towards a concept of the present that is sensitive to the 
process of transgression - a liminal present. Foucault, in his later writings, is 
searching for the inside of the outside of (his) thought - the interior of transgression 
that eluded the earlier (genealogical) works. I shall explore this further below. 
Perhaps my emphasis on transition in Foucault's later work is unjustified? That this 
is not the case is clear from the weight Foucault gives to the character of the 
transition between pagan and Christian ethico-moral practices. Broadly speaking, 
there are two positions that seem intuitively plausible when one thinks of how 
sexual morality was transformed between antiquity and Christianity. The first is to 
35 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p29. 
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say that the two eras were characterised by such different moral systems that they 
form wholly incommensurable paradigms. Pagan antiquity could be looked upon as 
a society that was lax on moral issues; that Greek and Roman law allowed for a 
vast array of licence and permissiveness. It could be argued that Christian morality, 
being dictated by codified and universal rules, was qualitatively different from the 
"arts of existence" that formed the informal pagan ethic. A second view might 
suggest that there are in fact amazing similarities between the moral and ethical 
practices of pagan antiquity and the Christian era. Foucault himself points to four 
areas where strong continuities can be found. There was, for example, a common 
fear of the sexual act, should it go out of control. Secondly, both epochs held in 
common the view that the ideal sexual relationship was one that was monogamous. 
Thirdly, the image of effeminate men as problematic was common to antiquity and 
Christianity - regardless of the fact that relations with young boys were positively 
encouraged in early antiquity. Lastly, the Christian model of abstention from the 
sexual act had its precursors in the Greek "athletes of self restraint" who would 
renounce pleasure from sexual activity.36 In general, therefore, it may be thought 
that these features prove the continuity of pagan and Christian attitudes to the 
desiring subject. Is it not the case that the Christian doctrines were just the same 
ideas but dressed up in a different garb? 
For Foucault, both these positions miss the point; it is neither one nor the other but 
both. In looking at the transition from pagan to Christian morality "it is possible to 
see clear-cut continuities and discontinuities".37 Or, paraphrasing P. Brown: "the 
parting of the waters is hard to pin down". 38 On the face of it this may appear 
trivial and obvious. Indeed, Foucault's investigations have always sought to reveal 
36 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp14-20. 
37 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, p39. 
38 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp240-241. 
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the lines of similarity and divergence between discourses. Madness and 
Civilization, for example, gives a detailed account of the transitions between 
Renaissance and Classical conceptions of madness. It includes thorough 
investigations into the precise elements that comprised each discourse, revealing 
just the kind of" continuities and discontinuities" that occupy his study of pagan and 
Christian discourses of desire. Furthermore, in the interview "On The Genealogy of 
Ethics", Foucault argued that, although there are some "very striking" continuities 
between pagan and Christian Morality, "behind, below this continuity there were 
some changes that I have tried to acknowledge".39 This suggests that Foucault's 
notion of transition is no different from that presented in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (see the end of chapter one). Perhaps Foucault is more willing to talk 
of continuities but revealing the ruptures of thought by way of genealogy remains 
his primary critical intent? If this is the case, then my claim that Foucault's later 
works contain (to some, yet to be defined, extent) a more refined concept of 
transition that surpasses the finitude of his previous work, would stumble at the first 
hurdle. 
In order to clarify my position it is necessary to restate the dual operation of 
transition that operates in Foucault's writings. First, there is the idea of transition as 
the movement from one regime or discourse to the next. To the extent that the 
argument refers to, what could be labelled, "historical transition" Foucault's concept 
of continuity and discontinuity between regimes is no different from his earlier 
work. From the very beginning he has sought to display the lines of continuity and 
discontinuity between discursive structures. However, if this is our understanding 
of Foucault's genealogy it is no different from the attitude of a conventional 
historian. It would be to forget Foucault's attempt to rework the relationship 
between history and philosophy - to forget, in other words, that genealogy is 
39 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p341. 
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distinct from conventional history. To reclaim the distinctiveness of genealogy is to 
remember that it is a process of unmasking that operates in the present; with an 
active awareness of the role of the present in the analysis. In this context genealogy 
is involved with the critical transition into the future. It is this second feature of 
transition that we must consider in order to comprehend the change inaugurated by 
the later works regarding Foucault's rethinking of the limit-attitude. The point is 
this; Foucault has always been concerned with excavating the intricacies of 
transition between discourses and regimes but it is only with the advent of his later 
work that the theoretical framework for a conceptual understanding of transition 
can fully emerge. This theoretical framework is intimately bound up with, but 'not 
reducible to, his ethical investigations. To see why this is the case we must 
consider the genealogical implications of his foray into antiquity; that is, the way in 
which his investigations bear upon the present. 
In this section I have argued that Foucault's genealogy of desire is not solely 
concerned with the character of subjectivity and the ethical practices surrounding 
subjects. The later works are also concerned with the nature of transition - as all 
Foucault's works have been - yet in the investigation of subjectivity and ethics we 
shall find a new approach to transition that shall overcome the problems presented 
by the earlier work. In the next section I shall look in more detail at the relationship 
between the transition from pagan to Christian ethico-moral practices and how this 
impinges upon the present. 
The Transition to the Present 
The evolution that occurred - quite slowly at that - between paganism and 
Christianity did not consist in a gradual interiorisation of rules, acts and 
transgressions; rather it carried out a restructuration of the forms of self-
relationship and a transformation of the practices and techniques on which 
this relationship was based.40 
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In the previous sections I have argued that although Foucault's later works revolve 
around the interplay of desire and subjectivity these themes do not exhaust the 
topics for analysis that we can glean from his work. Indeed the later writings can 
be considered as developing the analytic of transition, the analytic of the limit-
attitude, that was present in the earlier writings. It is further claimed that this 
development may overcome the problems, highlighted in chapter one, regarding the 
finitude of the genealogical present. In this section I shall look more closely at how 
Foucault's concept of "techniques of the self' may achieve this aim. Furthermore, 
in assessing this issue I shall be driven to ask two questions; first, "what is the 
intellectual's relation to the present?" and secondly, "what is the nature of a critique 
of the present?". It is to these two questions that I shall return in the following 
sections of this chapter. To be clear on these issues, however, we must first be 
clear on the nature of the transition from a pagan ethics to a Christian one. 
We can begin this process by considering Foucault's claim that the transition from 
paganism to Christianity is not "a gradual interiorisation of rules, acts and 
transgressions" . Foucault has two reasons for criticising this position. First, to 
think of the transition in this way is to suggest that the code, the moral law and the 
dictates enshrined in a revered text, are all that is worthy of study. Foucault, in 
contrast, argues that "rules, acts and transgressions" do not in themselves constitute 
the experience of a moral and ethical subject. The internalisation of moral codes 
through ethical practice, discussed in the previous section, can not be accounted for 
by reference to the codes alone. Despite the continuity of the moral codes of 
paganism and Christianity, "we should not let this apparent continuity obscure the 
fact that the ethical subject was no longer constituted in the same manner" .41 
Secondly, and as a corollary of the first argument, Foucault views the notion of a 
40 Foucault, The Use ofP1easure, p63. 
41 Foucault, The Use ofP1easure, p92. 
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"gradual interiorisation" as suggesting an already ethically constituted subject that 
absorbs the moral code. It is Foucault's aim, by way of contrast, to look at the 
constitution of the ethical subject and the mechanisms of its transformations. The 
difference can be expressed in terms of Foucault's relation to Sartre. Foucault 
accepts Sartre's notion of the self to the extent that Sartre refuses the idea that the 
self is a natural given. However, Foucault disagrees with Sartre's insistence that 
"we have to be ourselves", that the key to understanding the self lies in the notion 
of authenticity. Rather than focusing on an authentic self - a self based on being 
true to oneself - Foucault suggests that the self should be considered in relation to 
the concept of creativity: "we should not have to refer the creative activity of 
somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself; but should relate the kind 6f 
relation one has to oneself to a creative activity". 42 In other words, the self is not 
discovered to be authentic or inauthentic but emerges in the act of self-creation - a 
more dynamic understanding of the self that does not dictate the parameters of the 
true self. In relation to the discussion of the transition between paganism and 
Christianity the point is this; in examining the transition Foucault avoids the 
reification of the moral code or the ethical subject. In place of this he focuses on 
the ethical practices that constitute the relationship between the code and the 
subject. It is in this ethical arena that the techniques of the self operate. This must 
always be understood, though, in the context elaborated above, namely that self-
creation/techniques of the self are intertwined with operations of power and 
knowledge. 
Thus, for Foucault, the transition between pagan and Christian ethico-moral 
practices is qualitatively different to the notion of a moral code bearing down upon 
an existential subject. To understand the transition one must address how 
techniques of the self were reworked and transformed: 
42 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p351. 
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Instead of asking what were the code elements that Christianity may have 
borrowed from ancient thought, and what were those that it added in its 
own right, in order to define what was permitted and what forbidden 
within a sexuality assumed to be constant, it seemed more pertinent to ask 
how given the continuity, transfer or modifications of codes, the forms of 
self-relationship (and the practices of the self associated with them) were 
defined, modified, recast and diversified. 
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The importance of this examination into the transition period between paganism and 
Christianity is that it necessitates a look at a new domain of inquiry, the domain of 
the forms of self-relationship. Foucault's aim is to show how the Greek art of 
"governing oneself' is a domain that marks itself outside of the relations of 
knowledge and of power. Why, while examining the transition between pagan and 
Christian ethics, did Foucault come to delineate this new arena of thought? Why 
could his inquiry into techniques of the self not be contained by the analysis of 
power-knowledge he had used to such effect before? 
Knowledge, as characterised by Foucault, is most usefully understood as a series of 
relations that have become "stratified" into discursive formations. It operates 
through the definition of specific codes - establishing relations between words and 
things - which enable the production of statements. These codes and formations 
may overlap and change but nonetheless they function through the formalisation of 
contingent properties into sedentary structures. Power, as discussed in the first 
chapter, is a relation between different forces. The operation of power is defined 
by the ways in which one force may affect, or be affected by, another force. Power, 
furthermore, functions diagrammatically; that is, the workings of power may be 
similar across different stratified relations of knowledge. This is the lesson of 
Panopticism which operates on school-children, madmen and hospital patients (to 
name a few) as well as on prisoners. Yet, in attempting to understand the transition 
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from pagan to Christian ethics, Foucault required a third, new, domain. How does 
Foucault characterise this new arena? 
The relations characteristic of subjectivity, of the "arts" of self-relationship, are 
those whereby force affects itself. Where diagrams of power invoke relations of 
differing forces - the relation between warder and prisoner, for example - the 
relation one has with oneself is an act of force on itself. The realm of self-
governance lies in the creation of an "internal" regulatory principle that does not 
depend upon the stratification of a moral code. Yet, this relation of force to itself 
does not constitute an escape from the domains of power and knowledge, nor an 
arena that can be subsumed by (or subsumes) these other axes. Subjectivity is In 
relation to power and knowledge. But what is the nature of this relation? It is 
possible to glean one response to this by looking at Foucault's use of the classical 
Greek concept of "enkrateia": "the dynamics of a domination of oneself by oneself 
and the effort that this demands". 43 
According to Foucault, the dynamics of this "domination of oneself by oneself' - in 
the domain of desire/aphrodisia - consists of five different aspects. First, it implies 
an "agonistic" relation with the pleasures one feels. Ethical behaviour required that 
one battle against one's own pleasures; it was "contingent on a battle for power". 
Secondly, this battle was an agonism of the self In later, Christian, times the battle 
represented a microcosm of the battle between heaven and hell, and as such the 
pleasures that one sought to eradicate were essentially contained in an "other". In 
antiquity this battle was fought on the combat zone of the self; "one had to cross 
swords with oneself'. 44 Thirdly, and as a result of the previous notion, victory in 
this battle was not conceived as the expulsion of desire but of its control. Fourthly, 
43 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p65. 
44 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p68. 
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this agonism was integrally linked to the battle for control of one's domestic life and 
one's life as a member of a civic group; "ideal virtue had to be structured like a 
city" .45 Lastly, all of this required askesis, or training. This askesis was originally 
part of the general training in civic life - if one wanted to dominate others one must 
be able to dominate oneself - but later on it became a more autonomous part of 
one's life. 
The lesson Foucault draws from the Greek notion of enkrateia is that the relation 
of forces constitutive of self-governance can embody the possibility of freedom and 
self-control but only at the price of integrating self-control in regimes of 
power/knowledge. To control others one must control oneself and vice versa. 1n 
this sense, subjectivity is not "outside" of power and knowledge, it does not 
constitute a realm devoid of these relations, though subjectivity is a novel 
configuration of these relations. It is this novelty which marks it out as the third 
axis of Foucault's work. Power, knowledge and subjectivity - all related to each 
other but all differentiated by their internal configurations of force and form/strata. 
But this domain of subjectivity and sexuality is antiquated. What relation does it 
have to contemporary discussions? What are the genealogical implications of 
Foucault's investigation? Is Foucault arguing that we should recover an "art of 
existence" in today's world to mimic pag'an ethics? In response to this question 
Foucault distinguishes between the relevance of pagan society to our present 
culture and the importance of studying an historical epoch and its transitions into an 
other culture. On the relevance of pagan society to contemporary culture Foucault 
is extremely dismissive: 
Q; "The Greeks, do you find them admirable?" 
F; "No" 
45 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p72. 
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Q; "Neither exemplary nor admirable?" 
F; "No" 
Q; "What did you think of them? " 
F; "Not very much" .46 
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The reason for this attitude is clear. The operation of self-governance in antiquity 
applied only to free men. It was a society based on slavery and the subordination of 
women, one that in general "rested on a harsh system of inequalities and 
constraints" .47 Thus the nature of ethical life in antiquity is not one that ought to be 
recreated for the present: "I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the 
solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at an other moment 
by other people" .48 What the Greeks offer is something wholly different, 
From antiquity to Christianity we pass from a morality that was essentially 
the search for a personal ethics to a morality as obedience to a system of 
rules. And if I was interested in antiquity it was because, for a whole 
series of reasons, the idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules, is 
now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of 
morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics of 
existence.49 
Foucault is not concerned with returning to a pagan ethic. Rather, he is interested 
in analysing the idea of subjectivity in relation to moments of transition; the present 
being one such moment. While his analysis of the operations of power and 
knowledge playa part in the analysis of liminal periods, in order to get "inside" the 
moment of transition Foucault turned to the new axis of subjectivity. Foucault's 
self-proclaimed task of articulating a "politics of ourselves" relies upon a 
recognition of the importance of understanding moments of transition. The ethico-
political attitude that derives from the later work has subjectivity as its focus but 
46 Foucault, Politics. Philosophy. Culture, p253. 
47 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p25. 
48 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p343. 
49 Foucault, Politics. Philosophy. Culture, p49. 
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contains the elements to unearth a fourth axis in Foucault's thought, the axis of 
transition, transgression and liminality. This is only possible, however, by 
rethinking the character of the present to allow for an open (temporal) present, as 
discussed in chapter two. In the following section the idea of the present in 
Foucault's later work will be examined through a discussion of the essay, "What is 
Enlightenment?" . 
Foucault, Enlightenment and the Present 
In 1784 Kant responded to the challenge of a Berlin newspaper to discuss 'the 
question "What is Enlightenment?", by writing an essay of that title. Foucault sees 
the resulting essay as an attempt to answer the question: "what is it in the present 
that produces meaning now for philosophical reflection?". 50 In other words, Kant 
is offering a critical reflection on the contemporaneity of his own Enlightenment 
project. "What is Enlightenment?" becomes, therefore, an analysis of the relation 
thought has with its own present. This form of critical self reflection Foucault calls 
"modern".51 
Modernity is an attitude characterised by the notion of difference: "what difference 
does today introduce with respect to yesterday?". It is a way of relating to 
contemporary reality that problematises our relation to the present in terms of the 
difference that being in the present makes to established ways of thinking. As 
formulated by Kant, modernity is not a rigid "faithfulness to doctrinal elements", 
but rather it is the critique of the present in terms of the present. It is, suggests 
Foucault, similar to the Greek notion, discussed briefly above, of an ethos. 
50 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p87. 
51 For Foucault's brief discussion of pre-modem conceptions of the present see, The Foucault Reader, 
pp33-34. 
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Moreover, the ethos of Enlightenment inaugurated by Kant can be characterised in 
negative and positive terms. 
Negatively, this Enlightenment ethos implies that we do not fall prey to the 
"blackmail" of the Enlightenment. Foucault is suggesting that it does not make 
sense to be either "for" or "against" the Enlightenment. To do so is to go against 
the very ethos that Foucault sees in Kant; the ethos of a permanent critique of the 
present. Indeed the only projects that Foucault argues one can be for or against are 
projects that present themselves as such: that is, projects that claim to have located 
the essence of the Enlightenment or those that decry it as "dead". Both these 
options Foucault finds paradoxical given his reading of Kant who, at the very 
beginning of the Enlightenment, stressed the need for a continuously critical 
position in terms of our relation with the present. Both these options reify the 
Enlightenment in some strange wish to either "preserve it" or declare its 
bankruptcy. Those who seek to put the Enlightenment on trial and prove it's 
innocence or guilt simply miss the point for Foucault: "Let us leave in their piety 
those who want to keep the Aufklarung living and intact. Such piety is of course 
the most touching of treasons".52 This piety is also the piety of those who think 
that the Enlightenment can be easily dismissed. They do not realise the beginnings 
of the Enlightenment are rooted in a tradition of permanent critique, an attitude 
whose only "judge" can be on-going engagement with the present. 
Positively, this ethos of Enlightenment is characterised by Foucault as containing 
two major elements. First, there is Enlightenment as a "limit-attitude". Eschewing 
the blackmail of the Enlightenment it is no longer sufficient to be an intellectual on 
the "outside" or "inside" of modernity, "we have to be at the frontiers" .53 For 
52 Foucault, Politics. Philosophy. Culture, p94. 
53 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment"; The Foucault Reader, pp32-50, p45. 
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Foucault this involves the redefinition of the epistemological problem posed by 
Kant: "If the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to 
renounce transgressing ... today ... the point, in brief, is to transform the critique 
conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the 
form of a possible transgression" .54 Kantian epistemology is turned into a critical 
ontology of the present. 
Secondly, the analytic Kant outlined in relation to his present must now be 
rethought in relation to our present, a position that is firmly within the 
Enlightenment ethos of permanent critique offered by Kant. Foucault, therefore, 
addresses the relation of the contemporary intellectual to the present. What is the 
role of the intellectual in current society? Foucault defines it as follows: it is to 
rethink the limits of knowledge that Kant defined and seek "a new impetus, as far 
and as wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom" . 55 Where the Kantian 
search for rational foundations of knowledge had helped liberate people from the 
prejudices of feudal society, the current task is to pursue this liberatory role to its 
utmost extent. This includes, though, a thorough investigation of the dominatory 
tendencies of rationalism itself. 
However, realising that this talk of freedom may be no more than an "empty 
dream", Foucault substantiates his view in reference to the experimental attitude of 
the Enlightenment: 
I mean that this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one 
hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry, and on the other, put itself to 
the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where 
change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this 
change should take. This means that the historical ontology of ourselves 
54 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p45. 
55 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p46. 
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must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. In fact 
we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of 
contemporary reality ... has led to the return of the most dangerous 
traditions. 56 
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In place of projects of global transformation, for example Marxism, Foucault 
stresses the importance of specific struggles with clearly defined local sites of 
resistance. Experience informs us, though, that even local struggles are never 
finalised and must constantly engage with the present: "we are always in the 
position of beginning again". Examples of local struggles would be elements of the 
gay movement, feminism, the travellers, the black movement and so on; elements 
that don't seek to universalise their struggle on to all aspects of our diverse 
experience; elements that seek to form new, but never finalised, ways of living in 
the present. In this way one can seek to reclaim the present in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment as formulated by its first, and possibly greatest exponent, Kant. In 
this way Foucault situates his work in the long tradition that has sought to keep this 
critique of the present alive and vital; "it is this form of philosophy that from Hegel, 
through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School has founded a form of 
reflection in which I have tried to work". 57 To think of the Enlightenment as an 
ethos that characterises itself as a relation to the present is to see the importance of 
all these thinkers in carrying on that tradition: 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a 
theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating: it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the 
same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and 
an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.58 
56 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p46. 
57 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p95. 
58 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p50. 
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Foucault's version of Enlightenment social criticism, therefore, is based on the need 
to cross the limits of the present. It emphasises constant refusal of the present by 
way of a perpetual crossing of the limits of established ways of thinking. But how 
is this different from the genealogical "limit-attitude" that I criticised in the first 
chapter? Do the later works really reflect a new F oucauldian attitude to the 
present, one that will open it up to the features of liminality discussed in previous 
chapters? How has Foucault's foray into the transition between pagan and Christian 
ethics affected his conception of "going beyond" the present? The point is this: 
while examining the effects of regimes of power/knowledge Foucault was unable to 
get inside the moment of transition between discursive practices which meant that 
the approach he took to the present (itself an immanent site of transition) was 
limited by his own thought. In undertaking a genealogy of the desiring subject 
Foucault examined the character of transition and transgression through the new 
axis of subjectivity. Moreover, it was an analysis driven by a recognition that the 
present is characterised by an "absence of morality" (see above). At such a moment 
the possibility for reconceiving subjectivity, for enacting the arts of existence, 
comes into playas the practice of ethics assumes precedence over the formal 
requirements of the moral code. The "freedom" implicit in ethical practices of self-
creation (understood with the provisos mentioned above) can then be realised. If 
we couple this with Foucault's reinvigoration of Kant's Enlightenment project, with 
the ideal of permanent critique, then it is possible to discern in Foucault a new 
concept of the present that eschews the limits of his archaeological/genealogical 
account. The present, on this new account, becomes a potential site for transition 
and transgression rather than a barrier to thought. An "open" present, a present 
conceived as being permanently in transition, allows for the possibility of creative 
and active subjectivisations in sustaining a constant critique of that present; that is, 
of fulfilling the Enlightenment ideal as described by Foucault's reading of Kant's 
concept of Aufklarung. 
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In the next section I shall further examine how this notion of transgression does not 
fall into the same trap as the "histories of the present" described in chapter one. I 
shall do this by way of examples regarding some of the political implications of this 
interpretation of Foucault's later works: an interpretation that places the concept of 
an immanently transient present at the heart of his thought. 
Liminality, Virtuality and Politics 
One of the most harmful habits in contemporary thought...is the analysis 
of the present as being precisely, in history, a present of rupture, or of 
high point, or of completion or of a returning dawn etc. The solemnity 
with which everyone who engages in philosophical discourse reflects on 
his own times strikes me as a flaw. I can say so all the more firmly since it 
is something I have done myself. 59 
This admission is telling. It tells of a thinker who failed to find a history of the 
present, an analytic of" ourselves in the present", as a series of relations conditioned 
by power and knowledge. The product of this futile present was a concept of the 
future as an absolute void. By rethinking the character of transition between 
regimes and discourses as periods of liminality, however, the present itself becomes 
liminal. In other words, by analysing the inside of transition (through his 
investigation of subjectivity) Foucault can also get inside the present, into the past-
present-future of the present. This reveals the importance of Bergson to Foucault. 
Bergson, as explained in chapter two, analysed the present in its essential 
temporality; as a moment of duration that contains traces of that which has been 
and that which is becoming. The liminal present is also the "virtual" present: 
I would like to say something about the function of any diagnosis 
concerning the nature of the present. It does not consist in a simple 
characterisation of what we are, but instead - by following lines of fragility 
in the present - in managing to grasp why and how that-which-is might no 
longer be that-which-is. In this sense, any description must always be 
59 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy. Culture, p35. 
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made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the 
space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e. of 
possible transformation. 60 
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These "virtual fractures" are consistent with the Bergsonian "virtual". The present 
is thought of as a continuous moment in which past, present and future can not be 
separated from each other. This is a view of the present which is no longer thought 
of as a limit to genealogical analysis. Importantly, though, this does not mean the 
theme of discontinuity disappears from Foucault's work. Rather, it is precisely by 
emphasising the virtuality of the present that one can maintain the possibility of 
discontinuity - the present-as-limit condemns the analysis to a repetition of ·the 
same, whereas the present-as-virtual allows for the transformations that make 
discontinuity possible. 61 The future is no longer closed off; no longer the site of 
rupture; no longer the limit to theoretical knowledge; no longer trapped by the 
present. Rather, the future is brought into focus by the duration of our existence, 
our experience of constantly becoming. Becoming, that is, in the sense described in 
chapter three; becoming as the inescapable immanent temporality of our lives, 
becoming as always coming to presence. The "fractures" in the present of power 
and knowledge, the liminal points of crisis and change, create the possibility of 
radical subjectivisation. Foucauldian ethics, in other words, offers an alternative 
ontology to that which underpins the narrative account of the self - an open 
material ontology as opposed to a transcendental one.62 The hope that we may 
gain a critical subjectivity through analysis of intersubjective dialogue, as attempted 
by Habermas, is also fractured by the immanent transience of everyday speech. The 
virtuality of each present moment of dialogue disrupts the attempt to universalise 
60 Foucault, Politics, Philosophv, Culture, p36. 
61 Recall the discussion in chapter two which emphasised that only when the present is 
"temporalised" can the qualitative distinctions of kind that engender discontinuity be thought 
through. 
62 I shall elaborate upon this distinction in the conclusion. 
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the content of speech - except to say, of course, that transience subsists at all 
moments (even ifthe rules oflanguage may lead us to forget this). Radical, critical, 
theory must always recognise that transition, transience, transformation, 
transgression and liminality are the immanent ontological conditions of "concrete 
freedom" (more about this in the conclusion). Moreover, the work of intellectuals 
is to describe that-which-is by making it appear as something that might not be, or 
that might not be as it is. Which is why this designation or description of the real 
never has a prescriptive value of the kind, "'because this is, that will be"'. 63 Virtual 
becoming does not prescribe an actual form of being - except, of course, that which 
is defined as "agonistic". The practical task of theory is refuse theoretical 
constructions that create a repetitive present. The theoretical task of practice is to 
engender the immanence of continuous transition. 
Rajchman's interpretation of the concepts "community" and "freedom" in Foucault 
provides a useful starting point to examine the political consequences of thinking 
through an immanent liminal present. This will be complemented, towards the end 
of this section, by considering the debate generated by Habermas's essay, "Taking 
Aim at the Heart of the Present". 64 
On the issue of community Foucault's thought is quite clear. He made no claims to 
be a communitarian and his thought is, in many respects, antithetical to such an 
approach. While Foucault agreed that one can not conceive of an individual 
outside of the context in which the individual is created he also maintained that to 
replace individualism with communitarianism amounts to replicating the problem of 
individualism: it essentialises one form of human existence to the detriment of 
alternatives. The attempt to prioritise certain values by reference to their 
63 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp36-37. 
64Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", David Couzens Hoy (ed), Foucault: A Critical 
Reader, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp103-108. 
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embeddedness in a community neglects the multiplicity of forms of existence. 
Communitarianism, like individualism, is concerned with locating the core elements 
of human nature; Foucault is concerned with unmasking the concept of "human 
nature" itself He is neither a liberal individualist nor a communitarian. 
However to the extent that we experience living in communities, be they nations, 
linguistic communities, small groups or whatever, Rajchman argues that, for 
Foucault, each community could be viewed as consisting of three parts. First, there 
is the "given community". This consists of the system of relations that are available 
to each member of the community in terms of the self-defining code that it employs. 
Put simply it is the explicit recognition of each member as part of the larger 
community as encapsulated, for example, in the phrase "I am an X". Secondly, 
there is the "tacit community" which is the "materially rooted system of thought 
that makes X a possible object of identification". 65 In other words, whereas the 
given community is constituted by the discursive practices invested in structures 
and institutions, the tacit community is the enactment and reinforcement of these 
discourses through everyday practices. I may say, "I am a Scot" and identify myself 
as such with reference to the distinct legal, religious and educational institutions of 
Scotland. Yet, this identification relies upon my tacit acceptance of the legitimacy 
of these institutions by way of my participation in them. Thirdly there is the 
"critical community". This aspect of community arises when the links between the 
given community and the tacit one are fractured. It comes from the 
problematisation of the self-evidentness of any community. It is this element of 
community that is most interesting for the present discussion. 
It is Rajchman's contention, one with which I agree, that the importance of the 
critical community for Foucault is that at moments of fracture between the 
65 Rajchman, Truth and Eros, p102. 
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discourse of community (the given community) and the practices that sustain the 
discourse (the tacit community) we find the conditions for freedom. This is not 
freedom in the sense that once we dispel the bonds of community freedom ensues -
that would amount to a broadly liberal position whereby the individual is prioritised 
over the community. Rather, "it is the community that problematises identity and 
thus makes our subjectivity an open and endless question, at once individual and 
collective" .66 Neither liberal conceptions of autonomous individuals (as in Rawls) 
nor presupposed communitarian values (as in Taylor) are structural features of this 
critical position. In this respect, it superficially resembles the dialogical character of 
Habermas's ideal speech situation. However, Habermas's attempt to ground critical 
discussion on a presupposed consensus embedded in communication is markedly 
different from the presupposition of "agonism" that lies at the heart of the 
Foucauldian account. For Foucault, consensus may well be the result of the 
operationalisation of a critical community but it is not presupposed in the 
argumentative process. The reasons for this are apparent from the discussion in 
chapter four. Of course, in reality the fracture between the given and the tacit 
community is never likely to be total. It is more plausible to imagine different 
elements of a community experiencing fracture at different times. This does not, 
though, substantially alter the claim being made. Putting it simply, the 
poststructuralist invites the suspension of both substantive values and procedural 
presuppositions. 
The critical community, furthermore, implies a condition of "concrete freedom": 
"the passion of the critical bond is a passion of being free".67 Rajchman continues: 
The existence of freedom (that we are not under the sign of a unique 
necessity) resides in the fact that no historical determination of our being 
66 Rajchman, Truth and Eros, p 102. 
67 Rajchman, Truth and Eros, p109. 
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is absolute, that any such determination is exposed to events that interrupt 
it, transform it, and reinterpret what it is. The experience of freedom is an 
experience of such an event that frees our relation to the practices and the 
thinking that have historically limited our experience. And the practices 
of freedom are what people try to make of themselves when they 
experience the existence of freedom in the history that has formed them. 68 
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I would add that the condition of the existence of freedom is the temporal 
discontinuity implied by a liminal present - the continuity, that is, of past-present-
future which gives rise to the possibility of discontinuity and fracture. The liminal 
present, the immanently paradoxical present between the past and future, entails the 
on-going potential of freedom. Freedom is not the end point of struggle but .the 
condition of the very existence of struggle: it is "a permanent provocation".69 T4e 
condition of freedom is the liminality of the present; that is, the eternal potential for 
the openness of the present. The liminality of the present resides in the ontological 
condition of our lives as temporal beings: 
Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics; but ethics is the 
deliberative form assumed by freedom. If the existence of freedom in 
history conditions the elaboration of an ethics, that ethics is the attempt to 
endow this existence with a specific practical form. 70 
An ethical life, therefore, is one that strives towards freedom as a practice of living 
at the limits of the present. This may take the form of "individual" or "collective" 
action but neither approach is given priority. In Foucault's view, we are not free 
individuals coming together to form a community, nor communal beings whose 
freedom lies in their social relations; rather the potential for both is implicit in the 
present. In other words, we are that-which-is with the potential for that-which-is-
68 Rajchman, Truth and Eros, p 110. 
69 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pp208-226, p222. 
70 Foucault, "The Ethic of the Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom", Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, vol. 12, 1987, pp 112-13l. 
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not-yet. We are in a position of virtuality, of becoming liminal, that offers no 
solutions but never stops asking questions about our condition. This is a critical 
position, it must always invoke criticism, not in the name of some absolute, nor 
some logically implied consensus of reason, nor in the postmodern "free plai' of 
sheer negativity; but in the "future-past" of the crisis situation, the liminal forever 
beginning, that can not but arise in the present. Time in its virtuality, recalling 
Wood (chapter three), is permanently gathering it's forces to undermine the many 
~ 
stas's of time that order our lives - the working day, day and night, the calendar of 
seasons, the shrinking time of communications, shopping time, family time and 
much more. In this undermining of the "spatialisation" of time (chapter two) 
Foucault locates freedom. Social criticism, in this sense, must be ongoing; It 
creates "a plurality of questions posed to politics rather than a rein scription of the 
act of questioning within the framework of a political doctrine".71 
It may seem that this account of social criticism presents a futile picture of social 
relations. The possibility for social criticism may well exist in a liminal present but 
this tells us nothing about how we ought to live our lives. To the extent that such a 
criticism implies the need for a normative approach to social criticism it is wide of 
the mark. Three points are relevant. Firstly, the search for normative foundations 
is theoretically futile. More cautiously, the most adequate account to date of the 
normative approach, that of Habermas's discourse ethics, has been shown to rest 
upon a dubious "reconstruction" of everyday speech. Secondly, the task of 
analysing the ontological conditions of the present - of patriarchy, capitalism, 
postmodernity and so on - is constituted as a vital and on-going project. Thirdly, 
the role of political philosophy is one of creation and invitation; that is, the creation 
of fractures in the present and the invitation to experiment within them (always 
remembering that these fractures are local but not localised). To extend that role 
71 Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p386. 
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into the normative task of describing what ought to be done once the fractures are 
revealed is fraught with dangers (even if that "ought" is construed in a "weak" 
procedural sense). It is not that values can not be deployed in an act of social 
criticism but that the critic must see those values for what they are - contingent and 
based upon the "will to power". Taking these factors together, F oucauldian 
criticism becomes a "positive" exercise in the opening up of the present to critical 
apprehension, but one that is ever vigilant about over-reaching its scope. 
Poststructuralism is concerned with creating the eternal potential of freedom but at 
the expense of the potential of eternal freedom. In this respect the charge that 
poststructuralism leaves very little for political philosophy "to do" is misguided. 
In "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present" Habermas addresses Foucault's 
interpretation of Kant and the claim that the ideal of Enlightenment is best served 
by the permanent critique of the present. Habermas recognises that "Foucault 
discovers in Kant the contemporary who transforms esoteric philosophy into a 
critique of the present to answer the challenge of the historical moment".72 Yet, 
Habermas contends that this reading of Kant's essay does not fit into Foucault's 
overall programme of a critique of modernity. The question arises: "how can 
Foucault's self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment be 
compatible with his unmistakable criticism of this very form of knowledge of 
modernity?".73 This paradox, suggests Habermas, is symptomatic of a general 
"contradiction" in Foucault's work: "He contrasts his critique of power with 'the 
analysis of truth' in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the 
normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow from the latter" .74 
72 Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", p104. 
73 Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", p107. 
74 Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present", plOS. See also, Habermas, "Some Questions 
Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again" in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. 
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Habermas's critique, however, does not amount to a persuasive challenge to the 
Foucauldian position, as has been pointed out by Dreyfus and Rabinow.75 I shall 
briefly recap their defence of the F oucauldian reading of Kant and then at the close 
of this section relate their essay to the argument presented throughout the above 
chapters. Dreyfus and Rabinow begin their response to Habermas by arguing that 
his interpretation of the Foucauldian programme is misconceived: "the 
interpretation of Foucault as making normative but unjustified theoretical claims ... is 
not consistent with Foucault's general approach" .76 While they admit that 
normative elements appeared in some of Foucault's writings and interviews the 
overall pattern of Foucault's genealogical research was based on a refusal to 
"articulate normative principles". To support this interpretation of Foucault they 
assess his concept of modernity, as it appears in "What is Enlightenment?". 
Foucault, they argue, was not concerned with modernity as a specific set of 
theoretical tools brought into being by Kant. If Foucault had conceived of 
modernity in this way then his analysis would have amounted to an acceptance or 
rejection of the concepts that constitute "our" sense of modernity. Yet, as we saw 
above, Foucault was explicitly aiming to avoid the "blackmail" of the 
Enlightenment/modernity. If such "blackmail" is to be avoided, however, it is 
necessary to elaborate an alternative concept of what is meant by modernity in 
Foucault. Dreyfus and Rabinow summarise Foucault's concept of modernity as 
follows: 
Modernity is not a specific historical event, but a historical conjuncture 
which has happened several times in our history, albeit with different form 
and content. ... This breakdown results in a specific attitude toward reality 
which, to differentiate it from a subjective state, Foucault calls an ethos. 
In a modernity-crisis, a taken-for-granted understanding of reality ceases 
to function as a shared background in terms of which people orient and 
75 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, "What is Maturity? Habermas and Foucault on 'What is 
Enlightenment?"', Foucault: A Critical Reader, pp lO9-121. 
76 Dreyfus and Rabinow, "What is Maturity?", p1l3. 
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justify their activity and the modernist response is heroically and lucidly to 
face up to the collapse of the old order.77 
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Modernity, therefore, is not set of specific theoretical tools or normative principles 
outlined by Kant nor a singular moment in time but a category to understand any 
moment of crisis where a dominant understanding of reality gives way to another 
way of thinking about the world. During the moment of "breakdown", moreover, 
the potential for an ethical perspective is inaugurated. This ethical life of 
modernity, for Dreyfus and Rabinow, consists of two primary characteristics. First, 
a heroic attitude to the collapse of shared understandings, that is, one that 
recognises and faces up to the collapse. Secondly, an ironic attitude to the loss of 
shared understanding that refuses to reinstate universal principles. On these 
characteristics, Kant (and Habermas) have a heroic attitude to modernity but they 
have not "matured" into an ironic stance towards the present. Conflating modernity 
with Enlightenment embroils one in the blackmail of being for or against its 
precepts and tools - a futile exercise. Conceiving of the Enlightenment as one 
manifestation of modernity emphasises the importance of rupture in the constitution 
of our ethical commitments. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation of Foucault is more subtle and thoughtful 
than the" straw man" that Habermas knocks down: though there are also aspects of 
the Dreyfus and Rabinow argument with which I take issue. I shall conclude, 
therefore, on the following remarks. First, Habermas, given that his essay was 
written very shortly after Foucault's death, does not take on board the later writings 
which I have argued play a crucial role in our understanding of the connection 
Foucault makes between an analysis of the present and an ontological foundation 
for ethics. Secondly, in applying normative value to the concept of modernity 
Habermas is telling us more about his own programme as opposed to engaging with 
77 Dreyfus and Rabinow, "What is Maturity?", p 117. 
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Foucault's. The extent to which Habermas's critique may be valid relies upon 
whether or not we accept that the questions he asks are the right ones - questions 
relating to the procedural grounds of normative critique. In chapter four, though, I 
have argued that Habermas's attempt to locate a universal pragmatics to ground his 
normative ethical position is problematic given the assumptions it makes about the 
character of speech acts. To this degree, it is imperative that Foucault's works are 
critically explored outside of Haber mas's agenda as well as within it. Thirdly, and in 
relation to Dreyfus and Rabinow, the connection hinted at between modernity as a 
time of rupture and the ethical perspective this induces was not elaborated upon. 
This is due to the fact that they don't recognise the difference (and relation) 
between the archaeological/genealogical conception of the present, as an absolute 
limit to understanding, and the ethical/liminal present, that emerges in the later 
work via Foucault's analysis of subjectivity and desire. In this chapter I have 
sought to elaborate just this relation. 
Conclusion 
If knowledge is the codification of force into a system of propositional relations, 
power is force in relation with other forces and subjectivity is the action of force on 
itself, then what is liminality? Putting it simply, it is the action of time on force. 
Force itself must operate in time, creating new interrelations between the triad of 
power, knowledge and subjectivity. Foucault's analyses were concerned with the 
"foldings" of force in time; by looking at the effect of time on force we can 
conceive of a liminal (temporal) present. In this way we can make sense of the 
fractures of institutional time that provide the ontological conditions of freedom. 
Thus, when Rajchman argues that the form of our individuality at present, 
constructed as it is through the relations of power, knowledge and subjectivity, is 
"not a requirement of Eternity, but a concrete problem of history", he is only partly 
right. Certainly, "we as individuals" are a product of our history in a thoroughly 
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material sense. Yet, the potential for criticism of our individuality, for a critical 
stance in relation to the present, resides in the freedom contained in the glimpses of 
"eternity" apparent at times of crisis and lirninality. History is a product of eternity: 
to critically unmask the ways in which we are constituted in history is to reveal the 
"inside" of transitions at all levels of social relations. Social criticism, the art of 
speaking the truth about society, is a never-ending process of engagement and 
transgression, with the present as the (potentially permanent) exemplar of crisis. 
Foucault put it eloquently as follows: "The task of speaking the truth is an infinite 
labour; to respect it in its complexity is an obligation that no power can afford to 
short-change, unless it would impose the silence of slavery. "78 
78 Foucault, Foucault Live, p308. 
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CONCLUSION 
The argument can be summarised in two ways; firstly, as an interpretation of 
Foucault's works and secondly, as an attempt to articulate a distinctive position in 
debates surrounding the character of social criticism. 
The secondary literature on Foucault is a vast and ever growmg concern. 1 
Interpretations of his work have flourished since his death and the publication of 
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. The debate surrounding Foucault's 
"ethical turn" has reinvigorated the earlier interpretations of his genealogies of 
power/knowledge. Are the later writings, as McNay argues, a reaffirmation of 
"autonomy as a worthwhile goal of emancipatory politics"?2 Do these writings 
manifest "the free, ethical activity of thought" though continuing Foucault's 
rejection of humanism, as Bernauer suggests?3 Perhaps, as Shumway puts it, the 
last books "fall outside of [Foucault's] oeuvre".4 By interpreting Foucault's later 
works as an attempt to overcome the finitude of a genealogical conception of the 
present I have tried to chart a course through these various interpretations. 
Initially, I have argued in favour of treating the later works as part of an on-going 
project; in other words, that they represent a "break" in Foucault's project in a sense 
equivalent to the genealogical "break" from the archaeological project. Secondly, it 
is argued that Foucault's later writings do not amount to the relocation of an 
autonomous subject at the heart of his work. If this interpretation is pursued then 
Foucault's work becomes a weak version of critical theory; weak, that is, because 
the normative foundations for social criticism it implies are poorly formulated. 
1 For a recent biblography of secondary sources see, The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, pp328-
352. 
2 L. McNay, Foucault and Feminism, p197. 
3 J. Bernauer, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1990, p159. 
4 D. Shumway, Michel Foucault, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville and London, 1989, 
p155. 
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Instead, it has been argued that an alternative reading of Foucault's work, one that 
views the later writings as a continuation of anti-humanist themes, is the most 
fruitful approach (if one is to preserve anything other than "empirical insights" from 
his work). Thirdly, this implies an investigation into the character of his overall 
project. Bernauer views Foucault's project as the attempt to delineate an "ethics for 
thought". While highly insightful, Bernauer's account of ethics as the condition of 
thought-as-politics leaves the problem of the condition of ethics largely untouched; 
that is, how is an ethical intervention possible? Bernauer's response, that it demands 
a form of "ecstatic thinking", tends towards the humanism he is trying to avoid. By 
focusing on the later works as an attempt to account for a liminal present as against 
a limiting genealogical present, I have sought to explain the condition of possibility 
for ethics in Foucault's work without recourse to a transcendental strategy. The 
impact of this interpretation can be articulated as a facet of the debate regarding the 
character of social criticism. 
Five "models" of social criticism have been implicit in the preceding chapters. 
Firstly, there is social criticism as the reflection upon historical grand narratives. 
For Jameson, the task of the social critic is to demonstrate that the fragmented 
appearance of contemporary social relations can be revealed as the effect of the 
logic that underpins late-capitalism. Criticism is constituted by an "imperative to 
totalise". Only in this way is it possible to make sense of the roots of oppression 
and adequately account for the creative realisation of the self in post-capitalist 
society. Without the construction of grand historical narratives the act of criticism 
can be no more than irresponsible playfulness. 
Secondly, there is the postmodern refusal of all critical endeavours that employ 
modernist categories and concepts. The very idea of social criticism is called into 
question as one of the chief illusions of the Enlightenment project. Given the 
impossibility of discovering meta-narratives of liberation, all that remains is the 
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playful and ironic appropriation of groundless critical positions. Baudrillard's 
investigation of "the hyperreal" is a prime example of this attitude to social 
criticism. The critical act becomes equivalent to the act of parody - norms may be 
criticised as long as the critical act is suspended in quotation marks: "criticism". 
Thirdly, there is the communitarian account of social criticism as an act of self-
reflection upon substantive claims embedded in one's own community. Social 
criticism, in this sense, becomes the task of articulating a stance from within a moral 
framework as opposed to the discovery of grand narratives. As Walzer has put it, 
communitarian critics must "find a place to stand, close to but not engulfed by their 
company".5 Or as Taylor suggests, the communitarian critic must excavate the 
moral principles at the heart of the modern identity: "to show how my picture of the 
modern identity can shape our view of the moral predicament of our time".6 Both 
thinkers argue that a moral foundation can be discovered by which norms and 
institutions may be legitimated without having to place the critic in a privileged 
position "outside" of a social context. 
Fourthly, there is the attempt to delineate a normative basis for social criticism upon 
a conception of practical reason. Rather than offering substantive claims about the 
true nature of human beings (whether universalisable or context-specific), this 
project aims to outline a procedure against which the legitimacy of social norms 
may be tested. In other words, social norms and institutions can claim legitimacy to 
the extent that they would be chosen by subjects participating in a rational 
discussion. Procedural accounts of social criticism claim that they allow for the 
recognition of difference emphasised by postmodernism while not forsaking the 
critical foothold of substantivist accounts. Habermas's reconstructive critical theory 
5 M. Walzer. The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth 
CenturY, Peter Halban, London,1989, p26. 
6 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p521. 
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IS one attempt at delineating a conception of practical reason suitable for a 
procedural approach to social criticism. 
Lastly, there is the attempt to delineate the ontological conditions that make social 
criticism possible. On this account the critical act is that which suspends 
substantive and procedural claims while refusing the parodic stance of 
postmodernism. The role of the critic is to investigate each event in terms of the 
radical singularity immanent to it. There must be no trace of transcendentalism in 
the critical act; if there is then the critical act loses its effectiveness by becoming its 
own limitation. This was the lesson of Foucault's genealogy; the present assumed a 
role that had to transcend itself for the analysis to function and in becoming 
transcendent it ceased to refer to the actuality of the present. In his later works, 
though, the present became a singular event, a liminal present, and the possibility of 
delimiting the conditions of possibility for social criticism was reinstated. 
Certainly the boundaries between these different models are not clear cut and many 
of the critics examined above utilise a variety of approaches. The analytical 
distinctions, though, can be held intact. Given this, the case for the incorporation of 
F oucauldian - poststructuralist - conceptions of social criticism as a distinctive voice 
in the debate can be maintained. Thinking on a scale that runs from strong 
universalism to complete relativism, poststructuralism occupies a distinctive space 
of concerns between proceduralist and postmodern accounts of social criticism. 
Putting it more polemically, poststructuralism is not a "weak" version of Critical 
Theory nor is it a "strong" version of postmodernism. On the contrary, 
poststructuralist social criticism employs distinct conceptual categories that 
constitute an important contribution to contemporary political thought. 
Perhaps a poststructuralist ontology of social criticism is not up to the task of 
offering radical proposals for change? Perhaps it is caught in its own negativity? 
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Yet, perhaps it is the other models, in their immodesty and immaturity, which have 
led us to falsely believe that political philosophy is a grand problem-solving 
endeavour? Perhaps the role of political philosophy is to create the possibility for 
new questions to be asked and then step aside? And this is no small nor 
unimportant task. As Deleuze and Guattari have phrased it: "To think is to 
experiment, but experimentation is always that which is in the process of corning 
about - the new, remarkable, and interesting that replace the appearance of truth 
and are more demanding than it is."7 As Foucault has phrased it: "the task of 
speaking the truth is an infinite labour". 8 Poststructuralist political thought is the 
interrogation of the present utilising non-teleological and non-transcendental 
conceptual categories; it is, in other words, the never-ending subversion of the 
myriad manifestations of force that induce sedentary and complacent thought. 
7 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pIll. 
8 Foucault, Foucault Live, 308. 
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